

TOPIC GUIDE ON CONFLICT

Huma Haider

TOPIC GUIDE ON

CONFLICT

Huma Haider

About this guide

Conflict is inherent in all societies and arises when two or more groups believe their interests are incompatible. 'Conflict' is not, however, interchangeable with 'violence'. Non-violent resolution is possible when individuals and groups have trust in their governing structures, society and institutions to manage incompatible interests. Conflict becomes a problem when this trust and respective conflict management capacities are absent and conflicting parties choose instead to resort to the use of force to secure their goals.

Violent conflict is the subject of this topic guide. The guide provides an overview of key topics ranging from the causes, dynamics and impacts of conflict to options for interventions to prevent, manage and respond to conflict. It is divided into five main parts:

- Chapter 1: Understanding violent conflict
- Chapter 2: Living in conflict affected areas: focus on women, children and youth
- Chapter 3: Preventing and managing violent conflict
- Chapter 4: Recovering from violent conflict
- Chapter 5: Intervening in conflict-affected areas

The guide highlights key issues and debates for each topic covered and identifies relevant references. Clicking on the link in a document title will take the reader to a more extensive summary in the GSDRC document library, which includes a direct link to the original document. This guide will be updated on a quarterly basis with new publications and emerging issues.

This topic guide was written by Huma Haider (GSDRC). The GSDRC appreciates the contributions of Thania Paffenholz (Graduate Institute of International Relations and Development); Wafula Okumu (Institute for Security Studies); Lyndsay McLean Hilker (Social Development Direct); Marcus Lenzen (DFID) and Juliet Wattebot O'Brien (DFID). Comments, questions or documents can be sent to Huma Haider: huma@gsdrc.org

About the GSDRC

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) provides cutting-edge knowledge services on demand and online. It aims to help reduce poverty by informing policy and practice in relation to governance, conflict and social development. The GSDRC is primarily funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).

www.gsdrc.org

First published December 2009
This updated edition published January 2012
© International Development Department,
University of Birmingham

Contents

CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING VIOLENT CONFLICT

THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT	6
INTRODUCTION	6
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS	6
IDENTITY POLITICS	9
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS	11
RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS	13
CONFLICT CHARACTERISTICS, DYNAMICS AND IMPACT	17
NEW FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT	17
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND ROLE OF DIASPORA	19
MOBILISATION INTO VIOLENCE	20
CONFLICT DYNAMICS	24
IMPACT OF CONFLICT	25
CONFLICT ANALYSIS: FRAMEWORKS AND TOOLS	28
CONFLICT SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.....	31
CONFLICT SENSITIVITY: OVERVIEW, APPROACHES AND PROGRAMMING	31
CONFLICT SENSITIVE GUIDANCE.....	33
AID FOR PEACE AND PEACE AND CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT	33
CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNED	34

CHAPTER 2: LIVING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS: FOCUS ON WOMEN, CHILDREN AND YOUTH

WOMEN IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS	37
WOMEN AND CONFLICT: OVERVIEW	37
IMPACT OF VIOLENT CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND GIRLS	38
PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESSES, RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACEBUILDING	41
GENDER ANALYSIS AND GENDER-SENSITIVITY IN POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY	42
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS	44
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND CONFLICT: OVERVIEW	44
CHILD COMBATANTS, MOBILISATION AND WAR-AFFECTED YOUTH	45
DISSATISFIED YOUTH AND YOUTH BULGES	46
PARTICIPATION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN RECOVERY AND PEACEBUILDING	47

CHAPTER 3: PREVENTING AND MANAGING VIOLENT CONFLICT

PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT	49
INTRODUCTION	49
CONFLICT PREVENTION THEORY AND APPROACHES.....	50
EARLY WARNING AND EARLY RESPONSE SYSTEMS.....	52
DIRECT PREVENTION MECHANISMS.....	54
STRUCTURAL PREVENTION	57
ENDING VIOLENT CONFLICT	59
INTRODUCTION	59
CONFLICT NEGOTIATION.....	60
THIRD PARTY MEDIATION.....	65
PEACE AGREEMENTS.....	68
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION	73
NON-VIOLENCE AND LOCAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT.....	75
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS	77

CHAPTER 4: RECOVERING FROM VIOLENT CONFLICT

HUMANITARIAN AID, EARLY RECOVERY AND STABILISATION	83
INTRODUCTION	83
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT	84
EARLY RECOVERY	85
STABILISATION	87
PEACEBUILDING.....	92
INTRODUCTION	92
PEACEBUILDING MODELS.....	93
STATE-BUILDING AND PEACEBUILDING.....	97
GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING	99
SOCIOECONOMIC RECOVERY	105
RECONCILIATION, SOCIAL RENEWAL AND INCLUSIVENESS.....	113
NON-STATE ACTORS AND PEACEBUILDING	118
REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs).....	123

CHAPTER 5: INTERVENING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF INTERVENTIONS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS.....	129
PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE	131
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT: COHERENCE, COORDINATION, SEQUENCING AND FUNDING MECHANISMS	131
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.....	135
REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE	138
OTHER ACTORS: THE PRIVATE SECTOR	143
OTHER ACTORS: THE MEDIA	144

CHAPTER 1:

UNDERSTANDING

VIOLENT CONFLICT

The Causes of Conflict

INTRODUCTION	6
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS	6
IDENTITY POLITICS	9
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS	11
RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS	13

Introduction

There is no single cause of conflict. Rather, conflict is context-specific, multi-causal and multi-dimensional and can result from a combination of the following factors:

- Political and institutional factors: weak state institutions, elite power struggles and political exclusion, breakdown in social contract and corruption, identity politics
- Socioeconomic factors: inequality, exclusion and marginalisation, absence or weakening of social cohesion, poverty
- Resource and environmental factors: greed, scarcity of national resources often due to population growth leading to environmental insecurity, unjust resource exploitation

Each of these factors may constitute a cause, dynamic and/or impact of conflict. Identifying and understanding the interactions between various causes, dimensions and dynamics of conflict – and the particular contexts in which conflict arises, is essential in determining potential areas of intervention; and designing appropriate approaches and methods for conflict prevention, resolution and transformation.

The way in which a government or institution at an international or societal level addresses conflict between individuals, groups or nations can determine whether the parties to the conflict will resort to violence.

[Ohlson, T., 2008, 'Understanding Causes of War and Peace', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 133-160](#)

How are the causes of war and peace related? Is it possible to bridge the conceptual gap between causes-of-war theory and conflict resolution theory? This article puts forward a new conceptual framework to facilitate the analysis of the outbreak, conduct and resolution of armed conflict within states. This 'Triple-R' framework involves consideration of reasons, resources and resolve for engaging in violence.

Smith, D., 2004, 'Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin

[See full text](#)

Political and institutional factors

Weak state institutions

State weakness can create the conditions for violent conflict. Political institutions that are unable to manage differing group interests peacefully, to provide adequate guarantees of group

protection, or to accommodate growing demands for political participation, can fracture societies. There is a degree of consensus that there is a U-shaped relationship between levels of democracy and likelihood of violent conflict. While mature democracies are able to manage tensions peacefully through democratic inclusion, stark autocracies are able to repress violence and manage conflict through force. The most vulnerable states are those in political transition. Uncertainty and collective fears of the future, stemming from state weakness, clientelism and indiscriminate repression may result in the emergence of armed responses by marginalised groups and nationalist, ethnic or other populist ideologies.

[Mansfield, E.D. and Snyder, J., 2007, 'Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War in the Twenty-first Century', in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds., C. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, and P. All, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC, pp. 161-176](#)

Is democratisation the best way to promote peace? This research argues that the world would probably be safer if there were more mature democracies but, in the transition to democracy, countries become more aggressive and war prone. The international community should be realistic about the dangers of encouraging democratisation where the conditions are unripe. The risk of violence increases if democratic institutions are not in place when mass electoral politics are introduced.

[Lake, D. A. and Rothchild, D., 1996, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', International Security, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 41-75](#)

What causes ethnic conflict, and why does it escalate? This article argues that intense ethnic conflict is usually caused by collective fears for the future. It presents a framework for understanding the origins and management of ethnic conflict, and recommends how the international community can intervene more effectively. Three key factors contribute to the development of ethnic conflict: Information failure, when individuals or groups misrepresent or misinterpret information about other groups; Problems of credible commitment, when one group cannot credibly reassure another that it will not renege on or exploit a mutual agreement; and Security dilemmas, when one or more disputing parties has an incentive to use pre-emptive force. When these factors take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely.

Elite power struggles and political exclusion

Colonialism and liberation struggles in Africa, the Middle East and Asia have left various legacies, including divisive and militarised politics and fierce struggles for power and land. Post-liberation leaders in some countries have sustained these dynamics, retaining power through neo-patrimonial networks, state capture, militarisation and coercion. Studies have shown that in some cases, they have promoted ideologies of "Us versus Them", excluding and marginalising other groups.

The domination of access to state structures and resources by any one leader, group or political party to the exclusion of others exacerbates social divisions. It may provide incentives for excluded leaders to mobilise groups to protest and engage in violent rebellion. In contrast, inclusive elite bargains that seek to address social fragmentation and integrate a broad coalition of key elites can reduce the chances of violent rebellion.

[Van Wyk, J-A., 2007, 'Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers?', Occasional Paper Series, vol. 2, no. 1, The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes \(ACCORD\), South Africa](#)

What impact has leadership had on the development of African states? This paper analyses the multiple layers of formal and informal political leadership in post-colonial Africa. Political leaders are the primary holders, controllers and distributors of power and resources in a particular institution and/or territory. Contemporary African leaders operate in an environment constrained by colonial legacies and instability. Leadership is characteristically neo-patrimonial, featuring presidentialism, clientelism, the use of state resources and the centralisation of power.

[Lindemann, S., 2008, 'Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa', Discussion Paper, no. 15, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London](#)

Sub-Saharan Africa is the world's most conflict-intensive region. But why have some African states experienced civil war, while others have managed to maintain political stability? This paper argues that the ability of post-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa to maintain political stability depends on the ability of the ruling political parties to overcome the historical legacy of social fragmentation. Creating inclusive elite bargains can bring stability while exclusionary elite bargains give rise to trajectories of civil war.

[DFID, 2009, 'Building the State and Securing the Peace', Department for International Development \(DFID\), London](#)

How can support for state-building and peace-building be integrated? This Emerging Policy Paper outlines a strategic framework for DFID's engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, plus operational implications. DFID's integrated approach to state-building and peace-building aims primarily to promote inclusive political settlements. This facilitates the further goals of: (i) addressing causes of conflict and building resolution mechanisms; (ii) developing state survival functions; and (iii) responding to public expectations. Support across all four of these interrelated areas is necessary to help create a positive peace- and state-building dynamic.

Breakdown in social contract and corruption

A social contract is a framework of rules that governs state-society relations and the distribution of resources, rights and responsibilities in an organised society. How a government spends public revenue, regardless of whether it comes from taxes or from natural resources, is significant. If it spends it equitably on social welfare and satisfying basic needs, conflict is less likely than if it appropriates revenues for corrupt or fractional purposes. Corruption undermines public trust in government, deters domestic and foreign investment, exacerbates inequalities in wealth and increases socioeconomic grievances. Equally, the inability of states to provide basic services, including justice and security, to all its citizens reduces state legitimacy and trust in state institutions, weakening or breaking the social contract.

In some cases, ruling groups may resort to violence to prolong their rule and maintain opportunities for corruption. This can in turn provoke violent rebellion by marginalised groups. In other situations, research has found that "buying off" opposition groups and belligerents may facilitate transitions to peace.

[Murshed, S. M. and Tadjoeeddin, M. Z., 2009, 'Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict', Journal of International Development, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 87-111](#)

This article assesses two recent explanations for the onset of internal conflict: greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents. The latter argues that relative deprivation, and the grievance it produces, fuels conflict. However, this article argues that neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for the outbreak of violent conflict. Violent conflict requires institutional breakdown, or the failure of the social contract.

[Chandhoke, N., 2005, 'Of Broken Social Contracts and Ethnic Violence: The Case of Kashmir', Working Paper, no. 75, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London](#)

Are identity politics to blame for the outbreak of violence in Kashmir? This paper, based on research carried out in Srinagar, argues that this is not the case. It concludes that the outbreak of militancy has been caused by the failure of political institutions and organisations, and the violation of the social contract.

Addison, T. et al., 2008, 'Ending Violent Conflict and Building a Social Compact', Chapter 6 in Escaping Poverty Traps, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Manchester

[See full text](#)

[Le Billon, P., 2003, 'Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts', Journal of International Development, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 413 - 426](#)

What is the relationship between corruption and the outbreak, duration and termination of conflicts? Donors and analysts consider corruption a primary explanation for a whole range of development problems. Yet this study suggests that corruption is partially driven by internal processes of capital accumulation and global structural forces. Corruption may have a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, but it also forms part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflict may be engendered more by changes in the pattern of corruption than by corruption itself.

Additional resources

For discussion and resources on political and institutional factors of state fragility, see '[political and institutional factors](#)' in the [causes and characteristics of fragility](#) section of the GSDRC's fragile states guide.

Further resources on corruption can be found in the [governance programming](#) section in the peacebuilding component in this guide.

Resources on the relationship between elections and conflict can be found in the [elections in post-conflict or fragile environments](#) section of the GSDRC's political systems guide.

Identity politics

There has been ongoing debate about the role of identity in violent conflict. The 'primordialist' (or 'ancient hatreds') argument that ethnic, religious or cultural differences inevitably result in conflict has been discredited in much of the literature. In contrast, 'instrumentalist' theorists have asserted that identity is simply constructed and exploited as a means of mobilisation (see [mobilisation into violence](#) under conflict dynamics). Most recent authors argue for a middle ground: ethnic, religious or cultural identities do not condemn people to fight against each other and are usually not the main issues and reasons for conflict; however, when introduced and mobilised, religion, ethnicity and culture provide a system of beliefs and practices that can unite adherents in a community, alter their perception of others and encourage them to take collective action in the name of their group.

In situations of exclusion and discrimination, the salience of group identity can be a deciding factor in whether groups can be mobilised to violence. At the same time, cross-cutting identities and/or

weak cohesion within particular religious or ethnic groups are believed to reduce the probability that a group will be able to mobilise in an exclusionary manner.

Identity politics can be used by both dominant and marginalised group to articulate exclusion and discontent. It should not be assumed, however, that all forms of ethnic and religious politics are exclusionary or foster violence. While identity can be a discourse of power as well as of grievance, it can provide a peaceful means of inclusion and empowerment and a basis for claiming rights and citizenship.

Further discussion and resources on identity politics can be found in the [peace agreements](#) section of this guide.

[Luckham, R., Moncrieffe, J. and Harris, C., 2006, 'Understanding the Routes in and out of Political Violence: An Assessment of the Linkages Between Identity Politics, Exclusion, Inequality and Political Violence in EMAD Countries', Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

Nationality and other sub-sets of identity, including ethnicity, religion and class, clan and sub-national region are important identity markers people use to claim citizenship and empowerment. Identity politics are dynamic. They can contribute to violent or peaceful solutions. Not all forms of ethnic and religious politics are exclusionary, nor do they necessarily lead to violence. How identity politics combine within a particular context determines whether violence does or does not occur, and extremist groups that resort to violence are often small minorities within minorities and require micro-analysis of the conditions in which they operate. This paper synthesises the results of case studies of Bolivia, Peru, Tajikistan and Yemen and recommends the application of regional and country context when analysing countries prone to political violence.

[Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A., 2009, 'Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution', in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, eds., J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk, and I. W. Zartman, SAGE, London, pp. 264-280](#)

How can the religious texts, values and beliefs used to incite conflict be harnessed to promote peace-building and reconciliation? What contributions can faith-based actors make to conflict resolution? This chapter examines the ways in which religion can be used to inspire both war and peace. The revival of religiously motivated conflicts, and the increasing involvement of religious actors in resolving them, requires understanding of their dynamics.

[Cocodia, J., 2008, 'Exhuming Trends in Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation in Africa: Some Selected States', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 9-26](#)

Why are certain parts of Africa characterised by ethnic conflict while other parts remain relatively calm? This paper argues that equity, justice, literacy levels and external threats are key factors which determine the likelihood of conflict. Case studies of both conflict and cooperation situations are examined – from Tanzania, Botswana, South Africa, Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire.

[Miklian, J., 2009, 'Nepal's Terai: Constructing an Ethnic Conflict', South Asia Briefing Paper, no. 1, International Peace Research Institute \(PRIO\), Oslo](#)

Recent ethnic violence in Nepal has polarised citizens along ethnic issues that were largely unaddressed during the civil war and the subsequent peace agreement. This paper traces the history of Nepali post-war ethnic violence and the current difficulties implementing peace agreements. Reducing the risk of future armed conflict involves targeting grassroots opinion, preventing demonisation of specific ethnic groups and recognising long-standing discrimination of the Madhesi people of the Terai region.

[Melvin, N. J., 2007, 'Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency', SIPRI Policy Paper, no. 20, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm](#)

What is behind the recent return to violence in southern Thailand and how can the conflict be resolved? This paper outlines interpretations of conflict in the Patani region. These focus on historical grievances, the role of violent Islamism, modern Thai politics and the 'global war on terror'. Measures to address two longstanding sources of grievance – language and education – could help improve the situation.

For resources on the role of religion and religious actors in peacemaking, see the [direct prevention mechanisms](#) section of this guide.

Socioeconomic factors

Inequality, exclusion and marginalisation

There is increasing recognition that it is the nature of inequality, rather than the extent of inequality, that determines the likelihood of violent conflict. Research has found that inequalities that align with cultural, ethnic or religious identities ('horizontal inequalities') are more likely to result in violence. This is especially the case when there are 'multidimensional horizontal inequalities' – where culturally defined groups experience multiple forms of exclusion from political, economic, social and cultural realms. Often these forms of inequality, exclusion and marginalisation interact and compound one another: unequal access to land and natural resources, for example, may result from the lack of access to power and decision-making.

A strong sense of collective injustice, due to actual or perceived exclusion based on social or cultural identity, can increase a group's feelings of alienation from the wider society. This may lead to animosity and resentment. Over time, such tensions can foster group mobilisation and fuel violent conflict. It is not only the relatively deprived who may instigate violence, however, but also the privileged who fear losing power and benefits.

Government responses are important in determining whether dissatisfaction turns violent. If the state reacts harshly to non-violent protests, as opposed to seeking to address exclusion, then the chances of violent conflict are more likely. Exclusion and inequality as a cause of conflict may be connected to the breakdown of the social contract, discussed under [political and institutional factors](#).

[Kanbur, R., 2007, 'Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link', International Peace Academy, New York](#)

How do poverty and inequality causally interact with conflict? While there is a general view that poverty and inequality can lead to conflict, the nature of the links are less well appreciated. This paper draws out the links based on the recent economics literature and discusses their implications for policy. While inequality is a natural concomitant of economic processes, particularly those driven by the market, its implications for security emerge when unequal outcomes align with socio-political cleavages.

[Sen, A., 2008, 'Violence, Identity and Poverty', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 45, pp.5-15](#)

How do we explain the cause of violence in the world today? This article argues that approaches to explaining violence should avoid isolationist programmes that explain violence solely in terms of social inequality and deprivation, or in terms of identity and cultural factors. The coupling between

cultural identities and poverty increases the significance of inequality and can contribute to violence.

[Stewart F., Brown G.K., Langer A., 2008, 'Major Findings and Conclusions on the Relationship Between Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict', in Stewart, F. \(ed.\), 'Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies', Palgrave Macmillan](#)

What are the links between horizontal inequalities (HIs) and conflict? This chapter summarises findings from case studies plus more global analyses. Severe HIs are particularly likely to be a source of conflict when they are consistent across socioeconomic, cultural and political dimensions. While socioeconomic HIs generate fertile ground for conflict and cultural status inequalities bind groups together, political HIs provide incentives for leaders to mobilise people for rebellion.

[Human Rights in China, 2007, 'China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalisation and Rising Tensions', Minority Rights Group, London](#)

Over the past twenty-five years, China has undergone rapid social and economic change. This report argues that this transformation has exposed the Chinese government's negative policies towards minorities. Key issues preventing minorities from exercising their rights include limited political participation, inequitable development and inadequate protection of minority cultural identity.

[McCoy, D., 2008, 'Rectifying Horizontal Inequalities: Lessons from African Conflict', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 105-134](#)

How can countries emerging from conflict create sustainable peace and stability? This article argues countries must address the horizontal inequalities that cause many violent conflicts. The examples of Mali and Rwanda illustrate steps countries can take to rectify horizontal inequalities in post-conflict environments, providing long term conflict resolution.

For further discussion and resources, see the [underlying causes of conflict](#) in the GSDRC's [social exclusion](#) guide.

Poverty and conflict

Conflict and poverty are clearly linked - a disproportionate number of conflicts take place in poor countries. The direction of causality has been debated, however. Most research contends that poverty, in itself, is rarely a direct cause of conflict; yet it is evident that conflict exacerbates poverty (see [impact of conflict](#)). Most authors now contend that it is relative deprivation, rather than poverty per se, that makes violent conflict more likely. Poverty may contribute to or sustain conflict through its association with perceived injustices and forms of exclusion between groups (see [inequality, exclusion and marginalisation](#)). In some specific contexts, there is evidence that extreme poverty has provided the motivation for effective recruitment and mobilisation of the masses.

[Goodhand, J., 2001, 'Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty, Working Paper, no. 6, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Manchester](#)

What is the nature of links between conflict and poverty? What are the implications of academic debate for policy and future research? This paper provides an overview of the literature on chronic poverty and conflict. Traditionally the concepts of chronic poverty and violent conflict have been treated as separate spheres. It is argued that poverty and conflict are linked. Violent conflict is not a side issue and needs to be better understood in order to achieve development goals.

[Justino, P., 2009, 'The Impact of Armed Civil Conflict on Household Welfare and Policy Responses', HiCN Working Paper, no. 61, Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton](#)

How does armed conflict impact on households and how do they respond to and cope with it? This paper examines the direct and indirect effects of conflicts and shows that the indirect effects are channelled through markets, political institutions and social networks. Until there is more research on the fundamental processes linking armed civil conflict and household welfare, it will be difficult to develop effective policies for preventing and resolving conflicts.

Resource and environmental factors

Greed and opportunity in war

Regardless of the beliefs, ideologies and grievances involved, all armed conflicts must be funded. Such funding often comes from illicit sources and activities. Economic relations may become coercive during armed conflict and peacetime economic activities may be looted by belligerents. Illicit trade in commodities (see next section on [resource exploitation](#)) during conflicts can reinforce other causes of conflict, including state weakness and lack of accountability.

While many conflicts are clearly motivated by political or social issues, others are mainly economically motivated. Some conflicts start due to political and social motives but are prolonged due to economic motivations ('greed'), which creates disincentives for peace. In the current conflict in Columbia, for example, it is unclear whether groups continue fighting due to the original political reasons or due to the income generated from war-related illicit drug trade. These complexities have led recent authors to challenge the simplistic "greed versus grievance" framework as both elements are often found in conflict situations.

[Berdal M. and Keen D., 1997, 'Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, London, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 795-818](#)

This article analyses conflicts and peace efforts in several African, Asian and Central American countries, revealing the crucial role played by economics. The pursuit of 'rational' economic goals by conflict participants is often a major factor behind the continuation of a war that otherwise seems illogical. People at all levels of society can profit from conflict to the extent that peace seems unattractive. Or violence may offer a degree of economic security that is preferable to the uncertain prospects of peace. Conflict can only be tackled by taking into account the non-political functions of violence and the economic benefits it can bring.

[Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2000, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

Are civil wars really caused by political repression, inequality, or religious and ethnic differences? What roles do factors other than grievance play in rebellion? This paper looks at the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. Civil wars are now more common than international conflict. Of 25 armed conflicts in 2000, 23 were internal. Rebellion needs both motivation and opportunity. Political science explains conflict in terms of motive. When grievances are sufficiently acute, here is violent protest. Such grievances include inequality, oppression, religious and ethnic tensions. A much smaller literature from economic theory models rebellion as an industry that generates profit from looting. Greed, not grievance, is the driving force, and opportunity is more important than motive.

[Cramer, C. and Hanlon, J., 2006, 'Greed versus Grievance: Conjoined Twins or Discrete Drivers of Violent Conflict', Civil War, Civil Peace, Yanacopulos, H. and Hanlon, J., Open University in association with James Currey, Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio](#)

The debate within neoclassical economics on the main sources of civil war has crystallised around a simple dichotomy between 'greed' and 'grievance'. This chapter argues that it is questionable whether the 'greed versus grievance' debate is useful as a means of understanding violent conflict. These terms are difficult to separate and, moreover, it is unlikely that there can be a clear 'either/or' explanation of the causes of war.

Resource exploitation

Research has demonstrated connections between lootable resources and conflict. Control and exploitation of natural resources can be involved in all phases of the conflict cycle, contributing to: the outbreak of conflict through inequitable resource and wealth sharing; the perpetuation of conflict, through the exploitation of 'high-value' resources to finance armed forces; and the undermining of conflict resolution and peace agreements by parties that could lose access to resource revenues. Extractable resources are most likely to provoke conflict when resource exploitation becomes linked to social or political exclusion. These issues also often arise where there is a shortage of non-lootable resources and where resources are located inside the conflict zone.

[Aspinall, E., 2007, 'The Construction of Grievance', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 950-972](#)

When and under what circumstances does natural resource extraction give rise to violent conflict? This article analyses the separatist conflict in Aceh, Indonesia. It argues that natural resource exploitation promoted conflict in Aceh only because it became entangled in wider processes of identity construction and was reinterpreted back to the population by ethnic political entrepreneurs in a way that legitimated violence. Rather than any intrinsic qualities of natural resource extraction, the key factor was the presence of an appropriate identity-based collective action frame.

[Snyder, R. and Bhavnani, R., 2005, 'Diamond, Blood and Taxes: A Revenue-Centred Framework for Explaining Political Order', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 563-597](#)

Why are lootable resources such as alluvial diamonds linked to civil war in some cases and peace in others? This article suggests that to answer this question the focus must shift from rebels to rulers, to state spending and to the constraints on the rulers' ability to earn revenue. It argues that in countries rich in lootable resources, the ability of rulers to achieve political order depends on the availability of non-lootable resources, the mode of extraction of lootable resources and patterns of state spending.

Lujala, P., 2010 'The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 15-28

[See full text](#)

Ikelegbe, A., 2006, 'The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria', African and Asian Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 23-56

[See full text](#)

De Koning, R., 2008, 'Resource–conflict links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo', Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm

[See full text](#)

For discussion and resources on the 'resource curse', see the section on 'natural resources and unearned state income' in [structural and economic factors](#) under causes and characteristics of the GSDRC's fragile states guide.

For further resources on conflict economies, see 'transformation of war economies' in the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section of this guide.

Environmental insecurity and resource scarcity

Seminal work by Homer-Dixon in the 1990s argued that environmental scarcities were contributing to violent conflict in areas in the developing world. Environmental scarcities stem from environmental change and resource degradation; population pressure; and the unequal distribution of resources, such as land and water.

Environmental factors are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of conflict, but can combine with other factors to contribute to instability and violence. For example, environmental pressures may contribute to the weakening of the state – for example when the state is unable to provide food security for its citizens. Environmental shocks can also result in economic instability, especially in predominantly poorer agrarian countries. Scarcities can also result in increasing rising competition over the allocation of resources between certain economic sectors, regions or population groups. The risk of conflict may be higher if the groups disadvantaged in resource allocation are also marginalised socially, economically or politically.

Climate change is likely to increase the risk of conflict in certain regions. The consequences will be most acutely felt in poor and badly governed countries, which may find it most difficult to adapt. Climate change may also exacerbate communal conflict, most seriously affecting politically and economically marginalised groups.

[Homer-Dixon, T. F., 1994, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 5-40](#)

Could environmental scarcities cause violent conflict? This article reports on the impacts of environmental change, population growth and unequal distribution of resources. Environmental scarcities are already contributing to violent conflict in the developing world. There are early signs of an upsurge in violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity. Poor societies will be less able to protect themselves from environmental scarcities and the social crises they cause.

[Smith, D. and Vivenkananda, J., 2009, 'Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Understanding the Linkages, Shaping Effective Responses', *International Alert*, London](#)

What effect will climate change have on violent conflict? This report argues that climate change is most likely to provoke conflict in poor, badly governed countries with a recent history of violent conflict. Adaptation policies must respond to the links between climate change, state fragility and conflict, and must begin by focusing on as local a level as possible. Further, a large-scale systematic study is needed of the likely costs of adaptation. This should address the social and political dimensions as well as economic sectors.

[Smith, D. and Vivenkananda, J., 2007, 'A Climate of Conflict: The Links Between Climate Change, Peace and War', *International Alert*, London](#)

What are the likely social and human consequences of climate change? Many of the world's poorest places face a double-headed problem: climate change and violent conflict. This report finds that in fragile states the consequences of climate change can interact with existing socio-

political and economic tensions, compounding the causal tensions underlying violent conflict. It argues that conflict-sensitive climate change policies can promote peacebuilding, whilst climate-proof peacebuilding and development policies can be effective climate change adaptation policies.

[Barnett, J. and Adger, W., 2007, 'Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict', *Political Geography*, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 639-655](#)

Does climate change increase the risk of violent conflict? This paper integrates three bodies of research on the vulnerability of local places and social groups to climate change, livelihoods and violent conflict, and the role of the state in development and peacemaking. Climate change reduces access to natural resources and undermines state capacity to help people sustain livelihoods. These impacts may in certain circumstances increase the risk of violent conflict, but further investigation is needed.

Lind, J. and Sturman, K., 2002, 'Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts', African Centre for Technology Studies and Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

[See full text](#)

[Houdret, A., 2008, 'Scarce Water, Plenty of Conflicts? Local Water Conflicts and the Role of Development Cooperation' INEF Policy Brief, no. 3, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg](#)

How can water scarcity lead to conflict? How can these conflicts be avoided? This Policy Brief analyses the causes of water conflict and suggests corresponding policy options. Water allocation often reflects social, political and economic inequalities, especially in countries where water is scarce. Water management is increasingly a question of fair distribution and political legitimacy.

[UNEP, 2009, 'From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment', United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi](#)

Conflicts associated with natural resources are twice as likely to relapse into violent conflict. Yet, less than a quarter of peace negotiations for conflicts linked to natural resources have addressed resource management mechanisms. This study argues that the recognition of the contribution of environmental issues to violent conflict underscores their potential as pathways for cooperation and the consolidation of peace. Integrating environment and natural resources into peacebuilding strategies is now a security imperative.

[Aning, K. and Atta-Asamoah, A., 2011, 'Demography, Environment and Conflict in West Africa', Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana](#)

Many West African countries have had to grapple with the mutually reinforcing destabilising factors of economic down-turns, population changes (particularly 'youth bulges' and migration), and resource scarcity. This paper examines West African conflicts and argues that demographic, economic and environmental factors require greater consideration in attempts to promote peace. It finds that the political exploitation of young people has contributed to the role of the youth 'bulge' in conflict. Migration and competition for environmental resources have added to social tensions, and conflict has caused environmental damage. Recommendations include youth development interventions and greater emphasis on environmental protection in security strategies.

USAID, 2005, 'Land and Conflict Toolkit', USAID, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

Conflict Characteristics, Dynamics and Impact

NEW FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT	17
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND ROLE OF DIASPORA	19
MOBILISATION INTO VIOLENCE	20
CONFLICT DYNAMICS	24
IMPACT OF CONFLICT	25

New forms of violence and conflict

Since the end of the Cold War, many conflict analysts have highlighted the rise of new forms of violent conflict. They argue that contemporary conflicts differ in terms of scope (internal rather than inter-state); combatants (non-state actors: private armies, warlords, criminal gangs, organised communal groups and terrorist or guerrilla organisations instead of governments, professional soldiers or conscripts); methods (increased use of terror and guerrilla actions and deliberate targeting of civilians instead of combat in conventional battlefields); and models of financing (external rather than internal).

Whether the objectives of contemporary wars have changed is contested, however. While some argue that new wars are no longer about ideology and nationalism and focus instead on identity and group conflicts; others stress that group labels can only resonate if tied to a specific political project. Wars are still fought, they argue, for economic, political, ideological and geopolitical reasons. In particular, control over and access to resources is still prevalent in many violent conflicts. Both nationalism and identity can come into play as a mechanism to provide justification for unique claims of control over resources and territory to the (forced) exclusion of other groups.

In addition, many authors argue that many contemporary conflicts – even if not inter-state – have a regional or global dimension. For example, in West Africa and the Great Lakes region, internal conflicts have become interlinked to produce regional civil wars and conflict systems. Furthermore, some contemporary terrorist activities are global in their reach, with loosely linked groups fighting on many fronts simultaneously and groups moving from country to country to fight in conflicts, like the Afghan *Mujahedeen* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, and Iraq.

Along with the recent rise in terrorism, there are new pressures stemming from migration, urbanisation and ‘youth bulges’ (see [children and youth in conflict-affected areas](#)) that, combined with poor economic opportunities, seem to have resulted in a rise in urban violence. Violence against women is also on the rise during peacetime and during conflict. Rape and other forms of gender-based violence are increasingly used as instruments of war (see [women in conflict-affected areas](#)).

“New wars”

[Kaldor, M. and Luckham, R. 2001, 'Global Transformations and New Conflicts', IDS Bulletin, 32\(2\), pp. 48-59, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton](#)

This article reviews the characteristics and legacies of post-Cold War conflicts, and the steps for building democratic peace. Most modern conflicts result from a breakdown in the legitimacy of political authority; the effects of globalisation, and powerful economic incentives for dissidents to take up arms against the state. They are generally struggles for control over, or access to, state

power rather than against substantive grievances. Most current wars are also based on identity, using pre-existing cleavages (racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious) for political mobilisation. Military victories are now difficult and rare. Post-Cold War conflicts predominantly involve a wide range of global and regional actors: Major powers; international agencies; neighbouring states; diaspora groups; arms salesmen; mercenaries and criminal networks. Greater access to global and regional institutions could provide greater accountability of external actors to local populations.

[Malešević, S., 2008, 'The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts', *International Political Sociology*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 97–112](#)

Are recent wars completely different to their predecessors? What are the purposes and causes of new wars? This paper looks at sociological accounts of warfare and uncovers weaknesses in their explanation of new wars. It challenges the notion that there has been a dramatic shift in the causes and objectives of contemporary violent conflict. What has changed is reliance on technology and the social, political and ideological context in which recent wars are fought.

[Bailes, A.J.K., Krause, K. and Winkler, T. H., 2007, 'The Shifting Face of Violence', Policy Paper, no. 18, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces', Geneva](#)

How has the nature of violence changed in the post-Cold War era? What can be done to stop, or at least reduce, the potential for increased violence? This paper presents a variety of different perspectives on recent trends in conflict and security.

Urbanisation

[Beall, J., 2007, 'Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century', Working Paper no. 9, Crisis States Research Centre, London](#)

What impact do acts of terror have on cities in the global South? This paper examines the largely negative implications of terrorist activities for development and the potential of cities for propelling reconstruction and peacebuilding. While specific challenges faced by cities in the global South cannot be under-estimated, urban terrorism is breaking down any sense of a rigid binary between the 'developed' and 'developing' worlds. The 'them' and 'us' attitude is misleading and damaging to both development cooperation and global security.

Sommers, M., 2003, 'Urbanisation, War and Africa's Youth at Risk: Towards Understanding and Addressing Future Challenges', Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) Activity, USAID, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

Radicalisation and Terrorism

[Brynjar, L. and Skjølberg, K., 2004, 'Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature', FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Kjeller](#)

Why are some societies more exposed to terrorism than others? What are the common theories and hypotheses concerning the causes of terrorism? This paper surveys theories on the causes of terrorism, as well as those for explaining terrorism on an international or world system level of analysis.

Okumu, W. and Botha, A. (eds.), 2006, 'Understanding Terrorism: In Search for an African Voice', Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

[See full text](#)

[European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008, 'Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism' Submitted to the European Commission](#)

Understanding the origins of violent radicalisation requires understanding that terrorist groups consist of different types of disaffected individuals who undergo different paths of radicalisation. This report analyses empirical facts on violent radicalisation, recent academic literature and the link between external conflicts and violent radicalisation. More research on individuals who join terrorist groups, terrorist recruitment, indoctrination and training, and types and development of current radicalisation processes, would inform future state response strategies.

Transnational politics and role of diaspora

The role that diasporas can play in fuelling conflict has received increasing attention in recent years. The traditional focus has been on the role that remittances play in funding violent conflicts. Yet, diasporas also play a key political role in conflict in their countries of origin and can reinforce, exacerbate and prolong violent conflict.

Diaspora groups, and group members, cannot be treated uniformly, however. Groups evolve distinctly and adopt varying outlooks on homeland politics, different levels of involvement, strategies and methods of recruitment, mobilisation and participation. In general, diaspora groups have the potential to contribute to conflict escalation as well as to peace processes. They may also change their positions over time. An understanding of such transnational politics is essential in conflict analysis.

Ethnic groups often span international borders. Recent research has found that the existence of transnational ties can increase the risk of conflict, since cross-border groups can be difficult for national governments to control.

[Horst, C., 2008, 'The Transnational Political Engagements of Refugees: Remittance Sending Practices Amongst Somalis in Norway', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 317-339](#)

How do diaspora groups seek to influence political developments in their home countries? What can be learned from the engagement of Somalis living in Norway with conflict and reconciliation processes in the Somali territories? This article shows that the Norwegian Somali diaspora engages primarily on a sub-national level – through clan relationships rather than through 'state' entities. Diaspora groups promote conflict and peace, and may promote both simultaneously. Their substantial remittance flows can alter the local balance of economic, political and military power.

[Lyons, T., 2007, 'Conflict-generated Diasporas and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 529-549](#)

How can diaspora groups created by conflict contribute to either increased polarisation or new opportunities for peace in the homeland? This article explores ways in which conflict-generated diaspora groups link processes of globalisation and transnational migration to homeland politics and conflicts. The case of the Ethiopian diaspora in North America illustrates how recent political developments were shaped by this diaspora and points to broader patterns of linkages among diasporas and homeland processes.

[Fair, C., 2005, 'Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 11, pp. 125-156](#)

How are diasporas involved in ethnic conflict in their homelands? This paper examines the role of diasporas in north India's Punjab insurgency and Sri Lanka's Tamil insurgency. Both Sikhs and

Tamils have mobilised financial, diplomatic, social and religious support. But while the Sikh diaspora has never developed a sophisticated over-arching structure, the Tamils have created an infrastructure with considerable global scope and strategy.

Cederman, L., Girardin, L. and Gleditsch, K.S., 2009, 'Ethnonationalist Triads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars', *World Politics*, Volume 61, Number 3, pp. 403-437

[See full text](#)

Although, research has generally focused on the role diaspora groups can have in fuelling violence, members of the diaspora can also be proponents of non-violent, positive social change. They play an important role in peace processes and post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding.

For discussion and resources on the role of diasporas in peacebuilding, see the diaspora section in [non-state actors and peacebuilding](#) in this guide.

Mobilisation into violence

Processes of mobilisation

People or groups do not haphazardly fight each other, even if stark inequalities or other grievances prevail in a society; rather, they need to be mobilised. An understanding of these processes of mobilisation is critical to understanding and preventing violent conflict.

Research has demonstrated that some form of ideology or legitimising narrative is usually required to mobilise people into collective action – including of a violent nature. Many authors argue that identity-based ideologies are particularly effective: it is easier for leaders to mobilise followers based on ethnicity or religion, as targets are more easily identifiable; loyalties are more fixed and unambiguous; and (in the case religion in particular) there are often ready-made networks that can be used for mass recruitment for war efforts. Others stress, however, that identities are socially constructed (see section on [identity politics](#)) and that processes of ethnic or religious mobilisation are similar to those in other types of conflict, such as class conflicts. Most authors agree, however, that to be effective, legitimising ideologies must resonate with existing narratives in a society. For example, in Rwanda, research has found that mobilisation required the existence of a collective memory among the Hutu population of a history of oppression at the hands of the Tutsi population, which was then utilised and distorted in the genocidal propaganda.

[Kalyvas, S. N, 2008, 'Ethnic Defection in Civil War', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 41, no. 8, pp. 1043-1068](#)

How common is ethnic defection during civil war? This study examines the relationship between ethnic identity and civil war and points to instances of fluidity in the expression of ethnic identities within civil war. It argues that ethnic defection is best predicted by the extent of territorial control exercised by the main political actors and the level of prior insurgent violence. Ethnic defection is a function of the resources available to political actors. It is important therefore to analyse the internal dynamics of civil wars.

[McDoom, O., 2005, 'Rwanda's Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide', *Working Paper*, no. 77, *Crisis States Research Centre*, London School of Economics and Political Science, London](#)

The theory that state influence alone can trigger genocide is an insufficient explanation of the 1994 genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda. This paper reports on a research project that

examines the question of why so many ordinary Hutus participated in the genocide. The bottom-up factor of a Hutu mindset of historic grievances against Tutsis was a necessary pre-condition for genocide of this scale and execution to occur.

Eck, K., 2009, 'From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilisation and Conflict Intensification', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 53, no. 2, pp 369 – 388

[See full text](#)

[Harpviken, K. B. and Røislien, H. E., 2008, 'Faithful Brokers? Potentials and Pitfalls of Religion in Peacemaking', *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 351-373](#)

What potential do religious actors have for acting as constructive peacemakers? How does the fundamental identity of the peace broker affect the chances of success? This article examines the role of religious actors in peacemaking. Three facets of religion – norms, identity, and organisation – are analysed. Each may feed into the emergence or escalation of conflict, and each is in itself transformed through exposure to armed conflict. Similarly, each facet forms part of the peacemaking potential of religious actors. Religious brokers may be of three distinct types: the 'liaison', the 'coordinator', and the 'representative'. Religious actors should not be assumed to have inherent peacemaking capability, but religion is an integral dimension of most attempts to foster peace and must not be neglected.

For additional discussion and resources on ethno-religious mobilisation, see [identity politics](#) under causes of conflict.

For discussion and resources on the role of religious actors in peacemaking and peacebuilding, see 'religious peacemaking' in [direct prevention mechanisms](#) and 'religious actors' in [non-state actors and peacebuilding](#).

Micro-dynamics of armed groups

Greater attention has been paid in recent years to micro-level analysis of violent conflict, in particular: why individuals decide to fight, incentive structures, how armed groups are formed and how they function. While such research can be challenging and time-consuming, an understanding of these motivations and micro-dynamics is critical in designing strategies to deter individual and group participation in violence and to influence conflict management and peace processes with armed groups.

On an individual level, recent research on participation in civil war (based on surveys of fighters in Sierra Leone) finds that socioeconomic grievances, the expectation of material incentives and personal safety, and social pressures linked to family and community, are all important motivations. Involuntary participation – the abduction or coercion into service - is also a critical issue. It is important to recognise that the determinants of individual participation and mobilisation are dynamic and vary over time. It is especially challenging for armed groups to motivate people to participate when the risks are high and returns uncertain.

On a group level, the development of armed groups often relies on pre-existing structures and institutional settings. Recent research on the formation of armed groups identifies three key mechanisms through which such groups come into existence: the resort to armed action by opposition that has been violently repressed by government forces; resort to armed action by individuals who feel excluded from neo-patrimonial networks organise; the evolution of state-supported irregular forces into free actors. These differently formed groups vary in their legitimacy

and their ability to attract and sustain members and popular support, with the first type of formation having the most legitimacy and stability.

[Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J. M., 2008, 'Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 436-455](#)

Why do individuals choose to participate in civil war? Why do some individuals fight against the government while others defend the status quo? This study tests the three major theories relating to participation using testimony from ex-combatants who participated in Sierra Leone's civil war. The results indicate the relevance of all three theories: grievance, selective incentives, and social sanctions, directing attention to the interaction between them. Factors such as poverty, a lack of access to education, and political alienation prove to be important in determining participation but the evidence suggests that they may indicate a general susceptibility to engage in violence or a greater vulnerability to political manipulation by elites rather than political grievances.

[Schlichte K., 2009, 'With the State against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups ', *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 246 – 264](#)

How do armed groups develop? This article investigates the formation of armed groups using the concept of figuration, which emphasises the interdependence of individuals. There are three main ways by which armed groups come into being: in response to violent repression, through exclusion from the ruling class and when government-created informal armed forces become free from state control. These mechanisms provide insights into the conditions under which armed groups are likely to form and whether they become institutionalised.

[Kalyvas, S.N., 2008, 'Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research Program: The Microdynamics of Civil War', in *Order, Conflict, Violence*, eds. S. N. Kalyvas, I. Shapiro and T. Masoud, Cambridge University, Cambridge, pp. 397-421](#)

How can micro-level research on the dynamics of civil war be improved? This chapter analyses micro-level studies of civil war, identifying a mismatch between their micro-level empirical focus and their macro-level conceptual and theoretical focus. This mismatch leads to difficulties that introduce bias: problematic proxies resulting from concept conflation, observational equivalence, endogeneity, over-aggregated variables, and the omission of significant variables. Engaging with cases, careful and detailed collection of fine-grained data, and thorough theorisation are therefore needed.

Social capital and social fragmentation

Social capital refers to the norms, values and institutions that govern social relations and bond communities together, as well as the bridges between communal groups and the state. Research has found that the degree of state responsiveness (vertical social capital) and the extent to which cross-cutting networks of relations among diverse communal groups exist (horizontal social capital) can determine the likelihood of violent conflict. High levels of social capital indicate a more cohesive society with inclusive mechanisms that can mediate conflicts and prevent violence. Associational forms of engagement that cut across identity groups, such as civic networks, trade unions, agricultural cooperatives and professional associations, can bridge communities.

While social capital can be constructive and support social cohesion and the mitigation of conflict, it can also be perverted and used to hasten social fragmentation and resort to violence. When there is a climate of tension in societies, it is highly likely that associations are separated by conflicting groups whereby each group has, for example, their own student association or teacher union. This can foster radicalisation of group identities. The absence of cross-cutting groups facilitates the spread of divisive rumours, which can lead to violence. The genocide in Rwanda was

preceded by the disappearance of cross-cutting associations and collapse of social capital between groups, combined with the strengthening of ties and social capital within groups.

[Colletta, N. J. and Cullen, M. L., 2000, 'The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda', World Bank, Washington DC](#)

What is the interaction between social capital, social cohesion and violent conflict? How can governments and international actors foster the socially cohesive relations necessary for conflict prevention, rehabilitation and reconciliation? This report uses data from two communities in Cambodia and Rwanda, in high and low intensity conflict areas. It is argued that the higher state responsiveness and cross cutting network relations intersect, the more likely society will have the inclusion and cohesiveness necessary to mediate conflict and prevent violence.

[Pinchotti, S. and Verwimp, P., 2007, 'Social Capital and the Rwandan Genocide: A Micro-Level Analysis' Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton](#)

What motivates people to kill their neighbours, friends and family members? Can we understand when genocide will happen and prevent it from recurring? This paper is a micro-level analysis of case studies in the remote cellules of Akatwa and Nyagasera. Learning to observe and predict shifts in social capital could serve as a way to monitor potential outbreaks of mass violence or genocide. Rwanda needs to reach a balance of strong horizontal associations and decentralized vertical associations.

Social-psychological elements – humiliation and collective fears

The role of social-psychological factors in mobilisation has been gaining attention in international relations and conflict literature. These perspectives understand conflict as a process driven by collective needs and fears. In the absence of mutual reassurances, parties to the conflict begin to process information in a way that confirms negative images and ignores disconfirming evidence. This exacerbates fears and results in conflict escalation.

Humiliation is another emotion that has the potential to mobilise. For example, research has found that humiliation, in particular public humiliation, and feelings of betrayal have strong resonance in Arab culture. They are connected to shame and loss of dignity, both of which are considered to be painful emotions, warranting revenge. These discourses have increasingly been adopted by transnational militant Islamists and have been successful in mobilising recruits to terrorist activities, in order to avenge humiliation, in a region that had traditionally been highly secular.

[Kelman, H. C., 2009, 'A Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Analysis and Resolution', in Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, eds., D. J. D. Sandole, et al., Oxon and New York, pp. 171-183](#)

How can social-psychological theory and research inform the analysis and resolution of international conflict? This chapter outlines psychological processes that promote the escalation and perpetuation of conflict. A conflict relationship generates images and norms that entrench conflict and create barriers to change. Conflict resolution work must therefore identify possibilities and conditions for change and overcome resistance to change.

[Fattah, K. and Fierke, K. M., 2009, 'A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 67-93](#)

What role does emotion play in political violence in the Middle East? Why are discourses of humiliation so pervasive in the region? This article explores why humiliation provides such a powerful motivation for political violence. Both militant Islamists and the United States, through

its War on Terror, have exacerbated the sense of humiliation in the region. The principle of human dignity needs to be used to rethink the international approach to the Middle East.

For discussion and resources on the role of media in mobilisation, see the section on [the media](#) under peace and conflict architecture in this guide.

Conflict dynamics

Escalation and sustainability

Conflict escalation can be defined as an increase in the magnitude of disagreements, hostilities or violence (Shale 2006). Many conflict theorists find that the likelihood of conflict escalation depends on the way the parties involved react in response to others. Where parties or institutions do not manage conflict well and react with force, conflict can escalate. In Zimbabwe, for example, the violence meted out during Operation Murambatsvina escalated the political conflict, polarising communities and rupturing relationships. Such fissures and hostilities can be a cause of future conflict.

Such dynamics contribute to the sustainability of conflict. The literature on 'greed' (see [resource and environmental factors](#) under causes of conflict) introduced the notion that the original causes of conflict may not be the same factors that sustain war. It is thus important to adopt a chronological, contextual and dynamic approach when engaging in causal analysis in order to understand how the conflict has developed over time.

[Shale, V., 2006, 'Operation Murambatsvina: The Dynamics and Escalation of Zimbabwean Intra-state Conflict', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 107-126](#)

Why does Zimbabwe remain trapped in a cycle of political violence and economic crisis? This article argues that Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina of 2005 was a purge directed against opposition supporters, and an example of Pruitt and Rubin's 'structural change' model of conflict escalation. The human cost of violence and impoverishment in Zimbabwe includes a disturbing trend of polarisation, mistrust and hostility within the community.

[Maitre, B., 2009, 'What Sustains 'Internal Wars'? The Dynamics of Violent Conflict and State Weakness in Sudan', Third World Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 53-68](#)

Are the factors that start internal wars the same as the factors that sustain them? This paper argues that the international community has been misguided in focusing on determining the causalities of internal wars and should instead focus on the contextual conditions and dynamic relationships that allow them to continue. Using the conflicts in Sudan as a case study, the paper concludes that time alters the reasons why internal wars are fought, and argues that the international community is not well placed to intervene.

Feasibility and availability of arms

Recent analysis has also stressed 'feasibility' as a key factor in explaining where and when conflict can occur. Many authors stress, for example, that the easy availability of small arms and light weapons has rendered resort to violence less costly and more likely.

[Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D., 2006, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War', CSAE Working Paper Series, no. 10, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford](#)

A key distinction among theories of civil war is between those that are built upon motivation and those that are built upon feasibility. This article explores this distinction by analysing a comprehensive global sample of civil wars between 1965 and 2004. The results substantiate the 'feasibility hypothesis' which contends that where civil war is feasible, it will occur without reference to motivation.

An updated version of this paper is available [here](#).

[IANSA, Amnesty International, and Oxfam, 2006, 'Arms without Borders: Why a Globalised Trade Needs Global Controls: Lack of Responsibility in the Ownership and Production of the Global Arms Industry', Oxfam](#)

The global arms trade will soon reach record levels, yet as weapons production has become more globalised, national regulations are insufficient to prevent unlawful use. What needs to be done to ensure that the burgeoning trade in arms is properly contained? This report examines how the proliferation of improperly controlled weapons has serious negative implications for conflict resolution, human rights and development. It argues that there is an urgent need for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty that will create minimum global standards for arms transfers.

[Ojakorotu, V. and Okeke-Uzodike, U., 2006, 'Oil, Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 85-106](#)

What fuels the present-day oil violence in the Niger Delta? This paper analyses the main sources of conflict, in particular a thriving small arms trade. Weapons smuggled through Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and Cameroon continue to supply ethnic militias. While addressing arms trafficking through border control can reduce the escalation of conflict, a key issue is inequity in Nigerian federalism. Adequate representation of minority interests needs to be addressed as an integral part of the project to create a true democracy, good governance, an enhanced position for ethnic minorities and transparent fiscal control.

Impact of conflict

Violent conflict has devastating effects across a range of areas, many of which have lasting impacts.

Human toll: Violent conflict results in loss of life, disablement, rape and sexual violence, displacement and forced migration, the spread of disease and famine. Loss of life continues into the future with the spread of HIV/AIDS and the presence of landmines.

Social systems: Armed conflicts disrupt and destroy families and community life. Family systems are undermined through the deliberate targeting of women, the recruitment of children to join ranks of rebel groups, massive displacements, and losses of life and property.

Political governance: Violent conflict impacts negatively on the rule of law, state capacity, and democratic political processes. Corruption and criminality often take root, and the influence of military actors rises. Politically excluded groups are increasingly marginalised and targeted.

Socioeconomic costs: Infrastructure, capital stock and household assets are destroyed during conflict, investment declines, and household and national incomes drop. The loss of livelihoods, due in part to the destruction of infrastructure and natural resources, and lack of employment opportunities coincides with a weakened social safety net and a decline in the capacity of the state to provide services, such as health and education. Socioeconomic indicators demonstrate that

impacts of conflict include declining literacy, a drop in life expectancy and increased infant mortality. The collapse of education systems and the loss of educated populations (due to death or displacement) have negative long-term implications for human capital and economic productivity.

The development of war economies, trade in illicit goods and a focus on informal sectors to cope with the weakening of the formal sector, can distort economic production and growth. Resource exploitation, the depletion of natural resources and other forms of environmental degradation can have long-term adverse effects for sustainable development.

Social capital: The processes and impact of violent conflict weakens and in some cases destroys the social fabric of societies. Conflict disrupts social relations and can result in social dislocation, and a decline in interpersonal and communal group trust. While social capital within a group may be strengthened, social capital across groups is weakened by the destruction of the norms and values that underlie cooperation.

Social-psychological: Experiencing violent conflict can be extremely traumatic. Many war-affected persons suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome, which contributes to poor mental and physical health, reduced quality of life, and in some cases, greater difficulties in work, education and family life - and increased violent behaviour. Women who have endured sexual violence can suffer rejection in their own families and communities. Youth and children are at particular risk: research has shown that experiencing violence at an early age results in higher risk of perpetuating violence. Feelings of humiliation and betrayal, and the desire for revenge, can also perpetuate a cycle of violence in which 'underlings' rise to power, engage in extreme acts, inflicting indignities on those who had done the same to them.

Legacy of large-scale human rights abuses: Violent conflict results from and produces a breakdown in law and order and the perpetration of human rights abuses on a mass scale – by government, non-state actors, and in the case of transnational conflicts, external actors. Addressing this legacy and finding the appropriate methods to come to terms with it is a key challenge in conflict-affected societies. Left unaddressed, there is the risk that grievances will persist and societies will remain locked in conflict dynamics.

Regional/global impact: Violent conflict has various effects in neighbouring countries and beyond as arms, drugs, conflict resources and refugees spill over the border. Mass refugee migration in particular can place a large economic burden on host countries. Neighbouring countries may also suffer from damage to cross-border infrastructure and the environmental impacts of conflict.

[UNDP, 2008, 'Legacies of Armed Conflict', Chapter 2 in Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery \(BCPR\), UNDP, New York, pp. 14-47](#)

What are the economic legacies of armed conflict? How should policymakers approach these legacies in recovery strategies? This chapter argues that post-conflict countries are not blank slates on which new economic and social systems can be built. For a recovery strategy to work, it must acknowledge the legacies of armed conflict and consolidate those that contribute towards peace and stability.

[Sexsmith, K., 2009, 'Violent Conflict and Social Transformation: An Institutionalist Approach to the Role of Informal Economic Networks' European Journal of Development Research, vol. 21 no. 1, pp. 81-94](#)

What is the role of informal economic networks in violent conflict? This article finds that in Somalia customary institutions of trust were preserved during conflict and contributed to economic coordination and conflict mediation. In Sierra Leone, patrimonial networks led to social

collapse. Thus, social transformations arising from conflict can be productive or destructive, depending on the institutions embedded in social networks. The historical relationship of informal networks to the state shapes the institutional content of these networks.

[Orero, M. et al, 2007, 'The Impact of Conflict on the Intergenerational Transmission of Chronic Poverty', Working Paper, no. 71, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Manchester](#)

What impact does conflict have on the intergenerational transmission of chronic poverty? This paper reviews conflict and poverty literature, and finds that conflict is likely a contributory factor to the intergenerational transmission of chronic poverty. It cautions, however, that the causal link is difficult to demonstrate and requires further research based on longitudinal approaches to better map the relationship between conflict and poverty.

[Justino, P., 2009, 'The Impact of Armed Civil Conflict on Household Welfare and Policy Responses', HiCN Working Paper, no. 61, Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton](#)

How does armed conflict impact on households and how do they respond to and cope with it? This paper examines the direct and indirect effects of conflicts and shows that the indirect effects are channelled through markets, political institutions and social networks. Until there is more research on the fundamental processes linking armed civil conflict and household welfare, it will be difficult to develop effective policies for preventing and resolving conflicts.

Additional resources

For discussion and resources on the impact of conflict on women and girls, see the [women in conflict-affected areas](#) section of this guide.

For discussion and resources on the impact of conflict on social exclusion, see the [underlying causes of conflict](#) section of the GSDRC's social exclusion guide.

For discussion and resources on addressing the legacy of large-scale human rights abuses, see the [transitional justice](#) section of the GSDRC's [justice](#) guide.

Conflict Analysis: Frameworks and Tools

Conflict analysis is an essential yet tremendously challenging process. The aim is to gain a comprehensive and shared understanding of potential or ongoing violent conflicts. This usually involves an assessment of key conflict factors (sources of tension and root causes of conflict, including linkages and synergies), actors (interests, potential spoilers, capacities for violence and peace, incentives required to promote peace), and dynamics (triggers for violence, local capacities for peaceful and constructive conflict management, likely future scenarios). Analysis is undertaken at local, national, regional and international levels.

Conflict analysis should inform decision-making with the aim of improving the effectiveness of conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding interventions, including the effectiveness of development and humanitarian assistance (see the following section on [conflict sensitive development](#)). It is important to emphasise that conflict analysis is an ongoing process and not a static, one-off exercise. As such, process design is very important.

The following are a selection of conflict analysis frameworks and tools adopted by international organisations, donor agencies and non-governmental organisations. While there are a variety of analytical frameworks and tools, many follow a similar logic. It is beneficial to find one most suited to a particular need or situation and to further adapt it, rather than understanding them as rigid frameworks.

United Nations

[UNDG/ECHA, 2004, 'Interagency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations', UNDG/ECHA](#)

United Nations (UN) post-conflict responses should be based on standardised inter-agency analyses to help overcome structures that lead to violent conflict and to promote integrated peace. This report outlines analytical components necessary to understand conflict causes and dynamics that support peace efforts in a transition situation. Application of such an analytical framework would help construct subsequent UN programming that incorporates context-specific factors and supports the achievement of lasting peace.

UNDP, 2003, 'Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA)', Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme, New York
[See full text](#)

World Bank

[Wam, P. and Sardesai, S. 2005 'The Conflict Analysis Framework', Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Team \(CPR\), The World Bank, Washington DC](#)

Conflict sensitive approaches to development assistance can help prevent the onset, exacerbation or resurgence of violent conflict. The World Bank's Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) is a tool to assess the causes and consequences of conflict, determine a country's resilience to conflict, and developing appropriate conflict sensitive approaches to programming. This paper outlines the stages of the CAF, examining when and how it should be applied.

[World Bank, 2006, 'Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organisational Challenges?', Report No. 36446-GLB, 21 June 2006, The World Bank, Washington DC](#)

Understanding the social and economic factors that affect conflict improves the effectiveness of development strategies and programmes. This paper examines the process of conducting conflict analyses and recommends how they should be organised, applied and disseminated. Creating buy-in for the analysis by country teams, use of local partners and dissemination of analysis findings are key to executing an effective conflict analysis.

Bilateral donors

[Goodhand, J., Vaux, T., and Walker, R., 2002, 'Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes', Department for International Development \(DFID\), London](#)

These guidance notes explain the principles and methodology of conducting effective strategic conflict analyses (SCAs). DFID's SCAs have three key aims: to map out causes and trends in a conflict; analysis of international responses to it; and development of future policy options. An abridged example is given as an appendix to the guide, along with sources of further information. SCAs should include international factors, risks and impacts of development interventions, and suggestions for making policies more conflict-sensitive. Flexibility is key: adapt SCAs to the end user's needs; be aware of the nature and phase of conflict; identify particular actors and triggers which could cause latent tensions to erupt into conflict.

[US Agency for International Development, 2004, 'Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program Development, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation', United States Agency for International Development \(USAID\), Washington, D.C.](#)

What can international donors do to help prevent conflict? This paper presents a conflict assessment framework. It is designed to help USAID Missions gain a deeper understanding of the causes of conflict and think about how to use development assistance more strategically in order to address them. It emphasises the interactions between the motives, means and opportunities for conflict, and recommends that donors take an integrated approach.

SIDA, 2006, 'Manual for Conflict Analysis', Division for Peace and Security through Development Cooperation, Methods Document, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Stockholm

[See full text](#)

Leonhardt, M., 2002, 'Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Implementation', GTZ

[See full text](#)

NGOs

[FEWER, International Alert, and Saferworld, 2004, 'Chapter 2: Conflict Analysis', Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack, London](#)

What is conflict analysis and why is it important? This chapter places conflict analysis at the foundation of a conflict sensitive approach. Without understanding the context in which interventions are situated, organisations implementing them may unintentionally fuel conflict. While conflicts are too complex for a single process to do them justice, key features of analysis are conflict profile, causes, actors and dynamics.

Specht, I., 2008, 'Conflict Analysis: Practical tool to Analyse Conflict in Order to Prioritise and Strategise Conflict Transformation Programmes', ICCO, Kirk in Action, and Transitional International

[See full text](#)

Gender mainstreaming

Anderlini, S. N., 2006, 'Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Analysis: Issues and Recommendations', Social Development Papers, no. 33, World Bank, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

For additional resources on gender in conflict analysis, see [gender analysis and gender-sensitivity in post-conflict recovery](#) in this guide.

Conflict Sensitive Development

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY: OVERVIEW, APPROACHES AND PROGRAMMING	31
CONFLICT SENSITIVE GUIDANCE.....	33
AID FOR PEACE AND PEACE AND CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT	33
CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNED	34

There has been greater focus in recent years on the links between conflict, peace, security and development. Not only is development seen as an integral aspect of security, conflict resolution, management and peacebuilding; but there is also recognition that humanitarian and development policies and activities can cause harm. The recent emphasis on conflict sensitive development largely emerged as a result of the stark realisation after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that prior development aid had reinforced the politics of exclusion and repression in the country.

Conflict sensitivity is an overall term to describe different efforts, methods and tools for working in conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas, with the aim of (1.) reducing the risk that aid unintentionally contributes to the escalation or sustainability of violent conflict ('Do no harm'); and (2.) contributing to peacebuilding. It involves thorough analysis of the context in which an intervention takes place; and of the interaction between the context, the intervention, and conflict or peace dynamics. Programming should be based closely on this analysis, and should adapt in response to regular monitoring and evaluation.

Conflict and peace academics and practitioners emphasise that 'avoiding harm' and 'doing some good' does not automatically contribute to peacebuilding. In order to impact on peacebuilding, it is necessary to link conflict sensitive programming with a broader national and international peace strategy; and to collaborate with relevant actors outside the field of development, including political and diplomatic actors. Collaboration may also need to extend to parties to the conflict, including armed non-state actors (see 'negotiating with non-state armed groups' in [conflict negotiation](#)).

It is also necessary to recognise that post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding strategies are not inherently pro-peace. Democratisation planning and processes for example, which form part of many post-conflict international interventions, require a comprehensive understanding of existing indigenous governance norms and approaches. This can help to ensure that interventions do not entrench existing inequitable and unjust power structures, or entrench identities in a way that produces tensions (see 'power sharing' in [peace agreements](#) and [governance programming](#) in the peacebuilding component of this guide).

Conflict sensitivity: overview, approaches and programming

[Paffenholz, T., 2009, 'Understanding the Conflict-Development Nexus and the Contribution of Development Cooperation to Peacebuilding', in Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, eds., D. J. D. Sandole, S. Byrne, I. Sandole-Staroste, and J. Senehi, Routledge, Oxon and New York, pp. 272-285](#)

How does development cooperation contribute to peacebuilding? This chapter examines connections between conflict, security, peace and development. It summarises: (a) research debates about the causes of armed conflict; (b) discourse in the development community on

conflict and peace and (c) the influence of these debates and discourses on development cooperation in conflict-affected contexts. Development policies should be an integral part of the peacebuilding agenda. But transfer from research to policy has largely ignored the complexity of development in conflict situations and the contribution of development to peacebuilding.

[Goodhand, J., 2006, 'Working "in" and "on" War', in Civil War, Civil Peace, eds. H. Yanacopulos, and J. Hanlon, Open University in association with James Currey, Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio](#)

Individuals working 'in' or 'on' war cannot be considered as neutral actors because their decisions have an impact on war itself. This chapter argues that those who intervene in conflict situations need to think of themselves less as project managers and more as change agents who understand and influence the conflict. Interveners need to look beyond the traditional project-based approaches and engender a strategic shift from 'development as delivery' to 'development as leverage'.

[Anderson, M., 1999, 'Reflecting on the Role of Aid' in Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War, Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, pp. 145-147.](#)

How does the micro level of warfare relate to the macro level? What is the appropriate relationship between outsiders and insiders in conflict areas? This chapter reflects on the experiences of aid workers in order to understand the challenges faced by development agencies in conflict settings. International agencies need to find a way of insisting that appropriate political actions are taken, while remaining non-political in providing aid.

[Barbolet, A., Goldwyn, R., Groenewald, H., and Sherriff, A., 2005, 'The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

Should conflict-sensitivity just be about tools and methodologies? How can the concept be applied more broadly? This paper explores new directions in conflict sensitivity. Conflict sensitivity is an investment in learning about the conflict context and a responsibility to act on that learning. It has relevance beyond traditional humanitarian and development sectors, to government, the private sector and peacebuilding. Whilst operational guidance is an important aspect of conflict sensitivity, it should not come in the form of a 'one-size-fits all' approach. A more encompassing approach - that goes beyond tools and methodologies - is needed.

SDC, 2006, 'Conflict Sensitive Programme Management', COPRET Team, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Bern

[See full text](#)

[Paffenholz, T., 2005, 'Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in International Cooperation: An Introductory Overview', International Politics and Society, issue no. 4, pp. 63-82](#)

Peace and conflict sensitivity has successfully entered the mainstreaming agenda of development donors and agencies and there has been a tremendous institutionalisation and conceptualisation of the topic. In practical terms however, a co-ordinated system for peace and conflict sensitive aid implementation remains a long way off. This article explores the gap between rhetoric and practice and identifies some of the challenges ahead.

Conflict sensitive guidance

FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld have pioneered approaches to conflict sensitivity, and have developed a pack for external agencies. This pack covers theory and principles, as well as practical guidance on conflict sensitivity planning and implementation.

[FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, 'Applying Conflict Sensitivity at Project and Programme Level', Chapter 3 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive Approaches, FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld, London](#)

How does designing and implementing projects and programmes in areas of existing or threatened conflict differ from more straightforward development contexts? This chapter of a manual by a consortium of six organisations provides tools for incorporating conflict-sensitivity into project and programme planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

[FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, 'Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Sectoral Approaches', Chapter 4 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive Approaches, FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld, London](#)

What is meant by sectoral approaches and how can conflict sensitivity be incorporated into their development and implementation? This chapter argues that assistance to a country or sector will have an impact (either positive or negative) on conflict risks and dynamics particularly in countries which are affected by, or at risk of, violent conflict. It is therefore imperative that this assistance be implemented in a conflict-sensitive way.

[FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, 'Institutional Capacity-building for Conflict Sensitivity', Chapter 5 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive Approaches, FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld, London](#)

How can practitioners begin the process of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into an organisation? All practitioners at all levels are both impacted by, and can impact, the development of their institution's capacity for conflict sensitivity. This chapter explores how to mainstream conflict sensitivity in a systemic way, using a six-step framework.

Other sections of the resource pack are available [online](#).

Aid for peace and peace and conflict impact assessment

'Do no harm' and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) are tools that are used to evaluate the impact of external activities in the context of conflict, in terms of minimising harm and promoting peacebuilding. They involve conflict analysis, conflict sensitive project planning, conflict monitoring, and impact assessment.

Focusing on a specific set of tools, however, has been critiqued for limiting the reach and utility of conflict sensitivity. Paffenholz and Reychler introduce instead the 'Aid for Peace' framework, which is a set of unified and inclusive methodologies that can be used by a broad range of different actors for all sorts of interventions. The framework consists of: analysing the peacebuilding needs of the conflict-affected country; the relevance of the planned or existing policy, programme or projects to these needs; the existing or possible conflict risks; and the potential positive and negative effects of the interventions on the conflict dynamics and peacebuilding process.

[Collaborative for Development Action \(CDA\), 2004, 'The Do No Harm Handbook \(The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict\)', The Collaborative for Development Action Inc, Cambridge, MA](#)

How does development assistance interact with conflict? How can assistance be provided without it being misused to pursue political and military advantage? This handbook offers a framework for addressing these issues. It aims to help assistance workers deal more effectively with the complexities of providing assistance in conflict contexts.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2007, 'Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Methodical Guidelines', Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

[See full text](#)

[Paffenholz, T., 2005, 'Third-Generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace Approach', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

How can the Peace for Aid approach help to address the questions surrounding the debate on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)? This paper moves on the PCIA approach and debate by presenting Aid for Peace. The Aid for Peace approach is a multi-purpose and multi-level process that facilitates the planning, assessment and evaluation of peace as well as aid interventions in conflict situations.

[Paffenholz, T. and Reyhler, L., 2007, 'Planning and Evaluating Development and Humanitarian Interventions in Conflict Zones', Part 3 in Aid for Peace: A Guide to Planning and Evaluation for Conflict Zones, Nomos, Baden-Baden, Germany pp. 71-127](#)

What is the best way to introduce peace and conflict sensitivity to development and humanitarian programmes? This study provides a guide to planning development and humanitarian interventions in conflict zones. It suggests that while peace and conflict sensitivity has been successfully mainstreamed as a topic of discussion, the international community has not yet arrived at an automatic, systematic peace and conflict sensitive aid policy and operational implementation. There needs to be a systematic link between the analysis of the conflict and peacebuilding environment and the implementation of interventions. The theory of conflict transformation should combine with professional operational requirements for programme planning.

Case studies and lessons learned

[World Bank, 2005, 'Toward a Conflict-sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy: Lessons from a Retrospective Analysis', Report no. 32587, World Bank, Washington](#)

Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) have become the primary tool for articulating a vision for growth and poverty reduction in nearly 60 low-income countries. Some 15-20 of these countries are affected by conflict, and other conflict-affected countries are still to begin the process. In what ways do PRSPs in conflict-affected countries take account of their particular contexts? To what extent have assessments of the sources of conflict and the ways they interact with poverty informed the strategies? This report aims to contribute to more effective poverty reduction in countries affected by conflict by analyzing these questions.

[International Alert, 2008, 'Building a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Recovery and Growth' Investing in Peace, Issue No. 1, International Alert, London](#)

How can policymakers create and support an effective economic recovery strategy in northern Uganda? This paper recommends that policy-makers and implementers adopt more conflict-sensitive approaches to their efforts to contribute to the economic recovery of the region as a part of the overall peacebuilding strategy. Conflict sensitive approaches suggest that all humanitarian

and development assistance should be designed so that they intentionally contribute to successful recovery, rather than inadvertently prolonging conflict. Combining conflict sensitive approaches with political economy analysis results in peacebuilding strategies that aim to address underlying power disparities and vulnerabilities.

[International Alert, 2007, 'Peacebuilding in Eastern DRC: Improving EU Support for Economic Recovery', International Alert, London](#)

How can economic activities help to address the factors that undermine sustainable peace? This International Alert report centres on economic recovery in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Efforts are needed to promote job creation and shared income-generating opportunities, as well as to address the drivers of conflict and fragility, if long-term economic recovery is to be realised. In order to ensure that assistance contributes positively to transformational peacebuilding, donors must be prepared to bear high transaction costs, particularly in terms of staff on the ground and longer time frames.

[Barron, P., Diprose, R., and Woolcock, M., 2007, 'Local Conflict and Development Projects in Indonesia: Part of the Problem or Part of a Solution?', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 4212, World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

Are local conflict and development projects in Indonesia part of the problem or part of the solution? This paper argues that development projects are capable of stimulating as well as reducing conflicts. Those projects that have explicit and accessible procedures for managing disputes arising from the development process are much less likely to cause conflict.

[CECORE, REDROC, Saferworld, and YODEO, 2008, 'Water and Conflict: Making Water Delivery Conflict-Sensitive in Uganda', Saferworld, London](#)

How can conflict-sensitive approaches (CSA) enhance development? This report documents how two water development projects in Uganda became more conflict-sensitive and, as a result, benefited recipient communities. CSA can deepen beneficiary participation and community ownership of development projects. More practical work is needed on implementing CSA within different sectors, and on understanding how best to adapt conflict-sensitive development to different levels and types of conflict.

CHAPTER 2:

LIVING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS: FOCUS ON WOMEN, CHILDREN AND YOUTH

Women in Conflict-affected Areas

WOMEN AND CONFLICT: OVERVIEW	37
IMPACT OF VIOLENT CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND GIRLS	38
PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESSES, RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACEBUILDING	41
GENDER ANALYSIS AND GENDER-SENSITIVITY IN POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY	42

Women and conflict: overview

Women and girls suffer disproportionately from violent conflict. They suffer not only from the by-products of war, but are also targeted as a strategy of war. Rape and sexual violence have been recognised as instruments of war, designed to weaken families and break down the social fabric of communities and societies. Although men and boys are also victims of gender-based violence, women and girls are the primary target.

There is increasing acknowledgement that women and girls play multiple roles during conflict. They are not only victims of violence, but can also be active participants in the violence, directly as combatants, or indirectly, by facilitating violence through fundraising or inciting their male relatives to commit acts of violence. Women also often become heads of households during war; women and girls learn new skills and contribute to peacemaking and rebuilding local economies and communities. These changes in gender relations, however, are usually short-lived and societies resort back to traditional gender roles after conflict.

Women also tend to be sidelined from formal conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes, and post-conflict recovery programmes often overlook women's security needs. This compromises the inclusiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding efforts.

[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325](#) (2000) on Women, Peace and Security recognises this shortfall. It addresses the impact of war on women, mandates the protection of women and girls during and after conflict and the greater involvement of women in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes.

[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820](#) (2008) extends SCR 1325 to explicitly recognise sexual violence as a security issue and tactic of war, demand parties to armed conflict to adopt concrete prevention and protection measures and assert the importance of women's participation in peace processes.

[United Nations, 2002, 'Women, Peace and Security', Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 \(2000\), United Nations, New York](#)

How does armed conflict impact on women? What role do women play in the peace process? This study is an initiative undertaken in response to Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security adopted in October 2000. While it shows that many positive steps have been taken to implement the resolution, women still form a minority of those who participate in peace and security negotiations, and receive less attention than men in post-conflict agreements, disarmament and reconstruction.

Rehn, E. and Johnson Sirleaf, E., 2002, 'Women, War and Peace', Independent Expert's Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-building', United Nations

Development Fund for Women, New York

[See full text](#)

BRIDGE, 2003, 'Gender and Armed Conflict', Institute of Development Studies, Brighton

[See full text](#)

Van der Gaag, 2008, 'Because I am a Girl: The State of the World's Girls 2008 – Special Focus: I the Shadow of War', Plan International

[See full text](#)

Impact of violent conflict on women and girls

The literature on sexual violence in armed conflict indicates that rape and violence against women and girls prior to, during and after conflict is extensive in scope and magnitude throughout the world. Sexual violence is defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Force on Gender and Humanitarian Assistance as “any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic a person’s sexuality, using coercion, threats of harm or physical force, by any person regardless of relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to home and work”. Sexual violence, particularly rape, is often used as a weapon of war to destabilise families, groups and communities; to carry out ethnic cleansing and genocide; to instil fear in populations in order to dampen resistance and/or incite flight; as a form of punishment and torture; and to affirm aggression. The destabilisation of families and communities can contribute to other forms of violence, including domestic violence.

Sexual exploitation, trafficking and sexual slavery tend to increase in armed conflict. Women and girls who are recruited, often by abduction, into combat are in many cases forced to provide sexual services and/or are subjected to forced marriages. Refugee and internally displaced women and girls, separated from family members and traditional support mechanisms, are also particularly vulnerable. Government officials, civilian authorities, peacekeepers and aid workers have been reported to demand sexual favours in exchange for necessities - safe passage, food and shelter. Limited monitoring of camp security also renders women and girls vulnerable to sexual violence and forced combat.

Security issues hinder women and girl’s access to services as well. When schools are destroyed for example, and children have to travel long distances, girls are more likely to stay at home in order to avoid the increased risk of abduction, sexual violence and exploitation.

The issues associated with reintegration are different for men and women. Returning females face different problems from returning males and women who have remained in the community during war face specific challenges when combatants return. Reintegration programmes should take gender dynamics into consideration.

Sexual violence

[Ward, J. and Marsh, M., 2006, 'Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in War and its Aftermath: Realities, Responses and Required Resources', Briefing Paper, United Nations Population Fund](#)

What is the extent and impact of gender-based violence during and after war? Statistics show that the sexual violation and torture of women and girls has become rife in conflict settings. Data also show that gender-based violence (GBV) does not subside post-conflict; certain types of GBV may even increase. This briefing paper from the United Nations Population Fund argues that while

international prevention and response efforts have increased in recent years, much more must be done. A multi-sectoral model which demands holistic inter-organisational and inter-agency efforts across health, social services, legal and security sectors offers the best approach for GBV prevention.

DCAF, 2007, 'Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector', Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

[See full text](#)

[GSDRC, 2009, Conflict and Sexual and Domestic Violence against Women, Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

The literature on sexual violence in armed conflict indicates that rape and violence against women and girls prior to, during and after conflict seem to be extensive in scope and magnitude throughout the world – with reported incidents in conflicts in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Whilst there is limited comparative analysis and understanding about where sexual violence may be more or less prevalent and why, it is widely recognised that sexual violence against women in conflict is usually reflective of pre-existing patterns in society. Generally speaking, rape and violence against women is a good proxy indicator of rising tensions and incipient conflict. Much of the literature also emphasises the persistence of violence and exploitation in the 'post'-conflict, reconstruction phase.

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam America, 2010 'Now, the World is Without Me: An Investigation of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo', Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam International

The number of reported assaults at Panzi Hospital in South Kivu, Eastern DRC has steadily decreased between 2004 and 2008. At the same time there has been a 17-fold increase in the number of rapes carried out by civilians as opposed to armed militia. This implies a normalisation of rape among the civilian population. Women require quality care in all areas; there must be further work to reduce sexual violence linked to military action; legal and justice initiatives must be strengthened for crimes against civilians by its armed forces, and protective deployments must be tailored to local realities.

[See full text](#)

Benjamin, J. A., and Murchison, L, 2004, 'Gender-based Violence: Care and Protection of Children in Emergencies – A Field Guide', Save the Children, London

[See full text](#)

[Nordås, R., 2011, 'Sexual Violence in African Conflicts', CSCW Policy Brief, Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO, Oslo](#)

This policy brief summarises key findings from a pilot study of conflict-related sexual violence in conflicts in 20 African countries, encompassing 177 armed conflict actors – state armies, militias, and rebel groups. The study finds that, in Africa, sexual violence is: mostly indiscriminate; committed only by some conflict actors; often committed by state armies; often committed in years with low levels of killings; and often committed post-conflict.

Displacement

[Buscher, D., 2006, 'Displaced Women and Girls at Risk: Risk Factors, Protection Solutions and Resource Tools', Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, New York](#)

Why do large numbers of displaced women and girls continue to be abused, raped and exploited? This paper explores risks facing displaced women and how to address them. Women and girls

must be involved in their own protection. Their communities, including the men, must be similarly engaged. Yet only individual assessment can adequately address women's unique protection concerns. Women and girls are not just victims but also survivors, caretakers, leaders, peacemakers and providers.

Access to services

[GSDRC, 2009, *The Impact of Conflict on Women's Education, Employment and Health Care, Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham*](#)

The extent to which conflict restricts women's freedom of movement depends on a number of factors including the stage of conflict, whether the women are displaced, whether they are directly or indirectly affected by the conflict, and the cultural norms of the conflict-affected area. Forced displacement, for example, may in some cases lead to greater mobility, where women assume additional responsibilities such as taking on the role of primary breadwinner. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the fear of violence more often than not restricts women's freedom of movement. In times of political, economic and social uncertainty, there is a strong tendency to revert to traditional values which appear to offer protection for women and girls but which restrict their mobility.

Young women and girls as fighters

[Coulter, C., Persson, M., and Utas, M., 2008, 'Young Female Fighters in African Wars: Conflict and Its Consequences', Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala](#)

What role do young women play in contemporary African wars? Mainstream thinking on war and conflict sees women as passive and peaceful and men as active and aggressive. This report calls for a broader understanding of women's roles and participation in armed conflict in Africa. Programmes to disarm, demobilise and re-integrate former fighters need to be adapted to local contexts and designed to meet the needs of female ex-fighters.

[Denov, M., 2007, 'Girls in Fighting Forces: Moving Beyond Victimhood', Canadian International Development Agency, Ottawa](#)

Girls in armed groups have generally been neglected by scholars, governments and policymakers. This paper traces the experiences of girls in armed conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Uganda. It finds that girls in fighting forces are rendered invisible and marginalised during and after conflict, although they are fundamentally important to armed groups. They experience victimisation, perpetration and insecurity, but are also active agents and resisters.

Reintegration

[Maina, G., 2011, 'The Complexity of Applying UN Resolution 1325 in Post Conflict Reintegration Processes: The Case of Northern Uganda', African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes \(ACCORD\), Durban](#)

How effectively have the needs of women and girls been addressed during rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction in Uganda? This study looks the reintegration experience of women and girls after the long war between the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army. The study analyses the situation in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls on all actors to address the special needs of women and girls during rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction. The study concludes that, since the female populations in northern Uganda still struggle with deprivation, want and exclusion, it is difficult speak of meaningful and durable peace.

Participation in Peace Processes, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding

Conflict can present new opportunities for women to assume different roles in society and to get involved in decision-making. Women often secure important gains within the family and local community and in broader political participation. Women are still usually sidelined, however, in formal conflict resolution and peace negotiation processes. This is especially problematic as the outcomes from these processes usually dictate the post-conflict landscape.

The inclusion of women in peace processes is essential as their participation contributes to the fulfilment of human rights norms of equal participation; allows for the articulation of different experiences and needs of women in conflict; and results in women as active agents in post-conflict recovery processes. Women may be particularly effective at making alliances across political lines.

There are a few examples of women's involvement in formal processes and its positive impact. In Somalia, for example, women activists formed a 'Sixth Clan' (comprised of the five main clans involved in negotiations) and were successful in gaining access to the negotiating table. Their representation and advocacy at the table in turn led to the inclusion of quotas for women in new governance structures. In Afghanistan, the participation of women at the Bonn negotiations had a profound impact on the post-conflict environment – with the inclusion of women's rights in the Constitution and the inclusion of women in political decision-making roles.

Women have managed to play a critical role in informal negotiation processes as well – often preparing the ground for negotiations and bridging divides. Women's organisations and other international organisations and donors have also implemented training and capacity building workshops for women – to impart conflict mediation and resolution skills; and the skills necessary for political participation. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that these are exceptions and women are still largely marginalised in peace processes and as international mediators.

[Banaszak, K. et al., eds., 2005, 'Securing the Peace: Guiding the International Community towards Women's Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes,' United Nations Development Fund for Women](#)

How and why should women be involved in peace processes? This paper highlights the importance of involving women at every stage of peace negotiations and gives recommendations on how this might be achieved in practice. It argues that when approaching the task of ending war, the stakes are too high to neglect the resources that women have to offer.

[Chhabra, S., 2006, 'Gender Perspective in Peace Initiatives: Opportunities and Challenges', Women's Link Journal](#)

How can women play a more effective role in peace initiatives? This research argues that it is important to improve understanding of how women's and men's perspectives on peace and violence vary, and whether there are policy implications for these differences. A full understanding of the role of women as actors during war and conflict and as victims of war is essential to ensure full participation of women at all levels of decision-making and implementation in peace processes.

[Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010, 'Summary Report - Experts Meeting: Women at the Peace Table - Asia Pacific', Organised by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue with Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace and the Alliance for Social Dialogue in Kathmandu, September 27-30 2010, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva](#)

How can women's representation in peace negotiations be improved? This report of a meeting with 40 women experts from across Asia and the Pacific notes that gender issues are sidelined as being 'social' or 'welfare' and their importance to hard security is overlooked. A broader

perspective is needed, as women's contributions outside of formal negotiations (to conflict resolution at local level, to conflict prevention, and to influencing informal processes) have been significant. Women can forge common ground across conflict and party lines. Their inclusion can be enhanced through links with the women's movement outside the formal peace process.

See also: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011, 'Peacemaking in Asia and the Pacific: Women's Participation, Perspectives and Priorities', HD Centre, Geneva

[See full text](#)

[Conaway, C.P., 2005, 'Charting Progress: The Role of Women in Reconstruction and Stabilisation Operations', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

To what extent are women included in reconstruction initiatives after conflict? This report argues that despite progress within the United States government to recognise the importance of women's inclusion in stabilisation and reconstruction operations, no overarching strategy or programme exists to ensure implementation. An ongoing capability must be institutionalised within the US government to enhance the role of women. Action taken prior to an intervention will improve the success of the mission.

[GSDRC, 2009, The Impact of Conflict on Women's Voice and Participation, Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

Although conflict can reduce the voice of less powerful groups (including women), there are also opportunities for these groups to contest well-established social structures and divisions, and for new, non-traditional leaders to emerge. Women assume varied roles during armed conflict, as victims, but also as perpetrators, as well as peace activists. There are sub-groups of women who may be particularly vulnerable as a result of conflict and are frequently invisible in post-conflict peace processes and community-driven development (young women, female-headed households, widows, and women from marginalised groups). However, women are not necessarily the only, or even the most, excluded group in a given society. Furthermore, female participation does not necessarily lead to positive outcomes for women. Not all women have equal voices or the same vested interests; other identity issues such as ethnicity, religion, and age can be equally important.

Gender analysis and gender-sensitivity in post-conflict recovery

Women, girls, men and boys participate in and experience conflict, peace processes and post-conflict recovery differently. Research has found that the needs of women and girls have often been neglected in assistance programmes. For example, women and girl combatants are often discriminated against in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes; and there is often a lack of provision of health services and trauma programmes for women and girls suffering from sexual violence.

New frameworks have been created and tested in order to promote understanding of the gender dimensions of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction.

[Hudson, H., 2006, 'Human Security and Peacebuilding Through a Gender Lens: Challenges of Implementation in Africa', DIIS Working Paper no. 2006/ 37, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen](#)

Why is it so difficult to translate an awareness of gender injustice into workable plans for post-conflict reconstruction? Evidence shows that while women are largely absent from formal peace negotiations, they do make a significant contribution at the grassroots level. Yet this gender

awareness has not been incorporated into practice. This paper draws on African feminism to argue for a balanced position between cultural relativism and a 'one size fits all' solution to this problem.

[Greenberg, M. E. and Zuckerman, E., 2009, 'The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Challenges in Development Aid', in Making Peace Work: The Challenges of Social and Economic Reconstruction, eds. T. Addison and T. Brück, Palgrave MacMillan, UNU-WIDER, Helsinki](#)

Why do post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) programmes need to address gender relations and equality? How can gender be 'mainstreamed' in PCR interventions? This chapter considers gender, particularly the needs of women, in post-conflict situations. PCR programmes commonly fail to recognise and address gender issues. Investing in women and promoting gender equality are necessary both for maintaining peace and achieving sustainable development.

[The Peace and Conflict Gender Analysis: UNIFEM's Research in the Solomon Islands](#)

How can the use of gender analysis help improve post-conflict peace processes? This paper discusses the research methodology and results of the 2005 Peace and Conflict Gender Analysis (PCGA) conducted by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in the Solomon Islands. The use of gender analysis to shape peace processes would help solidify women's gains in status and contribute to economic and civil society development.

Anderlini, S. N., 2006, 'Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Analysis: Issues and Recommendations', Social Development Papers, no. 33, World Bank, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

Additional resources

For further discussion and resources on gender and peacekeeping, see 'gender, peacekeeping and protection' in the [peacekeeping and peace support operation](#) section of this guide. For resources on gender and justice and security sector reform, see the 'women, security and conflict' section in [gender and justice](#) in the GSDRC's justice guide.

Children and Youth in Conflict-affected Areas

CHILDREN, YOUTH AND CONFLICT: OVERVIEW	44
CHILD COMBATANTS, MOBILISATION AND WAR-AFFECTED YOUTH	45
DISSATISFIED YOUTH AND YOUTH BULGES	46
PARTICIPATION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN RECOVERY AND PEACEBUILDING	47

Children, youth and conflict: overview

Millions of children and youth are caught up in violent conflict and suffer from its devastating impacts. Many are killed as a by-product of general disorder and violence, whereas in some situations, for example, in genocide, children and youth may be specifically targeted. They are also targeted and recruited, often but not always forcibly, as child combatants. Research has shown that war-affected children and youth, regardless of whether they have served as combatants, may suffer from severe emotional distress.

Literature on children and youth has tended to concentrate on their portrayals as passive victims or as active security threats, in the case of youth. There is increasing attention, however, on the need to focus as well on the resilience of children and youth and on their positive contributions to peace processes and reconstruction activities.

Conflict also disrupts children's access to services such as health and education. Education is increasingly accepted as an integral part of humanitarian response in conflict and post-conflict situations. It can help restore normalcy, safeguard the most vulnerable, provide psychosocial care, promote tolerance, unify divided communities and begin the process of reconstruction and peacebuilding. However, both providing and accessing education in such contexts is particularly problematic.

[Sommers, M., 2006, 'Youth and Conflict – A Brief Review of the Available Literature', USAID, Washington, D.C.](#)

How can programmes help youth in conflict and post-conflict situations? This literature review illuminates key themes, trends and prospects for war-affected youth and the programmes that aim to assist them. While war's effects on youth are complex, resilience is a prominent shared characteristic. Effective youth interventions require increased participation of female youth, better engagement with youth to determine and address their precise needs, quality programme evaluations and more dissemination of programme documents.

[UNDESA, 2003, 'Youth and Conflict', Chapter 14 of the World Youth Report, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York](#)

How can youth involvement in conflict be addressed? This study shows that youth are often a targeted group during conflict. It argues that traditional prevention mechanisms have proved top-heavy and ineffective in addressing the root causes of conflict and problems leading to the escalation of tensions. In tackling conflict, the international community must go beyond the narrow approach determined by top-level ideals of peace and embrace cross-sectoral approaches.

UNICEF, 1996, 'Impact of Armed Conflict on Children', UNICEF, New York
[See full text](#)

UNDP, 2006, 'Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Development in Crisis?', United Nations Development Programme, New York

[See full text](#)

[UNESCO, 2011, 'The Hidden Crisis: Armed conflict and education', Education for All, Global Monitoring Report, UNESCO](#)

To what extent are the goals of Education for All being achieved in countries affected by armed conflict? This report shows that there is not only a lack of provision of education but also a failure to protect education systems and their students, and to devote sufficient funds to education in reconstruction and peacebuilding programmes. It argues that educational challenges in conflict-affected states are largely unreported, and that education in such contexts merits a far more central place on the international development agenda.

Child combatants, mobilisation and war-affected youth

The precise number of child combatants globally is unknown. The figure most frequently cited is 300,000, most of which are adolescents. Key negative impacts for combatants have been found to be psychological distress concentrated in those that experience the most violence; loss of human capital due to time away from civilian education and work experience; and social exclusion, as former child fighters are considered tainted and impure.

The literature has tended to focus on child combatants as boys who are abducted and coerced into fighting. The role of girls in fighting forces is largely neglected, and girls have consequently been excluded from recovery programmes. There has also been limited examination of situations in which children and youth are not abducted but are mobilised in other ways. Some recent work has looked at youth agency and the role of the desire for status and a sense of empowerment. New research has shown that children and youth in displacement camps may become motivated to engage in political violence due to frustrations and the distinctiveness of life in a camp and the politicisation of everyday experiences.

Reintegration packages have generally focused on education, income generation and livelihoods. Youth often prefer support for income generation and livelihoods as they find it difficult to return to school with children much younger than them. In order to counter the social exclusion of former child combatants, initiatives have also included community based projects in order to make the receiving village more receptive to the former combatants' reintegration.

[Blattman, C., 2006, 'The Consequences of Child Soldiering', Households in Conflict Network Working Paper 22, The Institute of Development Studies, Brighton](#)

Hundreds of thousands of child combatants fought in recent civil wars in Africa, yet little is known about the long-term impact of child soldiering. Using data collected in Uganda, this paper finds that, contrary to existing evidence, the major consequences of child soldiering are educational and economic. Exposure to conflict also seems to increase political participation by abductees, and the psychological impacts of war appear to be moderate and concentrated in a minority. More research is needed to inform evidence-based post-conflict policies and programs.

[Denov, M., 2007, 'Girls in Fighting Forces: Moving Beyond Victimhood', Canadian International Development Agency, Ottawa](#)

Girls within armed groups have generally been neglected by scholars, governments and policymakers. This paper traces the experiences of girls in armed conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Uganda. It finds that girls in fighting forces are rendered invisible and

marginalised during and after conflict, although they are fundamentally important to armed groups. They experience victimisation, perpetration and insecurity, but are also active agents and resisters.

Hart J., 2008, 'Displaced Children's Participation in Political Violence: Towards Greater Understanding of Mobilisation', *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 277-293
[See full text](#)

[Housden, O., 2009, 'In a Weak State: Status and Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed forces and Armed Groups \(CAAFAG\) in Nepal', IPCS Research Paper, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi](#)

Despite Nepal's 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement targeting rehabilitation of children from armed group associations, the government has failed to implement satisfactory reintegration. This paper reviews the current status of the reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups. State failure to tackle deep-rooted inequality and structural problems continues to allow armed movements to recruit marginalised groups, including children, and consequently flourish.

McIntyre, A. (ed.), 2004, 'Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa', Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
[See full text](#)

For discussion and resources on gender-based violence against women and girls, see the section on [women in conflict-affected areas](#) in this guide.

Dissatisfied youth and youth bulges

Youth bulge refers to "extraordinarily large youth cohorts relative to the adult population" (Urdal 2007). A large pool of young people is not inherently destabilising; however, some analysts argue that there is a correlation between youth bulges and political violence, in particular under conditions of economic stagnation. While contested, the understanding is that young people - particularly young men, who are jobless and alienated, and have few outlets for positive engagement, are ready recruits for those seeking to mobilise violence. Thus, it is argued that more attention needs to be paid to providing employment or education opportunities to youth, particularly during times of economic decline. Limits on migration may increase the risk of violence in some countries with large youth bulges if it is not compensated for by increased domestic employment opportunities.

The countries expected to experience high relative youth populations in years to come are mostly situated in the Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia.

[Urdal, H., 2007, 'The Demographics of Political Violence: Youth Bulges, Insecurity and Conflict' Chapter 6 in Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict and Security in the 21st Century, eds. L. Brainard and D. Chollet, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, pp. 90-100](#)

This chapter reports study findings suggesting that demographic 'youth bulges' may provide both a motive and an opportunity for political violence. These bulges increase the risk of internal armed conflict, terrorism, and rioting, but the conditions under which they are most volatile seem to differ. Bulges appear to particularly increase the risk of terrorism and riots under conditions of educational and economic stress, but to provide greater opportunities for armed conflict in autocracies and greater motives in democracies.

[Hilker, L. M., Fraser E. M., 2009, 'Youth Exclusion, Violence, Conflict and Fragile States', Report prepared for DFID by Social Development Direct, London](#)

What factors contribute to youth exclusion and increase the likelihood of youth engagement in violence? How can DFID effectively address issues of youth exclusion and violence? This report examines existing evidence and analysis on the links between youth exclusion, violence, conflict and fragile states. It highlights factors which can contribute to youth violence, and makes recommendations for DFID's work on youth exclusion and violence.

For additional resources on youth and social exclusion, see the GSDRC's [social exclusion](#) guide.

Participation of children and youth in recovery and peacebuilding

There is growing recognition that children and youth need to be engaged in positive activities; and that they have much to contribute to peace processes, reconstruction and peacebuilding initiatives. Children and youth have already been making effective contributions to various programmes, including those focused, for example, on rebuilding social relationships, developing cultures of peace, rehabilitating education systems, and promoting livelihoods and economic recovery.

Involvement in such activities can counter the traumatising and destructive experiences of violence that war-affected children and youth have undergone. More broadly, it provides positive and constructive roles for youth that render them less susceptible to mobilisation to violence.

[USAID, 2005, 'Youth and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention', USAID, Washington](#)

Why do young people participate in conflict? What can be done to steer young people away from violence? This toolkit examines youth participation in violent conflict and draws out lessons for development programming. It asserts that although a large proportion of young people is not necessarily destabilising, those (particularly young men) who are uprooted, intolerant, jobless and have few opportunities could represent a ready pool of recruits for ethnic, religious and political extremists. Avoiding future conflict means drawing positively on the energy and capacity of youth as the leaders of tomorrow's societies.

[Fischer, M., 2006, 'The Need for Multi-Dimensional Youth Work: Education, Interethnic Networking and Income Generation', in Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten Years after Dayton, ed. M. Fischer, Lit Verlag, Münster](#)

How can youth in postconflict societies become a catalyst for positive change? This research gives an overview of the challenges facing youth work in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It presents the 'Young People Build the Future' project, which uses a multidimensional approach to try to meet some of these challenges. An integrated combination of initiatives that provide training, empowerment, peace education, vocational training and income generation opportunities is essential.

CHAPTER 3:

PREVENTING AND MANAGING VIOLENT CONFLICT

Preventing Violent Conflict

INTRODUCTION	49
CONFLICT PREVENTION THEORY AND APPROACHES.....	50
EARLY WARNING AND EARLY RESPONSE SYSTEMS.....	52
DIRECT PREVENTION MECHANISMS.....	54
STRUCTURAL PREVENTION	57

Introduction

The prevention of violent conflict, often referred to as ‘conflict prevention’, refers to approaches, methods and mechanisms used to avoid, minimise, and/or contain potential violent conflicts; and in post-conflict environments, to prevent violent conflict from re-emerging. Prevention is critical for avoiding the devastation and immense human suffering associated with war. It is also prudent as the financial and political costs of managing conflict are much higher once violent conflict has already erupted. In addition, there are a broader range of response options available before conflict has fully escalated. Conflict prevention has also been found to be effective. A reported decline in armed conflict since the Cold War has been attributed in part because of an extraordinary increase in activism by the international community directed toward conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding (Human Security Report 2005).

Prevention approaches and mechanisms are generally classified as direct/operational prevention or structural prevention, although there is often overlap. The former refers to short term actions taken to prevent the often imminent escalation of potential conflict (e.g. workshops, dialogue, confidence-building measures, sanctions, coercive diplomacy, special envoys, preventive deployment); whereas structural prevention entails long term interventions that aim to transform key socioeconomic, political and institutional factors that if left unaddressed, could lead to violent conflict in the future. These long term preventive mechanisms overlap with approaches adopted in the aftermath of conflict in order to prevent a renewal of violence. The UN has introduced a third category of conflict prevention, ‘systemic prevention’, to describe measures that address trans-national conflict risks.

Most preventive action has been taken in a small number of high-profile cases concentrated in Europe and the Middle East. Asia has received comparatively little attention. The most common tools for early prevention are verbal pronouncements and facilitation; coercive measures are very rarely used.

Conflict prevention is now official policy in the UN, the EU, the G-8 and in many states. It has been successfully applied in a range of places at the national level, including in South Africa, Macedonia, the Baltic states, Crimea, and the South China Sea. The many successful violence prevention efforts on the community and sub-national level, often remain invisible. Much conflict literature emphasises that despite these developments, conflict prevention has not been pursued sufficiently. There is still a lack of strategy and capacity for prevention efforts, and inadequate local knowledge and local networks. In order to fill the gap between conflict prevention rhetoric and practice, prevention needs to become a full-time professional and governmental endeavour. Only then, it is believed, can the devastating impacts of violent conflict be systematically avoided.

[Öberg, M., Möller, F., Wallensteen, P., 2008, 'Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises 1990-98: A New Dataset', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 67-91](#)

What are the trends in and effects of early conflict prevention during the escalation of ethnic crises? This article uses a new dataset to analyse operational conflict prevention measures prior to the outbreak of war in intrastate ethnic conflicts between 1990 and 1998. Most preventive action is focused on a few high profile cases, and Asia in particular receives little attention. Diplomatic measures and relief efforts both have conflict dampening effects, while carrots (inducements) increase the likelihood of war. Other measures show no significant effects. Expectations about the effectiveness of coercive preventive measures may thus be overstated.

[Swanström, N.L.P. and Weissmann, M. S., 2005, 'Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and Beyond: A Conceptual Exploration', *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Programme, Washington, DC and Nacka, Sweden*](#)

What are the interpretational differences in conflict, conflict prevention and conflict management? How do we come to terms with the lack of consensus within the academic and policy community? This paper provides an overview of the conceptual terms. Traditional assumptions are challenged with the three concepts viewed as inter-related rather than as separate. An integrated, holistic approach is recommended.

Human Security Centre, 2005, 'Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century', Human Security Centre, Vancouver

[See full text](#)

[OECD, 2011, 'Investing in Security: A Global Assessment of Armed Violence Reduction Initiatives', *Conflict and Fragility Series*, OECD Publishing, Paris](#)

What works and what does not in armed violence reduction and prevention? To begin to address this question, this report draws on a large-scale mapping of AVRP activities around the world, focusing on programming trends in the varied contexts of Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa and Timor-Leste. The most promising AVRP activities are based on inter-sectoral partnerships and operate simultaneously at local and national levels. Development agencies need to adopt integrated approaches to AVRP, and link the AVRP agenda to the promotion of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Conflict prevention theory and approaches

There are ongoing attempts to develop conflict prevention into a proper discipline. For example, Lund has attempted to develop theory and methodology for prevention, designed to help in determining the appropriate mix of tools in varying stages of conflict and contexts. He identifies the key stages as: latent conflict, manifest limited conflict, and escalating violent conflict. He argues that structural prevention interventions (e.g. helping specific governments to address socioeconomic sources of conflicts or institutional and policy deficits that keep countries from addressing tensions meaningfully and peacefully) are most appropriate in earlier (latent) stages. There is a greater likelihood of being able to implement more far-reaching measures during latent conflict stages, as there are lower levels of inter-party and societal suspicion and mistrust. At later stages, the aim is more often direct prevention, aimed at preventing or containing escalation and the hardening of positions. Wallensteen has developed a methodology to measure effectiveness, in order to help ensure that conflict prevention interventions are tailored to achieve best results.

Theory and methodology

[Lund, M. S., 2009, 'Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice', in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, eds., J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenjuk, and I. W. Zartman, SAGE, London, pp. 287-308](#)

Why does there seem to be a gap between the promise and the actual pursuit of conflict prevention? How can decision makers devise effective conflict prevention policies? This chapter reviews the concepts, activities, and impacts of conflict prevention, focusing on the 'primary prevention' of prospective new conflicts. Policymakers need to consolidate lessons learned from past experience, and apply that knowledge to weak states through multilateral country consultations with key actors to develop jointly formulated, multifaceted conflict prevention strategies.

[Wallensteen, P. and Möller, F., 2004, 'Conflict Prevention: Methodology for Knowing the Unknown' Uppsala Peace Research Papers, no. 7, Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University, Uppsala](#)

What are the most effective means of preventing violent conflict from escalating into war? How do you develop a theory of conflict prevention? This study looks at the research on conflict prevention and proposes a more effective way of analysing it. It argues that if conflict prevention strategies are to be improved, there must be a more nuanced understanding of why current strategies fail or succeed.

International and donor approaches

International organisations and donor agencies have developed their own approaches and guidelines to conflict prevention. They include the use of aid to address the structural causes of conflict as well as joined-up approaches to a range of development, trade, foreign policy and security issues involving coordination across departments.

[United Nations Secretary General, 2004, 'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility', Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change](#)

The changes that have taken place in the world since the Millennium Declaration demand that consensus be revitalised on key challenges and priorities. What are these and how can they best be achieved? This report argues that security, development and human rights must be advanced together, otherwise none will succeed. The Millennium Development Goals can be met by 2015, but only if all governments dramatically increase their efforts. The report also commits the United Nations to strengthen international regimes and norms to support prevention of armed conflict.

[United Nations, 2006, 'Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General', United Nations, New York](#)

While a culture of conflict prevention is taking hold at the United Nations (UN), an unacceptable gap remains between rhetoric and practice. This progress report by Kofi Annan examines the current status of conflict prevention at international and national operational, structural and systemic levels. All relevant actors need to accept and act upon the principles of shared vulnerability and mutual responsibility so that conflict prevention becomes a deeply-rooted norm embraced at all levels of the community of nations.

[Bellamy, A., 2008, 'Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect', Global Governance, no. 2 \(April-June\), pp. 135-156](#)

Why has conflict prevention been neglected in the ongoing debates over global security? This article examines attitudes toward the international community's responsibility to prevent conflict

since the publication in 2001 of the report *The Responsibility to Protect*. In explaining the relative neglect of prevention in debates about The Responsibility to Protect, it argues that the answer can be found in a combination of doubts about how wide the definition of prevention should be, political concerns raised by the use of prevention in the war on terrorism, and practical concerns about the appropriate institutional locus for responsibility.

[DFID, 2007, 'Preventing Violent Conflict', UK Government Policy Paper, Department for International Development, London](#)

How can government development agencies play a part in tackling the problems that contribute to violent conflict? This paper seeks to show how DFID understands and responds to conflict across the breadth of its work. It proposes to place a greater emphasis on resolving conflict before it becomes violent, to make its response to armed conflict more effective by improving its support to peace processes and enhancing the conflict-management capacity of relevant bodies, and to make its development work more 'conflict-sensitive'. The paper includes case studies from Brazil, Indonesia, Colombia, Uganda, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sudan and Yemen.

[Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001, 'Helping Prevent Violent Conflict', OECD, Paris](#)

All development cooperation strategies and programmes must help societies to manage tensions and disputes without resorting to violence. How can international donors best promote peace-building and post-conflict reconciliation? A task force, established in 1995 by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, has produced detailed guidelines covering the design and implementation of development cooperation for conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery. Development cooperation must be coherent, comprehensive, integrated and aimed at helping address the root causes of conflicts.

For resources and discussion on the responsibility to protect, see the [peacekeeping and peace support operations](#) section of this guide.

Early warning and early response systems

Conflict prevention requires careful monitoring of indicators of rising tensions and taking measures to ease them. Early warning consists of data collection, risk analysis, and the transmission of information with recommendations to targeted recipients. Early response systems refer to timely and appropriate prevention initiatives, usually undertaken during latent stages of perceived potential violent conflict. Early warning and early response systems have been adopted by international organisations, bi-lateral agencies, research institutions and NGOs.

There is much critique, however, that early warning has not translated into early or effective response. While the formulation of accurate predictions is challenging, the more difficult aspect has been persuading political leaders and the public to act upon warnings. Often civil society organisations end up playing the dual role of warning as well as implementing measures in response.

Some analysts stress the need to recognise that early warning is inherently political – in terms of 'who is warning whom and to what end?', and in terms of which warnings are heeded. It has also been emphasised that early warning must monitor human security indicators that include protection of gender and minority rights. Notable violations of such rights can be indicators of rising tensions and incipient conflict. Recent research on regional organisations suggests that the

key constraint facing early warning systems is not lack of quality data, but rather organisational weaknesses and internal political divisions.

Concepts and guidance

[Nyheim, D., 2009, 'Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response', Development Co-operation Directorate - Policy Division, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris](#)

Are early warning and response systems prepared for the conflicts of the future? This report reviews recent literature on early warning and response to assess their value and their role in the prevention of violent conflict and for peacebuilding. It concludes that early warning and response systems require further support to ensure their future relevance.

[Matveeva A., 2006, 'Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas', Issue Paper, no. 1, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict \(GPPAC\), European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The Hague](#)

How can early warning and response systems be improved? This study suggests that although a rich literature exists on how early warning and response should be carried out, little is known about how early warning actually happens. There needs to be a community of practice where the issues and dilemmas of early warning and response can be refined, experiences shared and empirical theory built from practice.

Wulf, H. and Debiel, T., 2010, 'Systemic Disconnects: Why Regional Organisations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms', *Global Governance*, vol. 16, no. 4., pp. 525–547

<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4017>

Why is there a gap between warning and response in many conflicts? Why do regional organisations not use early warning and response (EWR) mechanisms more effectively? Current EWR mechanisms have four key weaknesses to address; they need to adequately consider causal chains, the local space, the impact of small events, and under what conditions they can be effectively replicated. Regional organisations do not use EWR effectively because of political interest, institutional rigidity, a lack of information that is tailor-made for decision-makers, and a lack of capacity. Concepts need to be developed on the precise role of regional organisations in EWR.

Brown, S., Doe, S. G., Nyheim, D., Rosenblum-Kumar, G., and Shanahan, Y., 2005, 'Early Warning and Early Response Handbook', Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network

[See full text](#)

Goldstone, J. A., 2008, 'Using Quantitative and Qualitative Models to Forecast Instability', Special Report, no. 204, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

[Mitchell, A. with Smith, E. M., 2011, 'Disaster Risk Management for Insecure Contexts', Action Contre la Faim, Paris](#)

This paper demonstrates how the integration of disaster risk management (DRM) with insecurity programming can expand the scope of risk management to the mutual benefit of communities and aid agencies. DRM programming has to be 'conflict sensitive' and peace-building has to be 'hazard-proof'. The common objectives and the combined impact of the various approaches to DRM, IP and relief and recovery operations can be harnessed to develop a long-term strategy leading to peace and resilience to all forms of threats and hazards. The integration of these approaches would lead to more streamlined operations and a more efficient use of funds. Programming can be

adapted to many insecure contexts by using a graduated management system based on multi-hazard threats surveillance and an early warning system.

Minority rights and gender early warning indicators

[Baldwin, C., Chapman, C., and Gray, Z., 2007, 'Minority Rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention', Minority Rights Group International, London](#)

Minority issues lie at the heart of many of the world's conflicts. Yet minority rights are often marginalised in peace processes and conflict prevention programmes. This study looks at Chechnya, Darfur, Kashmir, Kosovo and Sri Lanka. Understanding the warning signs provided by minority rights violations could prevent conflicts. Groups should not be separated along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines as a way of creating peace, as such divisions can entrench old hatreds and wounds in the long term.

[Srinivasan, S., 2006, 'Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Darfur', Minority Rights Group International, London](#)

What lessons can we learn from international engagement in the conflict in Darfur? This paper analyses events in the terms of structural and operational conflict prevention. It argues that the catalogue of political and institutional failures before and during the civil war indicates a need to address minority rights issues at every stage of conflict prevention. Institutional improvements in conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms will help avoid repeating the mistakes of Darfur.

[Schmeidl, S., with Piza-Lopez, E., 2002, 'Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action', International Alert, London](#)

This paper is divided into two: part one offers a brief overview of definitions, processes and development of conflict early warning, and part two examines links between gender and early warning, and identifies areas where the integration of a gender perspective can improve existing models. By drawing on the experiences of a number of different conflicts throughout the world, a list of gender-sensitive early warning indicators are proposed for the purpose of verification and expansion. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for future research and action, with particular emphasis on conducting empirical tests on the assumptions put forth.

Direct prevention mechanisms

Preventative diplomacy

The term, 'preventive diplomacy' was coined by UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld in the 1960s and referred to preventing the escalation of Cold War proxy wars in developing countries into global confrontations. After the end of the Cold War, attention shifted to the threat of internal wars. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali adapted the term then to mean not simply keeping regional conflicts from going global, but using diplomatic techniques (i.e. diplomatic persuasion, sometimes combined with military intervention) to prevent armed conflict between or within nations from arising in the first place.

[Zartman, W., 2001, 'Preventing Deadly Conflict', Security Dialogue, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 137-154](#)

How can deadly conflict be prevented? This article examines the choice of decisions taken in escalating deadly conflict in Lebanon, Liberia, Somalia, Zaire, Haiti and Yugoslavia. It analyses the characteristics of alternative policies to begin the process of creating a new polity out of conflict, the incentives and disincentives required for such policies and the reasons for their rejection at the

time. Opportunities tend to constitute a period of time in the life of the conflict when preventive diplomacy is possible, after which entry becomes much more difficult.

Stedman, S. J., 1995, 'Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling Preventive Diplomacy?', Foreign Affairs, May/June

[See full text](#)

Lund, M., 1995, 'Under-rating Preventive Diplomacy: A Reply to Stedman', Foreign Affairs, July/August

[See full text](#)

Incentives and Sanctions

International policy makers often use incentives, sanctions and conditionality as tools to influence the behaviour of key conflict actors and to alter conflict dynamics. Incentive-based measures include economic incentives (e.g. development aid), political incentives (e.g. diplomatic relations, recognition in international/multilateral institutions such as the EU), and security guarantees. Targeted sanctions, which have been the subject of increasing attention, focus on applying direct pressure on individuals who have political decision-making power in governments and groups that are parties to the conflict. This is considered to be an effective mechanism, and avoids the infliction of harm on the broader civilian population.

Some conflict analysts argue that incentives and sanctions, on their own, are unlikely to be sufficient to shift parties into the constructive problem-solving mode that is usually necessary for successful prevention. As such, they should be regarded and enforced as part of a comprehensive peacemaking strategy.

[Griffiths, A. and Barnes, C., eds., 2008, 'Powers of Persuasion: Incentives, Sanctions and Conditionality in Peacemaking', Accord 19, Conciliation Resources, London, pp. 4-23](#)

Do sanctions, incentives and conditionality support or undermine the peace process? This edition of Accord assesses whether these instruments can persuade conflict parties to engage in peacemaking. Used effectively, these tools can tip the balance towards a settlement by increasing the costs of fighting and rewarding peace. But unless developed as part of a coherent and strategic approach to peacemaking they can be ineffective and have sometimes exacerbated tensions and fuelled conflict. Sanctions, incentives and conditionality must be responsive to parties' own motivations and support pre-existing conditions for conflict resolution.

[Eriksson, M., 2008, 'Operational Conflict Prevention and the Use of Targeted Sanctions: Conditions for Effective Implementation by the EU and UN', Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, New York](#)

How can the international community improve the management and implementation of targeted sanctions? This paper suggests that targeted sanctions have the potential to be an effective tool in conflict prevention and management. However, sanctions policy and practice is in need of major reform to ensure better implementation, coordination and evaluation.

For resources on 'peace conditionalities', see the [conflict negotiation](#) section of this guide.

Peacemaking - Dialogue

Dialogue is considered a critical tool in peacemaking. It differs from mediation and negotiation in that dialogue is process-focussed and does not aim to produce a resolution or formal agreement. The purpose of dialogue rather is to get conflicting parties to talk, to build up trust and to

transform relationships. It is a long term inclusive process that can occur at political and community levels. It requires a safe space for parties to come together, to self-reflect and to speak their mind. It demands a willingness to address root causes; to recognise one another's humanity and demonstrate empathy; to recognise differences and commonalities; and to show a capacity to change. Dialogue is not appropriate in situations where violence, hate and mistrust are too strong that they block any movement toward consensus; or where there is an imbalance of power.

Inter-faith dialogue has been receiving growing attention as a potentially effective way to counter negative stereotypes of the 'other' and to develop trusting relationships. It aims to defuse inter-faith tensions that could cause future conflict or that derive from prior conflict. Other forms of religious peacemaking include religious activism, whereby religious actors directly oppose repression and seek to promote peace and reconciliation, for example the civil disobedience of the Buddhist monks in Burma (Myanmar); and mediation and facilitation by religious leaders. The incorporation of religion in peacemaking, which has traditionally been a secular arena, is in part due to the recognition that many cultures are heavily influenced by religion and thus people from such cultures may be more open to religious peacemaking efforts.

Dialogue, and peacemaking more generally, is not an end in itself however. Larger structural causes of conflict also need to be addressed. Still, aspects of dialogue – such as inclusiveness, can reflect some the elements of structural change required.

Dialogue

[Mirimanova, N., 2009, 'Mediation and Dialogue: Official and Unofficial Strands', Case Study: Lessons from South Caucasus, Initiative for Peacebuilding Cluster, International Alert, London](#)

How effective is mediation and dialogue in protracted violent conflict? This paper explores approaches to and formats of mediation and dialogue, and the relevance and effectiveness of these strategies in the context of protracted violent conflicts, particularly in the South Caucasus. Mediation and dialogue cannot be contained in an ivory tower and need to be placed in a real-life conflict context characterised by violence, mistrust, political opportunism, vengeance and systemic injustice. The EU needs to develop a more nuanced understanding of the interplay of mediation and dialogue and the conflict context in which it operates.

[Pruitt, B. and Thomas, P., 2007, 'Democratic Dialogue: A Handbook for Practitioners', General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, Washington, DC; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm; United Nations Development Programme, New York](#)

What is dialogue and how can it respond to the need for wider participation in the public sphere? The first section of this handbook outlines the need for dialogue and how it can make a difference in pursuit of peace, development and democratic governance. The number of dialogue processes taking place around the world has increased, as has the need for a greater understanding of effective dialogue.

UNDP, 2009, 'Why Dialogue Matters for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding', Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme, New York
[See full text](#)

Religious peacemaking

[Smock, D.R., ed., 2006, 'Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, Not War,' United States Institute of Peace \(USIP\), Washington, DC](#)

The threat of religious extremism is real and well documented, but the contribution that religion can make to peacemaking – as the flip side of religious conflict – is only beginning to be explored and explicated. This selection of studies edited by the USIP explores and analyses a number of case studies of faith-based interventions in peacemaking. It finds that faith-based institutions can engage in some of the most pressing conflict issues, particularly in religiously based conflicts.

[Harpviken, K. B. and Røislien, H. E., 2008, 'Faithful Brokers? Potentials and Pitfalls of Religion in Peacemaking', *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 351-373](#)

What potential do religious actors have for acting as constructive peacemakers? How does the fundamental identity of the peace broker affect the chances of success? This article examines the role of religious actors in peacemaking. Three facets of religion – norms, identity, and organisation – are analysed. Each may feed into the emergence or escalation of conflict, and each is in itself transformed through exposure to armed conflict. Similarly, each facet forms part of the peacemaking potential of religious actors. Religious brokers may be of three distinct types: the 'liaison', the 'coordinator', and the 'representative'. Religious actors should not be assumed to have inherent peacemaking capability, but religion is an integral dimension of most attempts to foster peace and must not be neglected.

Smock, D. and Huda, Q., 2009, 'Islamic Peacemaking Since 9/11', Special Report, no. 218, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

Smock, D., 2008, 'Religion in World Affairs: Its Role in Conflict and Peace' Special Report, no. 201, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

For additional resources on peacemaking, see the [Ending Violent Conflict](#) component of this guide.

Structural prevention

Structural conflict prevention comprises long term interventions that aim to transform key socioeconomic, political and institutional factors that if left unaddressed, could lead to violent conflict in the future. This encompasses a broad range of factors, including but not limited to: addressing inequality, exclusion and marginalisation; developing social capital and social cohesion; promoting livelihoods, local development and economic opportunities; and promoting legitimate and equitable political, justice and security institutions.

Many of these interventions are similar to those undertaken to promote peacebuilding: see the [peacebuilding component](#) of this guide. For discussion and resources on local conflict management, see the [non-violence and local conflict management](#) section in the ending violent conflict component of this guide.

Additional resources

For discussion and resources on state-building, see the GSDRC's [fragile states](#) topic guide. For materials on equitable service delivery, see the [service delivery](#) and [fragile states](#) topic guides.

For discussion and resources on promoting democracy, political participation and voice and accountability, see the GSDRC's [political systems](#) and [voice and accountability](#) topic guides. For materials on the promotion of human rights, rule of law and access to justice and security, see the [human rights](#) and [justice](#) topic guides.

For discussion and resources on promoting social inclusion and social protection, see the GSDRC's [social exclusion](#) and [social protection](#) topic guides.

Ending Violent Conflict

INTRODUCTION	59
CONFLICT NEGOTIATION	60
THIRD PARTY MEDIATION.....	65
PEACE AGREEMENTS.....	68
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION	73
NON-VIOLENCE AND LOCAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT.....	75
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS	77

Introduction

The processes and aims of conflict management and conflict resolution can overlap with those of conflict prevention. Conflict management refers to measures aimed at limiting, mitigating and/or containing a conflict without necessarily solving it. Conflict resolution refers to attempts to resolve the underlying incompatibilities of a conflict non-violently, including efforts to get the parties to mutually accept each other's existence (Swanström and Weissmann 2005). The methods involved in conflict management and resolution may include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, joint problem-solving and search for integrative solutions, and/or customary or traditional methods.

Similar to conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution activities often seek to identify and address the perceived root causes of conflicts, in order to tailor appropriate solutions. The applicability of democratisation and economic development, for example, which are commonly proposed solutions to conflict, may vary depending on the root causes of conflict. Where the root cause is political marginalisation or the absence of a social contract, democratisation may play a positive role in conflict resolution; whereas if the root cause concerns identity politics, democratisation may not be the appropriate response and in some contexts may exacerbate the risk of conflict.

Other recent research stresses that effective conflict management and resolution requires instead a shift in attention from root causes only to also the dynamics (actors and motivations) and impact of conflict (changes wrought by the war itself); and to the 'causes of peace' (political arrangements necessary to settle power struggles and limit the use of violence).

[Swanström, N.L.P. and Weissmann, M. S., 2005, 'Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and Beyond: A Conceptual Exploration', Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Programme, Washington, DC and Nacka, Sweden](#)

What are the interpretational differences in conflict, conflict prevention and conflict management? How do we come to terms with the lack of consensus within the academic and policy community? This paper provides an overview of the conceptual terms. Traditional assumptions are challenged with the three concepts viewed as inter-related rather than as separate. An integrated, holistic approach is recommended.

[Kriesberg, L., 2007, 'Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications' in Crocker, C., Hampson, F. O., and All, P. \(eds\), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 455-476](#)

What are conflict resolution (CR) strategies and how do they benefit those involved in wars? This chapter looks at the expanding field of CR in recent decades. CR offers many strategies that are relevant for combatants as well as for the intermediaries trying to mitigate destructive conflicts. CR ideas are increasingly influential and new developments are largely a response to the changing international environment. However, they are still insufficiently understood and utilised.

[Woodward, S.L., 2007, 'Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Operations', Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 143-170](#)

A focus on “root causes” of civil war would not improve peacebuilding interventions and could even be counterproductive. This paper disputes the explanation that interventions fail in part because they fail to address root causes of civil war. The most pressing question for peacebuilding missions is not why civil war occurs, but how we intervene and improve on currently inadequate results.

[Kotze, D., 2005, 'Implications of the Democracy-Development Relationship for Conflict Resolution', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 5, no. 1, pp.61-90](#)

Can democracy and development constitute a blueprint for conflict resolution? This study uses data from African countries to explore the relationship between democracy, economic development and conflict resolution. It finds that economic development is a more important variable than political legacy, and the social impact of growth is more important than growth itself. However, neither democratisation nor economic development, nor a combination of them, can be applied under all circumstances for conflict resolution.

Conflict negotiation

The main purpose of negotiations is to reconcile the conflicting positions of the relevant parties. This is a challenging process that needs to take into consideration many variables and factors, including but not limited to: timing and sequencing; leadership preferences; degree of inclusiveness in terms of parties and content; and methods of leverage.

The most difficult part of conflict negotiations is often getting the parties to the table. In the Mozambique peace process, for example, it took ten years from the first peace initiative and dialogue until formal negotiations started. Negotiations also frequently collapse. The existence of alternative channels and different actors that can connect to the conflict parties is therefore required to keep the process going until the parties return to the table and formal negotiations restart.

Ripeness

The concept of ‘ripeness’ refers to the belief that parties to a conflict will be open to negotiation processes when they arrive at ‘mutually hurting stalemates’ (MHS). Mutually hurting stalemates are situations in which parties find themselves locked in a mutually costly conflict that neither party can win. These situations have in the past provided the occasion for successful conflict resolution interventions. In many conflicts, however – particularly internal conflicts, there are no clear ripe moments, and external actors may need to create opportunities and entry points.

[Zartman, I. W., 2001, 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments', The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 8-18](#)

How can the timing of peace initiatives help to resolve conflicts? This article argues that parties resolve their conflicts only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral

means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked. Practitioners need to take advantage of this 'ripe moment' when it exists, or help produce it, or stand ready to act on it when it does not exist.

[Pruitt, D. G., 2005, 'Whither Ripeness Theory?' Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia](#)

How can ripeness theory be improved to further understanding of conflict resolution processes? This paper recasts ripeness theory to create a new variant, 'readiness theory'. The recast theory argues that an actor's readiness for conflict resolution is a function of both motivation to end the conflict and optimism about the success of negotiation. The model defines ripeness as the breadth of the 'central coalition' of ready individuals and of subgroups, a coalition that spans both sides of the conflict divide.

Process

The process that leads to a peace settlement is likely to play an important role in determining its success. A comprehensive approach to peace negotiations, where key issues are frontloaded may be preferable to an incremental approach, which presents opportunities for trust to break down.

[Bose, S., 2010, 'Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka', Harvard University Press](#)

How can peace be made between warring groups with seemingly incompatible aims? The concluding chapter of this publication examines five case studies of recent peace processes. It argues that in order to resolve ethno-national conflicts, peace processes should address border issues directly, use third parties and adopt a fast-track approach to peacemaking.

Aspinall, E., H. Crouch, 2003, 'The Aceh Peace Process: Why It Failed', Policy Studies 1, East-West Center, Washington, D.C.

[See full text](#)

Negotiating with non-state armed groups

Non-state armed groups have become key actors in violent internal and regional conflicts. They refer to non-conventional combatants (insurgents, partisans, rebel groups, terrorists, guerrillas, freedom fighters, the *mujahedeen*, separatists, national liberation movements and *de facto* governing authorities). While still considered controversial in some contexts, the need to negotiate with non-state armed groups for purposes of securing the peace and implementing development activities has been increasingly recognised in conflict and development literature.

The agreement of non-state armed actors for development activities to take place on territory under their control is essential. The exclusion of non-state armed groups from negotiations and peace processes can also result in continued resort to violence by those left out. Recent research argues that the engagement, and in turn legitimisation, of insurgent or 'terrorist' groups through talks may be a means to transform a conflict away from violence. Engagement by international actors with warlords and divisive local leaders, and the targeted use of incentives and sanctions, can also influence changes in behaviour to more peaceful methods of leadership.

When engaging with non-state armed groups, it is important to conduct assessments to understand the group's structure, command and control, and the capacity of its leadership to influence the behaviour of its members. It is also important to examine the group's relationship to the state, as the state / non-state distinction is often not clear-cut.

[Stott, N., 2007, 'Negotiating in Practice what is Non-Negotiable in Principle: Development Policy and Armed Non-State Actors', Discussion Paper, no. 8/2007, German Development Institute \(DIE\), Bonn](#)

Should Armed Non-State Actors be engaged in development dialogue? Would this be tantamount to negotiating with terrorists? Armed Non-State Actors are now an important feature of violent conflict within and between states. This paper identifies opportunities and challenges for engaging Armed Non-State Actors from a development perspective. It refutes the idea that this engagement legitimises violence and suggests there is widespread support for such work.

[McCartney, C., 2005, 'Engaging Armed Groups in Peace Processes: Reflections for Practice and Policy from Colombia and the Philippines', Accord, no. 16, Conciliation Resources, London](#)

How do we understand the nature of armed groups? What is the importance of perceptions in regards to motivation and goals? This paper reflects on the questions of ideology, power and representation; examining the implications for conflict resolution strategies. It is found that the conflict resolution community tends to ignore certain issues that do not fit into current conceptualisations, while a deeper understanding of how to build relationships is required.

Nilsson, D., 2008, 'Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Settlements', World Bank, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

[Toros, H., 2008, "'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts', Security Dialogue, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 407-426, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo](#)

Does negotiating with terrorist groups legitimise them? How can policymakers engage with multifaceted, horizontal organisations such as Al-Qaeda? This article argues that legitimacy and complexity can contribute to non-violent resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence. It also argues that naming groups as 'terrorist' makes non-violent responses to terrorism less possible.

[Peake, G., Gormley-Heenan, M. and Fitzduff, M., 2005, 'From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes', Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity \(INCORE\), University of Ulster](#)

What is the role of local political leaders in conflict and peacebuilding? This study explores the roles played by local leaders in starting, perpetuating and ending conflict in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. While local leaders play a key role in starting and perpetuating conflict, it is the pressure from, and involvement of, the international community which has been the pivotal force for change in these countries.

Inclusive peace negotiations – women, minority groups, and civil society

Inclusiveness in negotiations and peace processes relates not only to non-state armed groups, but also to other non-state actors. The activities of various non-state actors have often helped to create the conditions for formal peace negotiations to take place. In order for negotiations to have a greater likelihood of securing and sustaining the peace, they need to incorporate the active participation, perspectives and needs of women, minority groups, community groups, civil society more generally, and other non-state actors. This is important not only because these actors have important perspectives to contribute, but also because their participation early on in peace processes can help to guarantee their subsequent participation in new decision-making institutions that are often designed during negotiations.

The difficulty with inclusiveness is its feasibility. Mediators often argue that the inclusion of too many people at the negotiation table makes an already difficult task almost impossible. Thinking about a variety of ways to link otherwise excluded groups to a negotiation process is thus an important part of the negotiation set-up. In Guatemala, for example, a civil society assembly was held parallel to the official negotiation process and produced proposals that were often taken into consideration by the official negotiating parties.

[Banaszak, K. et al \(ed\), 2005, 'Securing the Peace: Guiding the International Community towards Women's Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes,' United Nations Development Fund for Women](#)

How and why should women be involved in peace processes? This paper highlights the importance of involving women at every stage of peace negotiations and gives recommendations for how this might be achieved in practice. It argues that when approaching the task of ending war, the stakes are too high to neglect the resources that women have to offer.

[Baldwin, C., Chapman, C., and Gray, Z., 2007, 'Minority Rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention', Minority Rights Group International, London](#)

Minority issues lie at the heart of many of the world's conflicts. Yet minority rights are often marginalised in peace processes and conflict prevention programmes. This study looks at Chechnya, Darfur, Kashmir, Kosovo and Sri Lanka. Understanding the warning signs provided by minority rights violations could prevent conflicts. Groups should not be separated along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines as a way of creating peace, as such divisions can entrench old hatreds and wounds in the long term.

Paffenholz, T., Kew, D., and Wanis-St. John, D., 2006, 'Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Why, Whether and How They Could Be Involved', Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, March, San Diego

[See full text](#)

[Paffenholz, T., 2009, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding', Working Paper, no. 4, The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva](#)

How can civil society most effectively work for peacebuilding? This paper presents the findings of a comparative research project which analysed the performance of civil society in regards to protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery in situations of war and armed conflict. It concludes civil society can play an important supportive role, but the effectiveness of its activities varied substantially. Contextual factors may limit or strengthen its ability to contribute to peacebuilding.

Gorman, D., and Kivimäki, T., 2008, 'Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes - The Case of Aceh', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva

[See full text](#)

For more discussion and resources on women's participation in peace processes, see [women in conflict-affected areas](#) in this guide.

Peace Conditionality

Peace conditionality can be defined as "the use of aid as a lever to persuade conflicting parties to make peace, to implement a proposed peace accord, and to consolidate peace" (Frerks 2006: 16). There are differing positions within the donor and academic community with regard to the

desirability and feasibility of such conditionalities. While some believe that aid can be an effective incentive to negotiate and to reduce social tensions, particularly when tied to specific steps to build peace; others assert that aid alone cannot affect conflict dynamics or transform conflict. The effectiveness of aid as an incentive in a peace process also depends on the level of aid dependency of the country in question.

[Frerks, G., 2006, 'The Use of Peace Conditionalities in Conflict and Post-conflict Settings: A Conceptual Framework and a Checklist', Conflict Research Unit Working Paper, Clingendael Institute, The Hague](#)

How can peace operations be made more effective? Can the application of so-called 'peace conditionalities' be helpful towards increasing the effectiveness of conflict-related activities? This study looks at the lessons-learned on peace conditionalities in post-conflict reconstruction. It shows that issue itself is contested on political and moral grounds, as is the question of whether it actually works. However, despite the limitations regarding the effectiveness of conditionality, there are a number of best practices that can be followed.

Goodhand, J., 2006, 'Conditioning Peace? The Scope and Limitations of Peace Conditionalities in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka', Clingendael Institute, The Hague
[See full text](#)

Boyce, J. K., 2003, 'Aid, Conditionality and War Economies', Working Paper Series, no. 70, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
[See full text](#)

Case studies and guidance

[Barnes, C., 2007, 'Bridging the Gap: Improving UK Support for Peace Processes', Working Paper, Conciliation Resources, London](#)

Is the United Kingdom (UK) government's response to violent conflict appropriate? Is it effective in helping warring parties create lasting peace agreements? This study suggests that there are conceptual, policy, institutional and practice gaps in the UK's responses to violent conflict. The government should direct more of its diplomatic, political and economic resources to the resolution and prevention of conflict through increasing and improving support for peace processes.

[Daley, P., 2007, 'The Burundi Peace Negotiations: An African Experience of Peace-making', *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 34, no. 112, pp. 333 – 352](#)

What do the Burundi peace negotiations reveal about the neo-liberal conception of peace that informs conflict resolution in Africa? Using the Burundi peace negotiations as an example, this article examines neo-liberal conflict resolution in Africa. Peace negotiations should be seen as political struggles, beyond that between the belligerents, due to the involvement of supporting actors promoting vested interests. Resulting peace agreements are not necessarily consensual or compromises for the sake of peace, but rather temporary stalemates between international, regional and local actors.

[Hayner, P., 2009, 'Negotiating Justice: Guidance for Mediators', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva](#)

What are the options for securing justice in peace negotiations? What role can mediators play in ensuring that peace agreements effectively address issues of justice? This report provides guidance on the parameters and policy options for justice in peace negotiations. It argues that recent practice shows that there are ways to secure both justice and peace. While much depends

on negotiating parties, mediators can better equip themselves to offer advice to ensure stronger attention to justice issues in peace agreements.

[Vinjamuri, L. and Boesenecker, A., 2007, 'Accountability and Peace Agreements: Mapping Trends from 1980 to 2006', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva](#)

To what extent have peace agreements incorporated mechanisms for dealing with justice issues? This study analyses 77 verified peace processes from around the world between 1980 and 2006. Negotiating justice is a complex and difficult process, especially within a peace agreement involving a whole range of additional issues.

Third party mediation

Third party mediation can be broadly defined as “a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to change their perceptions or behaviour, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (Bercovitch 2009: 343). The ‘outsider’ may be an individual, a group, an organisation or a state. Mediation strategies and tools can range from the channelling of information to parties to the provision of incentives and pressure designed to influence the bargaining process. Although mediation is non-binding, it can contribute to a cessation of hostilities, a peace agreement, or a full settlement of a conflict.

The study of mediation has given much attention to the motivation of mediators and parties to the conflict to engage in mediation. Some argue that mediators are not always neutral, altruistic ‘outsiders’, but may have their own aims. Through the act of mediating, they become an actor in conflict relationships and dynamics.

Despite the potential for mediation to contribute to conflict management and to a lesser extent to conflict resolution, it has largely been treated as an isolated discipline. Though mediation has received much attention in academia, politicians and activists have not given it the same level of attention as peacekeeping and aspects of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The international climate for mediation has changed radically in the last ten years, with a rapid increase both in the diversity of actors involved in peace processes and the frequency of interventions. The field of third party mediation has faced a number of challenges which include the ‘global war on terror’, the growing influence of new powers such as China and India, and ongoing divisions within the UN. Recent research on the African Union has suggested that efforts should be made to build the capacity of international and regional organisations to engage in mediation, and to develop strategies and mediation units within the organisations.

The success of peace negotiations is determined by a number of factors, including the space and resources given to the process, the credibility of the facilitator and the characters of the negotiating teams and mediators. The success of mediation efforts can be enhanced if the motivations of conflict actors are carefully analysed and understood.

[Bercovitch, J., 2009, ‘Mediation and Conflict Resolution’, in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, eds., J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenjuk, and I. W. Zartman, SAGE, London, pp. 340-354](#)

Can particular mediation strategies be linked with successful outcomes? This chapter discusses definitions of mediation, its performance, influential factors and evaluations of outcomes. Certain styles of mediation tend to be more effective in certain situations; intense conflict, for example, is likely to require directive forms of mediation. Mediation may well offer the most coherent and

effective response to current conflicts, but greater understanding of the process and consistent guidelines are needed.

[Crocker, C., 2007, 'Peacemaking and Mediation: Dynamics of a Changing Field', International Peace Institute, New York](#)

This paper suggests that peacemaking will remain a central requirement for managing conflict and identifies some of the critical challenges for peacemakers. It identifies areas of consensus within the peacemaking field, highlights continuing debates, and discusses 'new emphases' that affect the way state-based or unofficial peacemakers operate. Capacity building for peacemaking at the regional and subregional levels should be prioritised, and greater coherence in peacemaking efforts should be pursued.

Slim, H., 2007, 'A Guide to Mediation: Enabling Peace Processes in Violent Conflicts', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva

[See full text](#)

[Nathan, L., 2005, 'Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise', Discussion Paper, no. 10, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London](#)

This paper examines the strategic and institutional dimensions of mediation. It argues that international mediation should involve confidence-building rather than coercive diplomacy and should be pursued (by highly proficient and experienced mediators) as a specialised activity. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union should establish the Panel of the Wise, a sub-structure of the Council, as an expert mediation unit that is independent of states.

[Potter, A., 2006, 'In Search of the Textbook Mediator', in Kings of Peace, Pawns of War: The Untold Story of Peace-making, ed. H. Martin, Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd, pp. 159-173](#)

While there has been a growing literature on conflict resolution and mediation, there are few studies that specifically examine the experience of individual mediators. This chapter examines the 'art' of mediation in armed conflict. Drawing on the experience of high-level mediators in Iraq, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Cyprus and Aceh, it argues that the character and actions of mediators are critical variables in determining the outcome of peace negotiations.

Griffiths, M. and Whitfield, T., 2010, 'Mediation Ten Years On: Challenges and Opportunities for Peacemaking', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), Geneva

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4032>

What is the role of mediation in contemporary conflict? This paper reflects on ten years of mediation by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. It argues that mediation is at a critical juncture. Drawing on experience in Africa, the Middle East and South and South East Asia, the authors discuss challenging patterns of armed conflict. They emphasise that mediation has transformed dramatically over the last decade. The United Nations is no longer the sole multilateral mediator: regional organisations are playing an important role, and individual states are increasingly active. Mini-coalitions of states have emerged to support peacemaking and there has been a rise in the number of independent mediators.

Giessmann, H. and Wils, O., 2009, 'Conflict Parties' Interests in Mediation', Berghof Policy Brief 01, Berghof Centre for Conflict Resolution

[See full text](#)

Conciliation Resources, 2009, 'Ending War: The Need for Peace Process Support Strategies', Accord Policy Brief 2009, Conciliation Resources, London

[See full text](#)

Track Two Mediation

The terms 'track one' and 'track two' are used to distinguish between governmental and non-governmental diplomacy. They also serve to acknowledge that mediation and dialogue should not be the sole domain of elites, but should take place at varying levels of society. Track two mediation is also referred to as unofficial mediation, private diplomacy and/or transformative mediation. Participants include, but are not limited to, civil society leaders, students, journalists, ex-combatants, and private sector actors. Strategies used here are mostly linked to conflict resolution.

Official mediation is expected to produce solutions that contribute to the termination of violent conflict and that address the core conflict issues; whereas unofficial mediation is ongoing and geared more toward dialogue and relationship transformation. The literature stresses the importance, however, of linking and coordinating track one and track two efforts in order to increase the likelihood of effective mediation outcomes.

[Mirimanova, N., 2009, 'Mediation and Dialogue: Official and Unofficial Strands', Case Study: Lessons from South Caucasus, Initiative for Peacebuilding Cluster, International Alert, London](#)

How effective is mediation and dialogue in protracted violent conflict? This paper explores approaches to and formats of mediation and dialogue, and the relevance and effectiveness of these strategies in the context of protracted violent conflicts, particularly in the South Caucasus. Mediation and dialogue cannot be contained in an ivory tower and need to be placed in a real-life conflict context characterised by violence, mistrust, political opportunism, vengeance and systemic injustice. The EU needs to develop a more nuanced understanding of the interplay of mediation and dialogue and the conflict context in which it operates.

[Kemper, B., 2007, 'Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts: The Contribution of Track-Two Mediation Activities to Prevent Violence in the Aceh Conflict', INEF Report, no. 88, Institute for Development and Peace, INEF, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg](#)

Under what conditions can "track-two" mediation conducted by non-governmental actors contribute to the prevention of violence in intrastate conflicts? This paper presents results of a case study of two intrastate mediation processes conducted by track-two mediators in Aceh. Results indicate that track-two mediation has the potential to prevent violent intrastate conflict as long as mediators enjoy political expertise and moral leverage.

Tripathi, S. and Gündüz, C., 2008, 'A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples and Implications for Third Party Mediation', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva

[See full text](#)

Monitoring and Evaluation

Although it may be difficult to attribute quantifiable results to specific mediation activities, attempts have been made to devise a framework of questions that can be used in assessing mediation activities.

[Lanz, D., Wählich, M., Kirchhoff, L. and Siegfried, M., 2008, 'Evaluating Peace Mediation', Initiative for Peacebuilding, Brussels](#)

How can accountability mechanisms be established for international peace mediation given that it takes place in extremely complex contexts and its contributions are difficult to grasp? This study has developed a framework for evaluating international mediation activities that differ from

standard methodologies. It proposes a series of non-suggestive evaluation questions that allow a systematic but flexible assessment of aspects of peace mediation.

Case Studies

[Möller, F., DeRouen Jr., K., Bercovitch, J., and Wallensteen, P., 2007, 'The Limits of Peace: Third Parties in Civil Wars in Southeast Asia, 1993-2004', *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 373-391](#)

Why isn't Asia a focus for third-party conflict management? Asia has a high number of warring parties and long-lasting civil wars. Yet it receives relatively little attention from third parties. This article focuses on Southeast Asia, where most Asian civil wars take place, and examines the effectiveness of third-party involvement. It argues in the absence of adequate diplomacy, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction, civil wars in Southeast Asia will continue to pose a serious threat to regional and international security.

[Morfit, M., 2007, 'The Road To Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia's Democratic Development', *International Negotiation*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 111-143](#)

What explains the success of the Helsinki agreement in securing a peaceful settlement of the Aceh conflict? This article uses interviews and first-hand accounts to analyse the political context that surrounded the Helsinki negotiations. It finds that the conventional explanations for the agreement's success fail to capture the complexity of the process and underestimate the beneficial influence it has had on Indonesia's democratic development.

Åberg, A., Laederach, S., Lanz, D., Litscher, J., Mason, S. J. A., and Sguaitamatti, D., 2008, 'Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes', Mediation Support Project, CSS, and Swisspeace, Zurich, Bern

[See full text](#)

McCartney, C., 2006, 'Dilemmas of Third-Party Involvement in Peace Processes: Reflections for Policy and practice from Colombia and the Philippines' Conciliation Resources, London

[See full text](#)

Van der Meulen and Van der Putten, 2009, 'Great Powers and International Conflict Management - European and Chinese Involvement in the Darfur and Iran Crises', Clingendael Institute, The Hague

[See full text](#)

Peace agreements

Peace agreements are formal agreements aimed at ending violent conflict and creating the conditions for durable peace. They include ceasefire agreements, interim or preliminary agreements, comprehensive and framework agreements, and implementation agreements. The way in which the conflict ends – whether by compromise, or a one-sided victory, for example - typically has implications for the nature of the peace.

The signing of a peace agreement is often considered to signal the end of the conflict. Much of the literature argues instead that this signals only the beginning of a process toward ending the conflict. Given that relapse into violence is common, full implementation of the peace agreement is seen as another key milestone.

The failure of peace agreements to end violence and armed conflict has been attributed to both national and international actors. Key parties to the conflict may agree to peace agreements for tactical reasons, without being genuinely committed to the peace process. International interveners are also often blamed for pressuring parties to sign agreements that are likely to fail due to insufficient resolution of key issues and root causes, or due to unrealistic time frames for implementation. In addition, peace agreements often fail to address important regional dimensions of conflict. Overall, the key challenge is to ensure that peace agreements address, and do not avoid, difficult areas such as power-sharing arrangements, composition of the army and transitional justice.

Dealing with 'spoilers'

Spoilers are defined as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997: 5). Peace agreements and peace processes can be sabotaged by adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement, dissatisfied followers who consider peace a betrayal of their key values, and excluded parties who seek to alter the process or destroy it. It is essential to assess who the potential spoilers are and to develop, coordinate and implement strategies to manage them.

More recent literature expands the definition of potential spoilers to include a range of geographically external actors, such as ethnic or national diaspora groups, political allies and multinational corporations.

The notion of a binary view of spoilers as either for or against conflict settlement and peace has been critiqued in recent research. Peace agreements themselves may be flawed and considered unjust. The liberal peace framework adopted in many peace agreements can exacerbate conflict in certain situations (see the [peacebuilding models](#) section of the peacebuilding component of this guide). ‘Spoilers’ in these contexts would not be aiming to destroy the peace, but rather to create a more durable peace. It is therefore important to analyse who is defining an actor or a group of actors as ‘spoilers’ and to develop a thorough understanding of the issues at stake.

[Stedman, S, 1997 ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, *International Security*, vol 22, no 2, pp5-53](#)

How can spoilers of peace processes be managed? This article argues that choosing an appropriate strategy to manage spoilers requires the correct diagnosis of the type of spoiler. To make an accurate diagnosis, an international actor must overcome 'organisational blinders' such as prior commitments to the spoiler. International actors' success in spoiler management will also depend on factors such as a coordinated strategy and the ability to create an external coalition for peace.

[Jones, B.D., 2001, 'The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars', *International Peace Academy and Centre for International Security and Cooperation*, Stanford University, New York](#)

International actors face recurrent challenges coordinating their efforts to implement peace agreements to end civil wars. This paper identifies strategic coordination amongst third-party actors as a critical element of successful peace implementation. Incoherence and inconsistency in strategy can undermine the viability or the effectiveness of implementation efforts. Strategic coordination is a growing policy challenge due to the increasing proliferation of actors with overlapping mandates, competitive relations and minimal accountability.

[Newman, E. and Richmond, O., 2006, 'Peacebuilding and Spoilers', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 101-110](#)

Why do many ceasefires and peace agreements in civil wars fail? How and why do some groups actively seek to 'spoil' the peace process? This article examines the concept of spoilers as a threat to security. It argues that imposed or ill-conceived peace processes can encourage spoiling. The presence of spoilers, however, does not necessarily indicate that a peace process is doomed to failure.

Power-sharing

Power-sharing refers to political arrangements that bring rival groups into joint governments and guarantee them representation in political and security institutions as well as a stake in the country's wealth. Power-sharing has increasingly become a component of peace agreements, particularly in conflicts defined as identity conflicts.

There is a key debate between those who assert that power-sharing is a necessary and effective tool for convincing parties to sign a peace agreement, for creating a new shared political order, and for protecting minority rights; and those who argue instead that power-sharing freezes war-time power balances, excludes new entrants, institutionalises identity divisions and prevents long-term societal transformation. A proposed compromise is to make power-sharing a temporary arrangement that evolves over time to include participation at the elite-level beyond parties to the agreement and of society in general. A more critical body of literature has argued that the recent international preference for power-sharing agreements has created perverse incentives for armed groups to continue fighting.

[Papagianni, K., 2008, 'Power-sharing, Transitional Governments and the Role of Mediation', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva](#)

Power-sharing transitional governments are common components of peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. They guarantee the participation of representatives of significant groups in political decision-making and reduce the danger that one group will become dominant. Power sharing among former enemies is difficult to manage and potentially conflict provoking. This paper argues that the international community therefore has an important role to play in assisting power-sharing governments to manage their country's political transition. It draws on examples from Burundi, Iraq, Cambodia, Nepal and Liberia.

See also: [Papagianni, K., 2007, 'Power-sharing: A Conflict Resolution Tool?', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva](#)

[Mehler, A., 2008, 'Not Always in the People's Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements', GIGA Research Programme: Violence, Power and Security, Working Paper 83, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg](#)

Peace agreements that place a heavy emphasis on power-sharing often preclude people's interests and can impede sustainable peace. This paper analyses the impact of power-sharing arrangements in recent African peace agreements. Many peace agreement failures are caused in part by the international community's support of power-sharing that benefits armed rebel movements to the detriment of long-term conflict solutions.

[Tull, D. M. and Mehler, A., 2005, 'The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa', African Affairs, vol. 104, no. 416, pp. 375-398](#)

This article argues that inconsistencies in Western political engagement, as well as a shift in international attitudes towards insurgent groups, have affected domestic power struggles across Africa. In particular, Western efforts to resolve conflicts through power-sharing agreements (providing rebels with a share of state power) have created incentives for politically ambitious

leaders to start insurgency warfare. Power-sharing agreements may therefore contribute to the cycle of insurgent violence and undermine conflict prevention.

Miklian, Jason, 2009. 'Post-Conflict Power Sharing: The Nepal Case', South Asia Briefing Paper, no. 2, PRIO, Oslo

[See full text](#)

For more discussion and resources on power-sharing in conflict contexts, see the [elections in post-conflict or fragile environments](#) section of the GSDRC's Political Systems guide

Decentralisation

The effectiveness of decentralisation in securing the peace has also been debated. In some situations, decentralisation may contribute to peace processes by resolving grievances, for example identity grievances. Decentralisation can allow for the expression of diversity and attention to local needs, such as language protection and local development. In other contexts, however, the creation of sub-districts that coincide with identity politics can reinforce and legitimise ethno-religious identities and create tensions. The establishment of local conflict-management mechanisms are essential in these cases.

[Brancati, D., 2006, 'Decentralisation: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?' International Organisation, vol. 60, pp. 651–685](#)

Does political decentralisation reduce ethnic conflict and secessionism? Or does it actually increase these threats to stability? This article explores why decentralisation is more successful in reducing conflict and secessionism in some countries than in others. While decentralisation may increase opportunities for participation in government, it can also indirectly increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by encouraging the growth of regional parties. The overall effect of decentralisation on ethnic conflict and secessionism therefore depends on the strength of regional parties.

Siegle, J. and O'Mahony, P., n.d., 'Assessing the Merits of Decentralisation as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy', Paper prepared for USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance

[See full text](#)

[Diprose, R. and Ukiwo, U., 2008, 'Decentralisation and Conflict Management in Indonesia and Nigeria', CRISE Working Paper no. 49, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity \(CRISE\), University of Oxford, Oxford](#)

How does decentralisation affect local-level conflict dynamics? Decentralisation can be a useful conflict-mitigating mechanism, but can also generate new tensions in communal, ethnic and religious relations. This paper examines grievances, demands, and identity in the context of decentralisation in Nigeria and Indonesia. Decentralisation processes need to address inequalities between groups and have in-built conflict management mechanisms if they are to improve rather than worsen conflict situations, or to avoid triggering new tensions in previously stable communities.

See also:

[Diprose, R., 2007, 'Passing on the Challenges or Prescribing Better Management of Diversity? Decentralisation, Power Sharing and Conflict Dynamics in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia', CRISE Working Paper, no. 38, University of Oxford](#)

How has decentralisation affected conflict dynamics in Indonesia? This paper examines the history of grievances, demands and identity politics since independence and explores the relationship

between structural change and conflict management in Central Sulawesi. Decentralisation has had both positive and negative indirect impacts on conflict. Whilst it has brought changes that interact with and potentially stimulate local tensions, effective interventions and strategies can channel these tensions into productive outcomes.

Sector-specific provisions

Peace agreements act as blueprints for recovery and peacebuilding processes. As such, it is important to ensure that sectors that are vital to securing the peace and transforming societies, such as justice and education, receive proper treatment and consideration - and give due attention to different groups in society including men and women, children and youth and minorities. Recovery in these sectors also signals a renewal of the social contract.

[Vinjamuri, L. and Boesenecker, A., 2007, 'Accountability and Peace Agreements: Mapping Trends from 1980 to 2006', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva](#)

To what extent have peace agreements incorporated mechanisms for dealing with justice issues? This study analyses 77 verified peace processes from around the world between 1980 and 2006. Negotiating justice is a complex and difficult process, especially within a peace agreement involving a whole range of additional issues.

[Dupuy, K., 2009. 'Education in Peace Agreements, 1989-2005', Conflict Resolution Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 149–166](#)

How has education been addressed in peace agreements? This paper aims to fill a gap in research by providing a systematic overview of the way education has been included in peace agreements and its role as a peacemaking strategy. The way in which education is addressed varies significantly in terms of what it entails, how it will be provided and to whom. Education should be considered an important element both of peace agreements and peace-building processes.

For discussion and resources on justice mechanisms in peace agreements, and the debate concerning peace versus justice, see the [transitional justice](#) section of the GSDRC's justice guide.

Ownership and civil society participation

The degree of ownership of peace agreements and the establishment of realistic timelines can determine whether agreements succeed. The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), for example, is considered to have failed in large part because the international community did not allow sufficient time for parties to overcome their mutual distrust, to tackle critical issues and to consult with their supporters in Darfur. The final content of the DPA was therefore not a product of locally negotiated compromises and agreement.

The extent to which peace agreements include provisions for civil society and IDPs can also impact upon the durability of agreements and the promotion of peace. Provisions have ranged from their involvement in humanitarian relief to their participation in transitional governance. It is commonly assumed that the more extensive the role of civil society, the greater the likelihood of achieving broad-based peace. New research cautions, however, that civil society organisations are not neutral and uniform in their advocacy for peace agreements; some organisations are identity-based, with particular agendas and some have actively opposed peace agreements. This opposition may stem though from an effort to improve upon agreements (see [dealing with 'spoilers'](#) section above).

[Nathan, L., 2006, 'No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement', Working Paper, Crisis States Research Centre, London](#)

How did the manner in which the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was negotiated contribute to its failure to establish peace? This article examines the process of negotiations that took place between November 2005 and May 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria, leading to the signing of the DPA. It argues that the deadlines imposed by officials and the intransigence of the parties at the talks prevented effective mediation and contributed to the failure of the DPA to achieve peace. Ending civil wars requires patience and peace agreements have to be shaped and owned by the parties, not forced upon them.

[Brickhill, J., 2007, 'Protecting Civilians Through Peace Agreements - Challenges and Lessons of the Darfur Peace Agreement', ISS Paper 138, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria](#)

Why did the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) fail to create conditions for civilian protection? This paper argues that this was largely a result of the failure to secure effective ceasefire arrangements, a prerequisite for the achievement of a political settlement. A potential ceasefire was lost to short-term political expediency that imposed a premature 'comprehensive' peace agreement on the parties. Peace agreements require coherent, effective and specific security provisions and transition strategies that link short-term stabilisation with longer-term security sector transformation.

[Bell, C., 2007, 'The People's Peace? Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy', International Political Science Review, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 293-324](#)

To what extent do peace agreements support participatory democracy? This article analyses the provision made by post-1990 peace agreements for civil society. It demonstrates the importance of peace processes to theories of civil society. It does not, however, draw conclusions about the relationship between provision for civil society and the success of peace agreements. Further research is needed to evaluate the role of civil society organisations in transitions towards peace.

[Mikhelidze, N. and Pirozzi, N., 2008, 'Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in Abkhazia, Israel/Palestine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Western Sahara', Policy Working Paper, no. 3, MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict, Institute of Development Studies \(IDS\), University of Sussex, Brighton](#)

How do civil society organisations (CSOs) impact upon conflict dynamics and conflict resolution efforts? This paper provides critical assessments of local CSO contributions in five conflict cases. It finds civil society facing similar problems across these five intractable conflicts. CSOs could develop this sector further through a number of measures, including actively promoting the values of democracy to be learnt and experienced on the ground.

McHugh, G., 2010, 'Integrating Internal Displacement in Peace Processes and Agreements', Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace and Brookings Institution

[See full text](#)

Conflict transformation

Conflict transformation refers to "approaches that seek to encourage wider social change through transforming the antagonistic relationship between parties to the conflict" (Buckley-Zistel 2008: 21). It is process and structure-oriented with an emphasis on social change. Conflict scholars and practitioners, such as Burton, Galtung, Lederach and Mitchell, have emphasised that peace agreements and peace processes will produce only a fragile peace in the absence of fundamental social change and transformation. Change and transformation require confronting myths,

perceptions and stereotypes of the 'other'; and developing and entrenching tolerance and respect for the 'other'.

Dialogue across fault-lines is considered essential for changes in attitudes and conflict transformation, in particular, empathetic, respectful dialogue that explores the conflict (The Transcend Method). Finding entry points for communication, based on shared problems; and a focus on mutual responsibilities as opposed to the apportioning of blame are important elements of fostering such dialogue.

Culture is also seen as a critical resource, as opposed to an obstacle. The transformation of societies is said to require culturally appropriate models of conflict mediation and resolution aimed at empowerment and recognition. Furthermore, the recognition of cultural diversity as a positive and enriching factor can over time contribute to the de-politicisation of identity and the promotion of coexistence.

[Galtung, J., 2000, 'Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means \(The Transcend Method\)', Participants' and Trainers' manual, United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme \(UNDMTP\), Geneva](#)

The Transcend Method is based on the central thesis that to prevent violence and develop the creative potential of a conflict, there has to be transformation. At the root of the method is the understanding of conflict as incompatible goals, meaning a problem to be solved; not as incompatible parties (persons, countries etc.), meaning one or more parties to be controlled (usually not oneself). This manual gives an overview of the approach and explains how to put it into practice. Transforming a conflict requires transcending the goals of conflicting parties, defining other goals, disembedding the conflict from its original situation and embedding it in a more promising place. This is achieved through dialogue based on empathy, non-violence and joint creativity. Failure to transform conflicts leads to violence.

[Mitchell, C. R., 2005, 'Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution. An Enquiry', Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berlin](#)

What is the relationship between conflict and change? How can an understanding of this relationship help resolve conflicts? This paper sets out a framework for thinking systematically about conflict and change. This distinguishes between change that: produces conflict, exacerbates conflict, reduces conflict or resolves conflict. While protracted conflict imposes numerous constraints, one universal factor can lead to change: the fact that human beings learn and, through learning, change.

[Buckley-Zistel, S., 2008, 'Violent Conflicts and their Termination', Chapter 1 in Conflict Transformation and Social Change in Uganda: Remembering after Violence, Palgrave/Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 12-29](#)

How can the termination of a conflict lead to a more sustainable peace? This chapter examines how different methods of violent conflict termination relate to prospects for long-term social change. Settlement, resolution and transformation differ significantly with regard to their understanding of the causes and nature of violent conflict. At the same time, the three different methods each involve assumptions about external conflict resolution, the effect on participants and wider impacts. Transformative methods - particularly traditional conflict resolution mechanisms - seem the most promising but are likely to require adaptation if they are to deal with violent intra-state conflict.

[Saunders, H. H., 2009, 'Dialogue as a Process for Transforming Relationships', in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, eds., J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenjuk, and I. W. Zartman, SAGE, London, pp. 376-390](#)

Dialogue is the essence of relationship; its goal is to create new human and political capacities for problem-solving. This chapter focuses on the definition and practice of dialogue. How does one craft a space for dialogue to unfold? Can it shift attitudes from power politics to relationship building? Sustained dialogue affords new opportunities in conflict resolution, but its achievements are limited in a short-term time frame.

[Hagg, G. and Kagwanja, P., 2007, 'Identity and Peace: Reconfiguring Conflict Resolution in Africa', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Special Issue on Identity and Cultural Diversity in Conflict Resolution in Africa, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 9-36](#)

What kind of conflict resolution approaches can effectively address intra-state wars based on identity? Liberal peace models were designed to deal with inter-state conflicts, and when applied to inter-ethnic conflicts bring limited success and often disastrous results. This article argues that identities should be seen as key assets in building sustainable peace, justice and reconciliation. Regional peace and security mechanisms and traditional justice approaches should be used and international justice mechanisms approached with caution.

For further discussion and resources on conflict transformation and relationship building, see [non-violence and local conflict management](#) below and the [reconciliation, social renewal and inclusiveness](#) section of the peacebuilding component of this guide.

Non-violence and local conflict management

Non-violent resistance

The basic principles of non-violent resistance encompass “an abstention from using physical force to achieve an aim, but also a full engagement in resisting oppression, domination and any other forms of injustice” (Dudouet 2008: 3). Actions range from non-violent protest and persuasion (e.g. formal statements, public assemblies and processions) to non-cooperation (e.g. strikes) to non-violent intervention (e.g. sit-ins and fasts). Non-violent resistance is considered particularly appropriate at early stages of latent conflict as a tool for marginal or disenfranchised communities. It has the power to encourage popular empowerment, apply pressure on opponents, and win sympathy of powerful third-parties – thus providing a stronger position from which to negotiate.

[Dudouet, V., 2008, 'Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power Asymmetries', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

In what context and under what conditions can nonviolent resistance (NVR) contribute to successful and sustainable conflict transformation processes? This research analyses constructive conflict transformation through NVR in the first Palestinian intifada (1987-1993). It argues that nonviolent struggles might support the goals of peacemaking and peacebuilding by transforming unbalanced power relations in preparation for conflict negotiations. Furthermore, by using self-limiting conflict strategies, it reduces inter-party polarisation and encourages democratic practices.

[Vukosavljevic, N., 2007, 'Training for Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation. Experiences of the "Centre for Nonviolent Action" in the Western Balkans', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

What are the effects and challenges of training for peacebuilding and non-violent action? This paper draws on experiences of the work of the Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA) in the Western

Balkans. CNA is a peace organisation driven by local activists that focuses on cross-border activities. There is no recipe for designing effective training but the content of training must match reality. The quality of the training depends on the trainer team's sense of what is right and fair.

Local conflict management

The capacity for non-violent local conflict management refers to processes, mechanisms, and institutions in a society that can peacefully and constructively manage conflict. This may include informal and/or traditional approaches to conflict resolution, community meetings, a culture of tolerance, a strong civil society, traditional courts and local judiciary.

Informal social networks of individuals and/or collectives, for example, are considered to have contributed to the absence of violent conflict in Northeast Asia, despite high levels of military expenditure and intra-regional distrust. These ongoing networks have provided some form of connection and understanding of the 'other'. They have countered demonization of the 'other' and allowed for the building of trust and long-term relationships.

Traditional conflict management mechanisms in Africa tend to focus on whole communities as parties to a dispute, as opposed to individuals. The aim of conflict management mechanisms is to restore social relationships and harmony; and to provide restitution through apology and compensation. The benefits of adopting local mechanisms are that they facilitate ownership and have greater resonance in societies than Western conflict management approaches. They may also be more effective in strengthening group unity. Disadvantages, however, are that they may exclude key groups such as women, children and youth. In addition, they are limited in their ability to address more far-reaching conflict between local communities and outside actors that follow different traditions and customs, such as state authorities or multinational enterprises. The existence of numerous, different parties to the conflict in Nigeria, for example, have resulted in complex conflict management approaches. The most effective method adopted is considered to be the development of a non-adversarial, participatory approach that allows the various stakeholders to share information and opinions and to engage in joint problem-solving.

[Weissmann, M., 2005, 'Informal Networks as a Conflict Preventive Mechanism', Chapter 5 in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia, ed. N. Swanström, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Washington and Nacka, Sweden, pp. 103-119](#)

Can informal social networks be effective in conflict prevention? This study looks at whether informal networks can have an impact on conflict preventive mechanisms, or function as such a mechanism by themselves. It also examines their potential as part of a Northeast Asian way of conflict prevention. Although informal networks are no panacea for conflict prevention and peace, they offer more customised methods of conflict prevention and reduce the risk of conflicting parties being drawn in to conflict.

[Boege, V., 2006, 'Traditional Approaches to Conflict Transformation: Potentials and Limits', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

Is there a role for traditional actors and institutions in peacebuilding? This paper assesses traditional approaches to conflict transformation in the context of contemporary violent conflicts in the South. The hybrid nature of contemporary conflicts needs to be taken into account for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Attention must be given to non-state traditional actors and methods and their combination with modern forms of conflict transformation. The analysis of conflict and approaches to the control of violence must overcome a state-centric perspective.

[Okoh, R. N., 2005, 'Conflict Management in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Participatory Approach', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 5, no. 1, pp.91-114](#)

How can a participatory approach help quell violent conflict? The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented spate of violence related to the impacts of oil and gas production. This paper recommends a collaborative problem-solving approach to conflict management in the region. This avoids problems associated with more adversarial approaches and gives all participants the chance to express their views and influence decisions. However, the participatory approach requires very careful planning, determination on the part of all stakeholders, plus highly skilled facilitators.

For further discussion and resources on local conflict management, see the [non-state justice and security systems](#) section in the transitional justice component of the GSDRC's justice guide.

Peacekeeping and peace support operations

The standard definition of peacekeeping refers to a “United Nations presence in the field (normally involving civilian and military personnel) that, with the consent of the conflicting parties, implements or monitors arrangements relating to the control of conflicts and their resolution, or ensures the safe delivery of humanitarian relief”. It is a technique initiated by the United Nations as a means for maintaining international peace and security (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations). Although there are a number of individual examples of failed peacekeeping missions, research suggests that, in general, peace support operations have helped to maintain stability.

UN peacekeeping and peace support operations have controversially expanded in recent years beyond this standard definition to incorporate concepts of humanitarian intervention, exemplified by the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine; aspects of humanitarian aid delivery and post-conflict peacebuilding; as well as counterinsurgency operations. This has resulted in increasing overlap between military and civilian actors (humanitarian actors, development agencies, civil society etc.) and the need for more coherent and coordinated actions. This trend has also led to overstretch, with limited resources struggling to deal with a growing number of interventions.

Furthermore, other organisations have increasingly engaged in peacekeeping operations including other international and regional organisations like NATO, the European Union, and the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (see [regional peace and security architecture](#)).

[Gowan, R. and Johnstone, I., 2007, ‘New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the “War on Terror”’, Working Paper, Coping with Crisis series, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, New York](#)

What are the key challenges for peacekeeping operations? How might these be overcome? This paper argues that peacekeeping should be thought of as a strategic tool, rather than a strategy, since it is not an end in itself. Many current peacekeeping missions are expected to carry out a mixture of protection, peacebuilding, and counter-insurgency. They require hybrid approaches that need to be better coordinated. A doctrine for ‘peace enforcement’ as the use of robust force for limited purposes must be developed.

[Fortna, V. P., 2004, ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No 2., pp. 269-292](#)

Does the presence of international peacekeepers contribute to more durable peace in the aftermath of civil war than when they are absent? This article analyses all civil conflicts between 1944 and 1997. Controlling as much as possible for the degree of difficulty of a particular case, it is clear that intervention by the international community does help to maintain peace. Across the

various types of peacekeeping missions, the presence of peacekeepers reduces the risk of another war by over 55 per cent.

Bah, A.S. (ed.), 2009, 'Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009', Briefing Paper, Center on International Cooperation at New York University

[See full text](#)

'Responsibility to protect' and humanitarian intervention

The 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), adopted at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, mandates that "each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity". The international community is to assist States in exercising this responsibility and in building their protection capacities (the prevention component). Where a State nonetheless fails to protect its citizens, the international community should be prepared to take collective action in a "timely and decisive manner" through the Security Council and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (the flexible response component).

The endorsement of R2P was a critical step in establishing a new global norm for the protection of civilians. Development and implementation of R2P, however, has been limited. The 'prevention component', although identified as the most important aspect in the ICISS report cited below, has received minimal political and academic attention. Regarding, the 'flexible response component', which has received much greater attention, states have still been reluctant to go very far in breaching state sovereignty. Further, the post-9/11 counterterrorism agenda and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have limited the political willingness and military capacity of Northern countries to take part in R2P missions. They have also produced scepticism on the part of Southern countries about humanitarian interventions.

In order to address these limitations, the UN Secretary-General appointed Edward Luck as Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect in 2007. There has also been increasing focus on the adoption of R2P principles by regional organisations. The African Union, for example, has established norms similar to that of R2P. This, however, has not yet been matched by the institutional capacities to deliver on its responsibilities.

[International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty \(ICISS\), 2001, 'The Responsibility to Protect', International Development Research Centre, Ottawa](#)

The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities; to prevent, react and rebuild. It is important to address both the root and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. States should respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution and in extreme cases military intervention. States must provide full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. This paper stresses that prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.

United Nations, 2009, 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', Report of the Secretary General, United Nations

[See full text](#)

[Bellamy, A., 2008, 'Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect', Global Governance, no. 2 \(April-June\), pp. 135-156](#)

Why has conflict prevention been neglected in the ongoing debates over global security? This article examines attitudes toward the international community's responsibility to prevent conflict since the publication in 2001 of the report *The Responsibility to Protect*. In explaining the relative neglect of prevention in debates about The Responsibility to Protect, it argues that the answer can be found in a combination of doubts about how wide the definition of prevention should be, political concerns raised by the use of prevention in the war on terrorism, and practical concerns about the appropriate institutional locus for responsibility.

[Cottey, A., 2008, 'Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: The New Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention', *Contemporary Politics*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 429-446](#)

How have peacekeeping and military intervention evolved since 9/11? This article argues that Western states have become reluctant to engage in the types of humanitarian interventions they undertook in the 1990s. A new model of operations is emerging, lying between traditional United Nations peacekeeping and classical humanitarian intervention. This new generation of peace operations indicates movement towards the view that the international community has a duty to intervene in internal conflicts and crises.

Stamnes, E., 2009, "'Speaking R2P" and the Prevention of Mass Atrocities', *Global Responsibility to Protect*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp.70-89

[See full text](#)

Aning, K. and Atuobi, S., 2009, 'Responsibility to Protect in Africa: An Analysis of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture', *Global Responsibility to Protect*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 90-113

[See full text](#)

Humanitarian aid delivery

The involvement of the military in humanitarian activity has increased in recent years due to its adoption as a strategy in counterinsurgency operations to 'win hearts and minds'. While this may in some contexts be a useful tactic for military operations, there are concerns that this interaction compromises humanitarian principles and undermines the security of humanitarian staff.

[Egnell, R., 2008, 'Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military Force in Humanitarian and Development Operations', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 397-422](#)

Does increased civil-military integration in peace operations lead to increased effectiveness? This paper examines emerging trends in civil-military integration in recent humanitarian interventions. While some integration might be appropriate, (based on careful analysis of involved actors and their interests), the benefits of greater military involvement should not be assumed. Further study is needed into the causal mechanisms of effectiveness in complex peace support operations. It may be best to preserve the humanitarian space based on the impartiality, neutrality and independence of humanitarian organisations.

For further discussion and resources on the involvement of the military in humanitarian aid delivery, see the [stabilisation](#) section of this guide.

Peacekeepers as peacebuilders

The recent expansion of UN peacekeeping missions into a range of peacebuilding activities has been the subject of much debate. Critics argue that peacekeeping missions are not properly designed for peacebuilding as they have limited mandates, resources and duration, as well as limited leverage over national decision-making. In addition, peacekeepers are usually not trained

in peacebuilding and may lack the necessary understanding of the situation or the history of the conflict. Proponents assert that military involvement in peacebuilding operations can be beneficial so long as guidelines are established for effective civil-military coordination that goes beyond humanitarian activities.

[Hazen, J. M., 2007, 'Can Peacekeepers Be Peacebuilders?' *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 323-338](#)

Are peacekeeping missions equipped to handle peacebuilding tasks? The role of UN peacekeeping missions has expanded beyond traditional tasks to include political, economic, and humanitarian activities. This article argues that peacekeeping missions are a poor choice for peacebuilding given their limited mandates, capacity, leverage, resources and duration. Peacekeepers should focus on peacekeeping, and laying the foundation for peacebuilding. Peacebuilding should be the primary task of national governments and their populations.

[De Coning, C., 2005, 'Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution \(ACCORD\)*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.89-118](#)

Can UN civil-military coordination (CIMIC) policies that have been developed to manage the relationship between humanitarian actors and military forces during the humanitarian emergency phase of conflict, be applied to manage the relationship between all civilian actors and UN military units during peacebuilding? This research suggests that UN CIMIC actions can make a positive contribution to the overall peacebuilding process if the military components' resources, energy and goodwill can be positively channelled in support of the overall mission objectives.

[Van der Lijn, J., 2009, 'If Only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations', *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, vol. 18, pp. 45-71](#)

How do principles from the literature on UN peacekeeping compare with lessons emerging from UN peace-building operations? This article identifies from the literature eleven clusters of factors for success and failure and tests these against four case studies – Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and El Salvador. Although results largely confirm the factors for success and failure found in the peacekeeping literature, theory on UN peacebuilding operations still needs adjustment.

Gender, Peacekeeping and Protection

Reports of peacekeeper involvement in sexual exploitation and abuse of local populations emerged in the 1990s. This resulted in the adoption of a zero-tolerance policy in UN peacekeeping operations. It also confirmed the need for a greater female presence in peacekeeping forces.

The inclusion of more women in peacekeeping forces has been recognised as desirable for several reasons. In addition to countering the incidences of exploitation and abuse, studies have shown that the presence of women in peacekeeping missions broadens the range of skills and styles available within the mission and improves access and support for local women. Women in conflict/post-conflict environments are more comfortable approaching women officers to report and discuss incidents of sexual assault. Given the high levels of sexual violence in conflict, this access and support is essential. In addition, in more conservative societies such as Afghanistan and Sudan, the presence of women peacekeepers has been imperative, as women there may be reluctant to speak with male officers. The presence of women officers can also provide role models and incentives for other women to seek leadership positions.

[Pillay, A., 2006, 'Gender, Peace and Peacekeeping: Lessons from Southern Africa', ISS Paper 128, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria](#)

Post-conflict conditions can create possibilities for the transformation of gender relations. This paper discusses the participation of women in post-conflict organisations. A comparison of the impact of women in peacekeeping missions in South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates that women help defuse post-conflict tensions and increase awareness of gender issues. The participation of women in peace processes indicates progress, but more transformative measures are needed to achieve gender equality.

[Jennings, K. M., 2008, 'Protecting Whom? Approaches to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations', Fafo, Oslo](#)

Is the zero-tolerance policy toward sexual exploitation and abuse having a positive impact on UN peacekeeping missions? This report reviews evidence from missions in Haiti and Liberia and concludes that the policy is yielding mixed results. It contends that the policy's difficulties stem from implementation problems and contextual challenges that would be eased by better communication and clarity as to the intents and purposes of the zero-tolerance approach.

Jennings, K. and Nikolić-Ristanović, V., 2009, 'UN Peacekeeping Economies and Local Sex Industries: Connections and Implications', MICROCON Research Working Paper 17, Brighton
[See full text](#)

The following study attempts to map the implementation of human rights and gender mandates in various UN and EU peace operations, such as the missions in El Salvador, Cambodia, Haiti and the Balkans.

Boehme, J., 2008, 'Human Rights and Gender Components of UN and EU Peace Operations: Putting Human Rights and Gender Mandates into Practice', German Institute for Human Rights
[See full text](#)

Case studies

[Friesendorf, C. and Penksa, S., 2008, 'Militarized Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina', International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 677-694](#)

What are the causes and problems of militarised law enforcement in peace operations? How can these be addressed? This paper examines the role of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the military can contribute to law enforcement, such involvement is generally hindered by fear of 'mission creep' and lack of preparedness. Preferable alternatives to military involvement (such as international civil police forces collaborating with local officials) are obstructed by lack of political will. Law enforcement should be addressed early and systematically by the deployment of robust forces that avoid excessive use of force.

Bah, A.M.S., and Johnstone, I., 2007, 'Peacekeeping in Sudan: The Dynamics of Protection, Partnerships and Inclusive Politics', The Centre on International Cooperation, New York
[See full text](#)

ICG, 2009, 'China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping', Asia Report, no. 166, ICG, Brussels
[See full text](#)

Additional Resources

For discussion and resources on coherence and coordination of various actors in peace and security missions, see the section on [peace and security architecture](#) of this guide.

CHAPTER 4:

RECOVERING FROM

VIOLENT CONFLICT

Humanitarian Aid, Early Recovery and Stabilisation

INTRODUCTION	83
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT	84
EARLY RECOVERY	85
STABILISATION	87

Introduction

The term 'post-conflict' is widely used, yet can be difficult to define. The term is also contradictory in nature as conflict is inherent in every society; thus, there can theoretically be no 'post-conflict' period. Nonetheless, this term is widely used in practice to refer to the period after large-scale violence has ended. This is often considered to be the phase that begins following a ceasefire or a peace agreement.

There is consensus, however, that hostilities and conflict dynamics do not end abruptly. There is never a clear transition from war to peace or conflict to post-conflict. Rather, low level or sporadic fighting may continue; violence may persist in other forms, such as violent crime, organised crime and gender-based violence; and peace agreements can be derailed. In addition, compromises made to appease belligerents in order to secure peace agreements may in some cases institutionalise conflict dynamics. Many conflict analysts have critiqued the Dayton Peace Agreement, for example, for institutionalising 'ethnic cleansing' with the partition of the country based on ethnic grounds.

Given the complexities of 'post-conflict' settings, it is essential that actors seeking to engage in recovery efforts conduct comprehensive assessments. The aim of such assessments is to assist actors to understand the environment in which they will be operating, to determine country priorities and needs, and to plan recovery strategies and activities.

Evaluations of prior international interventions in conflict-affected countries have found that although the international community was effective in ending armed conflict, it was less successful in its post-peace agreement efforts. Weaknesses identified include: insufficient engagement with civil society; failure to prioritise development from the outset; failure to mainstream gender; insufficient attention to the regional dimensions of conflict; the undermining of national structures through the creation of parallel structures; and an excessive preoccupation with security (see UNDP 2006).

[Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F., 2008, 'A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview', Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity \(CRISE\) Oxford University, Oxford](#)

Which policies to promote sustainable peace-building and socio-economic development are needed in different types of post-conflict environment? This paper offers a typology of post-conflict environments, suggesting that policy choice should be informed by three key variables: the state of economic development; the presence of high-value natural resources; and the existence of sharp horizontal inequalities. Four enabling conditions are also important in determining policy options and effectiveness - the state of security, the commitments of the international community to the country, state capacity and the inclusivity of government.

[Keen, D., 2000, 'War and Peace: What's the Difference', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1-22](#)

What do war and peace have in common, and how can understanding this help in understanding transitions between the two? This article suggests that the conventional model of war as 'a fight to win' is often misleading. War may in fact offer a promising environment for the pursuit of aims that are also prominent in peacetime. Peacebuilding interventions therefore need to influence the cost-benefit calculations of conflict parties so that peace becomes the more attractive option.

UNDP, 2006, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict Affected Countries*, United Nations Development Programme, New York

[See full text](#)

[Kievelitz, U. and Schaef, T., 2004, 'Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations', a joint project of the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and United Nations Development Group, New York](#)

How can post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) be enhanced? Generally, PCNAs are jointly carried out by the UN and the World Bank, sometimes in conjunction with other key donor agencies. This guide aims to support current efforts among these agencies to further enhance their engagement in the PCNA by learning from available experience. It draws strongly on material from recent needs assessments in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq and Liberia.

Humanitarian assistance and transition to development

Debates about linking humanitarian assistance and development emerged in the 1990s and the term 'relief-development continuum' was then coined. This approach aimed to identify complementary objectives and strategies in relief and development aid, and to promote the concept that humanitarian assistance could provide a foundation for recovery and the development of sustainable livelihoods. The adoption of the continuum concept also focused attention on the need to bridge the funding and operational gap that typically arose between emergency aid and development programming. The concept of a chronological continuum was subsequently rejected by international aid actors as over simplistic, leaving the problems of the humanitarian-development gap unaddressed. Attempts to fill this gap have re-emerged with the concept of 'early recovery' (see [early recovery](#)).

New debates about humanitarian assistance have arisen in the post-9/11 context, with growing emphasis on linking humanitarian aid, development and security. Although integrated missions can be beneficial and serve the aims of coherence and coordination (see the section on [coherence, coordination, sequencing and funding mechanisms](#)), there are concerns about the securitisation of aid and challenges to the neutrality of humanitarian assistance (see [stabilisation](#) and [peacekeeping and peace support operations](#)).

[Harmer, A. and Macrae, J., 2004, Chapter 1 in *Beyond the Continuum: The Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises*, HPG Report 18, Overseas Development Institute \(ODI\), London](#)

Until recently, assistance to countries in protracted crises was seen only in terms of humanitarian aid. How has this changed? This review argues that there has been a shift in the linking of relief and development. It suggests that policy has moved towards areas of shared responsibility. However, it warns that humanitarian actors must communicate more clearly and fully the distinctiveness of their experience in these environments and work with development actors to explore common ground.

[Stoddard, A. and Harmer, A., 2005, 'Room to Manoeuvre: Challenges of Linking Humanitarian Action and Post Conflict Recovery in the New Security Environment', Human Development Report Occasional Paper, United Nations Development Programme, New York](#)

What role should humanitarian actors play in conflict and post-conflict situations? Should humanitarian and development actors pursue distinct or shared agendas? This report examines some of the challenges facing humanitarian operations in the new global security environment. Challenges relate to the large number of actors and mandates involved in situations of conflict and protracted crisis - and a lack of clarity over how humanitarian, development and security actors should work alongside each other. This lack of clarity has resulted in a blurring of roles, which has in some cases undermined the concept of neutrality in humanitarian assistance.

[Buchanan-Smith, M. and Fabbri, P., 2005, 'Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response: A Review of the Debate', Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London](#)

The challenge of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) has preoccupied aid organisations for over a decade. What does it mean? How can it be done? This paper gives an overview of the literature and informs LRRD-themed evaluations. While much has been written about LRRD, shifts in agency approach and practice do not appear to have matched recommendations.

Early recovery

The Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER), led by the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, defines 'early recovery' as: "a multidimensional process of recovery that begins in a humanitarian setting. It is guided by development principles that seek to build on humanitarian programmes and catalyze sustainable development opportunities. It aims to generate self sustaining, nationally owned, resilient processes for post crisis recovery. It encompasses the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and rule of law, environment and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations".

Early recovery is a concept that seeks to resolve the strategic, operational, financing and coordination gaps that have existed in the past between relief and development work. Rather than treating relief and development as separate interventions that occur sequentially, early recovery requires that development work is integrated into relief efforts and begins as early as possible (in the case of conflict, often before the peace process is complete).

There are multiple requirements for establishing the foundations of longer-term recovery at an early stage. These include: early needs assessment, planning and resource mobilisation for recovery that takes into account the different needs, resources and vulnerabilities of women and men; early efforts to develop state capacity, including training of civil servants; the reestablishment of essential services and rebuilding of livelihoods; the integration of emergency shelter, transitional shelter and permanent shelter into one reconstruction process; and the creation of strategic alliances between communities and local authorities ensuring the participation and inclusion of vulnerable, marginalised and discriminated groups. At all stages of the early recovery process, donors should seek to understand existing local recovery mechanisms and to build upon them.

[Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery \(CWGER\), 2008, 'Guidance Note on Early Recovery', Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme \(UNDP\), Geneva](#)

What is early recovery? How can early recovery activities be best coordinated with humanitarian and development activities in post-crisis situations? This note outlines how to implement early recovery in areas affected by natural disaster or conflict. It argues that early recovery coordination can be an interface between the humanitarian and development communities, bridging the gap between crisis response and longer-term recovery.

Bailey, S. and Pavanello, S., 2009, 'Untangling Early Recovery', HPG Briefing Paper, No. 38, Overseas Development Institute, London

[See full text](#)

United Nations, 2009, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict', Report, no. A/63/881-S/2009/304, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, New York

[See full text](#)

Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2008, 'UNDP Policy on Early Recovery'

[See full text](#)

Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER), 2006, 'Implementing Early Recovery', Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)

[See full text](#)

[Chandran, R., Jones, B. and Smith, N., 2008, 'Recovering from War: Gaps in Early Action', A Report by the NYU Centre on International Cooperation for the UK Department for International Development, New York University, New York](#)

How can international support for early recovery following conflict be improved? This report recommends measures to bridge three key gaps in the international response in the early recovery phase: gaps in strategy, financing and capacity. Work across all three areas is needed, and must start with an assessment of national capacity, or 'the state of the state'. The deeply political nature of post-conflict recovery cannot be overemphasised.

Livelihoods and employment

The restoration of livelihoods is often a key goal of relief efforts. In conflict situations however, livelihoods cannot be restored simply by restoring assets – a common approach adopted in relief efforts. Rather, as argued in the case of Darfur, systemic issues such as insecurity, land rights, unequal access to resources, and the lack of public infrastructure are closely connected to livelihoods and need to be addressed in early recovery efforts.

Livelihoods and employment are crucial in post-conflict environments for the success of reintegration programmes for demobilised combatants and refugees and internally displaced persons; as well as for conflict-affected populations more generally. Certain sectors, such as the construction sector, have high growth potential in post-conflict environments, as much infrastructure needs to be rebuilt. It is essential, however, that jobs created in these sectors are directed at local populations and not just contracted out to international workers.

Young, H. and Osman, A. M., 2006, 'A Situation Analysis of the Ongoing Conflict and its Continuing Impact on Livelihoods', Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, Medford Massachusetts

[See full text](#)

[Collier, P., 2007, 'Post-Conflict Recovery: How Should Policies be Distinctive?' Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford](#)

Should post-conflict economic policies be distinctive from other developing country policies? This paper examines available evidence from post-conflict countries to assess the applicability of various economic policies in such settings. It concludes that post-conflict environments are distinctive situations and require different interventions to stimulate economic recovery and, ultimately, long-term peace.

For additional discussion and resources on employment and livelihoods, see the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section of this guide.

Refugees and internally displaced populations

Refugees and IDPs require not only immediate humanitarian assistance but also interventions to help secure durable solutions, such as livelihoods and employment. Assessments of refugee and IDP needs should be conducted as early as possible in the displacement cycle. The participation of refugees, IDPs and affected populations is essential as a right in itself and also to ensure that interventions are effective in meeting their needs. Effective participatory assessments should provide for separate, structured discussions with women, girls, men and boys of diverse ages and backgrounds in order to understand their specific protection risks, capacities, priorities and solutions.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) - Protection Cluster and Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, 2007, 'Protection of Conflict-Induced IDPs: Assessment for Action', UNHCR, Geneva
[See full text](#)

Mailer, M., 2008, 'From Emergency to Recovery: Rescuing Northern Uganda's Transition, Oxfam Briefing Paper, Oxfam International
[See full text](#)

Kälin, W., 2010, 'Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons' UNHCR, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Feb 2010, Human Rights Council Thirteenth session, A/HRC/13/21/Add.4
[See full text](#)

For additional discussion and resources on refugees and IDPs, see the [refugees and IDPs](#) section of this guide.

Stabilisation

Stabilisation, as defined and developed by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), is "an approach used in violent situations where it is difficult or impossible to pursue conventional programmes. Its aims are explicitly political: to help establish and sustain a legitimate government. And it often involves a degree of military coercion to reduce violence sufficiently to allow recovery, development and peacebuilding programmes" (DFID 2008)

Stability requires a political settlement between local actors (see [political settlements](#) in the GSDRC's fragile states guide). International intervention is often necessary, however, to compensate for weak domestic institutions and political processes. The 'exit plan' for stabilisation is for the state to provide the functions, in particular security, essential for long-term stability.

Diplomatic and development actors play important roles in supporting the political process and helping government to fulfil its functions. In the absence of security, however, the military often plays a critical role in stabilisation efforts – providing the essential security that allows non-military actors to operate. Should the military have to play a counterinsurgency role, there is a risk that humanitarian and development work that occurs alongside may be perceived as political in nature as well and targeted. Guidance on stabilisation stresses that it is essential to assess and address such risks.

[Stabilisation Unit, 2008, 'The UK Approach to Stabilisation: Stabilisation Unit Guidance Notes', Stabilisation Unit, London](#)

What lessons have been learned from UK experience in stabilisation interventions? This document outlines emerging best practice guidance on how to assess, plan, resource and carry out stabilisation operations. Major lessons of experience so far are to: recognise the complexity and uncertainty of the action required; ensure an integrated, comprehensive approach between local authorities and external partners; and build on as much understanding and sensitivity to the local environment as can be generated.

Socioeconomic programming

The importance of economic well-being in the immediate period after hostilities is increasingly emphasised in the conflict literature. Livelihood creation, however, is still often relegated to a lower priority. This has been the case even in Iraq, where only US\$805 million of the nearly US\$20 billion of U.S.-appropriated funds to reconstruct Iraq was directed at jump-starting the private sector (Mendelson-Forman and Mashatt 2007). There should be more consistent efforts in immediate 'post-war' situations to provide for employment and income generation.

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are a tool that is increasingly relied upon to deliver timely and noticeable effects on the ground. They can include delivering basic services (such as water, health or education), improving employment and income generating opportunities or contributing to local security. They are particularly necessary as community contribution mechanisms may be limited. There is, however, also a danger of creating aid dependencies. Hence, such an approach has to be subject to sound assessment of the transition to more development-oriented approaches. In Nepal, for example, some development agencies integrated quick impact measures to promote livelihoods into their existing development projects in the immediate aftermath of war (Paffenholz 2006).

Donors often take the lead in the delivery of services in stabilisation contexts due to weak state capacity. At the same time, however, one of the goals of stabilisation is to enhance state legitimacy. In order to resolve this discrepancy, the literature on stabilisation advises that irrespective of the state's capacity, public information should seek to maximise the state's association with programmes, as this can help enhance its legitimacy. The literature also stresses the importance of understanding the complex bargaining processes that surround aid programmes in post-conflict contexts.

[Mendelson-Forman, J. and Mashatt, M., 2007, 'Employment Generation and Economic Development in Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations', Stabilisation and Reconstruction Series, No. 6, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

What role can employment generation play in stabilisation and immediate post-conflict environments? Is it appropriate to focus on livelihood creation in the first year after the cessation of fighting? This report suggests that employment generation and economic development should be given a high priority in reconstruction efforts.

[GSDRC, 2009, Service Delivery and Stabilisation, Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

The most commonly cited potential benefits of service delivery in post-conflict environments are that visible delivery enhances state legitimacy, strengthens the social contract and hence, promotes state building. Delivery of services can also address underlying causes of conflict, i.e. social exclusion, and services such as health can be used as entry points for wider peace-building processes. American military experts often use the term ‘health diplomacy’ when talking about health interventions as a means of achieving strategic objectives in stabilisation contexts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, while at the same time aiming for a positive impact on the health sector as a whole. However, various commentators argue that there is little evidence to suggest that even major improvements in health services delivery have proved a singularly important factor in the consolidation of the peace process or in the successful passage from transitional government to a more stable political environment. This may be because, as other experts suggest, the legitimacy of the state depends on much more than the delivery of services and that stabilisation, therefore, requires a more multi-pronged and multi-layered approach.

Goodhand, J. and Sedra, M., 2009, ‘Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction, and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan’, *Disasters*, Volume 34, Issue 1, pp. 78-102

[See full text](#)

Specker, L., 2008, ‘Integrating Socio-economic Recovery into Post-Conflict Stabilisation Programmes’, CRU Policy Brief, no. 7, Clingendael Institute, The Hague

[See full text](#)

Paffenholz, T., 2006, ‘Nepal: Staying Engaged in Conflict: Experiences and Lessons Learned from Conflict Sensitive Programme Management in Fragile Contexts with Armed Conflict’, *Asia Brief: Approaches*, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Bern

[See full text](#)

For additional materials on socioeconomic programming, see the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section.

Media

The capacity of the media to influence progress in conflict-affected countries has been increasingly explored in recent years. A coherent and effective media strategy may contribute to the mitigation of post-war tensions by elevating moderate voices and dampening extremist ones, and allowing peaceful outlets for ongoing conflict management and dialogue. If media plans are not well designed, however, there is a risk that the media could reinforce divisions or that a weak media sector could be vulnerable to exploitation by warlords, political patrons, and spoilers.

[Bajraktari, Y. and Hsu, E., 2007, ‘Developing Media in Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations’, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

What strategies, tool and methods work best in the development of post-war media institutions? In war-torn societies, the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media is critical to fostering long-term peace and stability. This report aims to provide guidance by drawing on best practices from past and present post-war media development efforts. A permanent, indigenous mechanism dedicated to monitoring media development is critical to fostering a healthy, independent media sector. It is particularly important to monitor hate speech.

For further discussion and resources on the media in conflict and peacebuilding contexts, see [the media](#) section in this guide.

Cultural preservation

The protection of cultural heritage is another area that requires greater attention. The looting of Iraq's museums and archaeological sites in the immediate aftermath of the 2003 invasion has resulted in the devastating loss of Iraqi history and common heritage, essential for nationhood. The capacity to protect cultural sites during and after armed conflict must be strengthened. Military doctrine needs to incorporate concern for cultural property, possibly through training and awareness campaigns. Some analysts recommend that international police units, which may be better able to deal with civil disturbances and illicit activities than the military, should be deployed during armed conflict and in post-conflict stability operations.

Detwiler, E., 2008, 'Iraq's Cultural Heritage: Preserving the Past for the Sake of the Future', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

For further discussion and resources on cultural preservation in conflict contexts, see 'cultural heritage' in the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section of this guide.

Role of women

The participation and leadership of women in the immediate stabilisation period can serve as a 'window of opportunity' to empower women, promote gender equality, and advance women's position in society. Initiatives, funding, and projects that incorporate women, however, have largely been *ad hoc* and limited. There needs instead to be an overarching strategy with corresponding resources that ensures the inclusion of women in stabilisation operations.

[Conaway, C.P., 2005, 'Charting Progress: The Role of Women in Reconstruction and Stabilisation Operations', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

To what extent are women included in reconstruction initiatives after conflict? This report argues that despite progress within the US government to recognise the importance of women's inclusion in stabilisation and reconstruction operations, no overarching strategy or programme exists to ensure implementation. An ongoing capability must be institutionalised within the US government to enhance the role of women. Action taken prior to an intervention will improve the success of the mission.

For further discussion and resources on women in conflict and peacebuilding contexts, see the section on [women in conflict-affected areas](#) in this guide.

Monitoring and evaluation

Research on monitoring and evaluation practices caution that individual agencies often judge progress in large part on the basis of resources spent or the implementation of projects rather than their impact on stabilisation. This has made it difficult to determine the actual impact of interventions.

Devising indicators is also difficult in stabilisation contexts, as changes sought often relate to the attitudes and perceptions of local populations. Still, there are simple monitoring and evaluation tools that can be used to provide some indications, such as the use of proxies. The amount of travel along key routes, for example, may be a reliable indicator of how secure people feel.

[Cohen, C., 2006, 'Measuring Progress in Stabilisation and Reconstruction', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

Measuring progress is essential to the success of stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. This report examines the shortcomings of current processes, including the tendency to measure implementation rather than impact. Proper assessment tools and reliable measures of progress are needed to enable policymakers to take stock of the challenges before intervening and to continuously track the progress of their efforts towards stabilisation. Political will is also essential to ensure leadership and cooperation across organisational boundaries.

Case Study: Afghanistan

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a security and stabilisation force, with combat units that conduct joint security operations with the Afghan government's forces. It has provided security necessary for the implementation of diplomatic and development programmes and the strengthening of a new political order, under President Hamid Karzai. Much of the conflict literature on Afghanistan highlight however that the focus of ISAF operations in Kabul has left the rest of Afghanistan vulnerable to takeover by non-state actors, including armed militias, drug barons and traffickers, who have sought to undermine the central government.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are civil-military organisations that were established in 2002 to provide security and reconstruction outside of Kabul and to extend the reach of the Afghan government beyond the capital. PRTs have been controversial, however. Their attempts to build up good will with local populations through the construction of schools, clinics, wells, and other small village improvements have been criticised for securitising aid. Relief agencies have argued that blurring the distinction between combatants and humanitarian workers has put them at risk. In addition, research has found that "Afghan populations are sceptical about military intentions, and are not fooled by simplistic material incentives designed to 'win hearts and minds'" (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Wardak, and Zaman 2008: 8).

[Saikal, A., 2006, 'Afghanistan's Transition: ISAF's Stabilisation Role?', Third World Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 525-534](#)

What role has the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) played in Afghanistan? This article provides an overview of conditions in Afghanistan and discusses the expanding structure and function of ISAF. It argues that the ISAF has made important contributions to stabilisation and reconstruction. Yet it has also suffered shortcomings, arising mainly from tensions between the US and NATO allies. Nonetheless, the ISAF model is worth studying for future international deployments in conflict zones.

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam S., Wardak, M., Zaman, I., 2008, 'Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations' Research conducted for the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)

[See full text](#)

USAID, 2006, 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, USAID, Washington, D.C.

[See full text](#)

Perito, R. M., 2005, 'The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified', Special Report, no. 152, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

[See full text](#)

Peacebuilding

INTRODUCTION	92
PEACEBUILDING MODELS.....	93
STATE-BUILDING AND PEACEBUILDING.....	97
GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING	99
SOCIOECONOMIC RECOVERY	105
RECONCILIATION, SOCIAL RENEWAL AND INCLUSIVENESS.....	113
NON-STATE ACTORS AND PEACEBUILDING	118
REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs).....	123

Introduction

Peacebuilding, as defined by the United Nations, involves “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives”.

This understanding of peacebuilding reflects the growing consensus that peace requires more than the absence of direct or physical violence (‘negative peace’ as defined by Johan Galtung). Instead, it is a long-term process that should aim to achieve the absence of indirect or structural violence (‘positive peace’ as defined by Galtung). Positive peace incorporates notions of social justice and social cohesion.

Peacebuilding has come to be seen as the collective, strategic framework under which security, humanitarian, governance, development, social cohesion and social capital, and reconciliation dimensions can be brought together to address the causes and impact of conflict and build mechanisms for non-violent conflict management. Recognition of the importance of local context and capacities, and the participation of a wide range of local actors in peacebuilding is essential.

United Nations, 2009, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict’, Report, no. A/63/881-S/2009/304, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, New York

[See full text](#)

[Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M., and Sitea, L., 2007, 'Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?', *Global Governance*, 13, pp. 35-38](#)

How is peacebuilding interpreted in meaning and practice? To what extent has it been institutionalised? Peacebuilding is generically defined as external interventions designed to prevent armed conflict. This article surveys twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental bodies that are active in peacebuilding. It analyses how they conceptualise and operationalise their peacebuilding mandate, along with mapping areas of potential concern. It finds that most programmes have focused on the immediate or underlying causes of conflict, to the relative neglect of state institutions.

For resources on coherence and coordination of peacebuilding missions, see the section on [coherence, coordination, sequencing and funding mechanisms](#) in this guide.

Peacebuilding models

The liberal peace model

The liberal peace model, which emerged at the end of the 1980s, is premised on the belief that the promotion of a liberal democracy and market-oriented economy in post-conflict countries will create the conditions for lasting peace. Democratisation, under this model, is considered essential for creating the space for non-violent conflict management and resolution, and market economics is seen as the best method of promoting economic growth.

While still perceived as the dominant model, the liberal peace model has been subject to much criticism. Some theorists and practitioners portray it as top-down, formulaic and ethnocentric. They argue that the imposition of an external model that is disconnected from societies will undermine the legitimacy of institutions and participation in such institutions. The liberal peace project is not equally foreign to all countries, however. Post-conflict societies in which some form of democratic institutions may have already existed, for example, may fare better under this model.

The liberal peace model has also been criticised for failing to address societal tensions, fear and distrust that persist from the conflict, resulting in an unstable peace. In some cases, political and economic liberalisation processes may even exacerbate tensions. High levels of societal competition, sparked by liberalisation, and the absence of a state that can peacefully manage disputes, may increase the risk of renewed violence. Economic stabilisation processes can also intensify social exclusion, inequality and marginalisation. A more gradual approach has been proposed, which delays democratic and market reforms until a basic network of domestic institutions are in place. These institutions include social-safety nets, moderate media channels and cross-cutting associations that can build social capital.

The liberal peace model has been not been applied consistently. A range of actors are involved in these interventions, and they pursue multiple objectives using a variety of approaches. The model is often mediated by complex negotiations with local actors, leading to outcomes that often diverge sharply from intervening parties' stated objectives.

[Paris, R., 2004, 'Introduction', in *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, pp.1-10](#)

What is the relationship between liberalisation, institution building and peace in countries that are just emerging from civil conflict? This book examines post-conflict operations between 1989 and 1999. This introductory chapter outlines the author's argument that while peacebuilders should preserve the broad goal of converting war-shattered states into liberal market democracies, peacebuilding strategies need to build effective institutions before liberalisation takes place.

See also:

Paris, R., 2010, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 36, pp. 337-365
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=7589576>
http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/Saving_Liberal_Peacebuilding_FINAL.pdf

[Kurtenbach, S., 2007, 'Why Is Liberal Peace-building So Difficult? Some Lessons from Central America' GIGA Working Paper, no. 59, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Latin American Studies](#)

Has the liberal peace-building model been successful in addressing the challenges faced by post-war societies? This paper examines peace processes in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. It finds that outside of the historical example of Western Europe, the termination of war does not necessarily represent a critical juncture for pacification, democracy and market liberalisation. Central American post-war societies do not provide proof for a self-enforcing cycle of peace, democracy and development assumed by liberal peace-building, but demonstrate instead a negative cycle of social exclusion, criminality and weak governance and development.

[Suhrke, A., 2007, 'Reconstruction as Modernisation: The Post-conflict Project in Afghanistan?', *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, pp. 1291-1308](#)

How successful has the recent post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan been in the light of historical experiences of similar reforms? This article argues that the conflation of post war reconstruction with a broader agenda for development and modernisation has brought out a wide range of tensions associated with social change. The entire project shows signs of severe contradictions that are adding to the problems caused by the growing insurgency.

Goodhand, J. and Walton, O., 2009, 'The Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding? International Engagement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 303-323

[See full text](#)

Alternative contextual approaches to the liberal peace

Despite criticisms of the liberal peace model, a viable full-fledged alternative model has arguably yet to emerge. There have, however, been different adaptations of and approaches to the liberal peace model.

In the Middle East, both the Gulf States and Jihad Al Bina (the reconstruction wing of Hezbollah) adopted a model in Lebanon that had aspects that were similar and different to the Western model. A key divergence was the reliance by Jihad Al Bina and Gulf States on unconditional cash transfers to affected families. These were considered to be beneficial as they were instantaneous and unencumbered by bureaucracy and gave recipients choice and a sense of autonomy.

In Africa, the African Union and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) have identified the dismantling of exploitative war economies as a priority for promoting peace. This has resulted in the articulation of a 'developmental peacekeeping' model that seeks to achieve sustainable political and economic development that will promote the advancement of democracy and the dismantling of war economies and conflict systems.

These locally-grounded approaches have led some authors to present a 'popular' peacebuilding model as an alternative to liberal peacebuilding. This approach is deemed more locally legitimate because it is based on local, everyday realities. A variant of this 'popular peacebuilding' model is 'republican peacebuilding'. This approach emphasises representation and the fostering of legitimacy and stability in post-conflict settings. It is less concerned with the liberal principles of preserving the autonomy of the individual from the state and the promotion of civil society.

[MacGinty, R., 2007, 'Reconstructing Post-war Lebanon: A Challenge to the Liberal Peace?', Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 457-482](#)

In the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War in Lebanon, the Gulf States and Jihad Al Bina, Hezbollah's reconstruction wing, undertook significant post-war reconstruction activities. This article examines the extent to which these reconstruction activities constitute an alternative to the liberal peace. While they do not have the critical mass or ambition to constitute a fully-fledged alternative, they reveal limitations in the liberal peace approach to reconstruction.

[Neethling, T., 2005, 'The Security-Development Nexus and the Imperative of Peacebuilding with Special Reference to the African Context', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 5, no. 1, pp.33-60](#)

How is the link between security and development influencing peacebuilding activities in post-conflict countries? This article reviews case studies from Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Angola and finds that international actors are already adapting their post-conflict strategies to integrate issues of human security and welfare. It contends that further efforts should be made to embrace the link between security and development, including the implementation of 'developmental peacekeeping'.

[NEPAD, 2005, 'African Post-conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework', New Partnership for Africa's Development \(NEPAD\) Secretariat, Governance, Peace and Security Programme, South Africa](#)

What constitutes an African framework for post-conflict reconstruction? This policy framework aims to provide a common frame of reference and conceptual base for the assessment, planning, coordination and monitoring of post-conflict reconstruction systems across Africa.

[Barnett, M., 2006, 'Building a Republican Peace. Stabilizing States after War' International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 87-112](#)

How can liberal peacebuilding be improved upon? This article examines the core principles of republicanism – deliberation, representation and constitutionalism – and highlights the differences between liberal and 'republican peacebuilding'. It argues that liberal peacebuilding may be doing more harm than good, and that republican peacebuilding is better suited to promoting stability and legitimacy in post-conflict environments. Republican peacebuilding emphasises the necessity of institutional mechanisms of representation, constitutional arrangements that distribute political power, and deliberative processes that encourage groups to generalise their views. It helps to slow the peacebuilding process and ensures that those with the knowledge have the ability to shape their lives.

Roberts, D., 2011, 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy', International Peacekeeping, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 410-424

This article advances the idea of a 'popular peace' to address the lack of legitimacy that undermines orthodox peacebuilding projects. This concept would refocus liberal institution-building on local, democratically determined priorities, in addition to internationally favoured preferences (such as metropolitan courts and bureaucratic government). A popular peace approach could help to create social institutions around which a contract could evolve as a foundation for durable peacebuilding.

<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=4166>

Alternative conceptual approaches to peacebuilding: transformative peacebuilding

A broader understanding of peacebuilding that incorporates the need to address structural causes of violence and to engage in deeper social transformation has not necessarily resulted in a new way of doing things. Recent research advocates for an evolution from the technical peacebuilding approach that has dominated thus far to a 'transformative peacebuilding' approach. This latter approach seeks to mainstream transformative elements into project designs, in particular a deliberate focus on building relationships as an adjunct to addressing other content and tasks.

Other research calls for a move away from a debate focused on whether international actors or local actors are best placed to engage in peacebuilding. What is considered more useful is developing a nuanced understanding of how international and domestic forces interact in post-conflict situations, and what relationship between the two is most likely to be conducive to the goals of sustainable peace.

[Fisher, S. and Zimina, L., 2009, 'Just Wasting Our Time? Provocative Thoughts for Peacebuilders' Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

Whose peace are peacebuilders working for? Should peacebuilders be working to transform or reinforce the status quo? This paper argues that the impact of the peacebuilding community has been stunted by factors including lack of clarity about values, deference towards political leaders, organisational rivalry and lack of competent practitioners. The authors argue for and outline an approach to transformative peacebuilding.

Bozicevic, G., 2009, Reflections on Peacebuilding from Croatia, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin

[See full text](#)

[Donais, T., 2009, 'Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes', Peace & Change, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 3-26](#)

Local ownership is accepted in theory but rarely practised in post-conflict peacebuilding. This paper explores understandings of 'local ownership' in contemporary peacebuilding and considers the challenges of operationalising it. New efforts are needed to bridge the international-local divide in the name of sustainable peacebuilding.

Lederach, J. P., Neufeldt, R. and Culbertson, H., 2007, 'Reflective Peacebuilding', Catholic Relief Services and Joan B. Kroc, Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame

[See full text](#)

For further resources and discussion on transformative peacebuilding, see 'social renewal processes and coexistence programming' in the [reconciliation, social renewal and inclusiveness](#) section, as well as 'economic recovery' in the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section of this guide.

Challenging state –centric approaches to peacebuilding

Recent literature has challenged the predominantly state-centric approaches to peacebuilding that have been practised by international agencies. These approaches are often ill-equipped to deal with cross-border conflict or violence that occurs in borderland regions. Another emerging criticism is that international peacebuilding efforts have failed to understand and tackle local violence, which in some contexts is the primary cause of continued conflict. Donors need to think

beyond the state, through regional engagement and below it, through cross-border community or trade networks.

[Ramsbotham, A., and Zartman, W., 2011, 'Promoting 'trickle-up': linking sub- and supra-state peacebuilding', in Paix Sans Frontieres: Building Peace Across Borders, Accord, Issue 22, Conciliation Resources, London](#)

This article reviews peacebuilding strategies in Asia, Europe, the Caucasus, Africa, Central America and the Middle East. It shows that country-based analysis can produce flawed conflict responses. Instead, policy based on conflict *systems* can shape more flexible and comprehensive responses. It can identify actors and dynamics that exist outside state borders, such as narcotic networks that support insurgent groups, and incorporate these into peacebuilding interventions. Thus, cross-border peacebuilding needs to 'think outside the state' – both *beyond* it, through regional engagement, and *below* it, through sub-state cross-border community or trade networks. To work effectively, supra- and sub-state initiatives need to be strategically linked.

[Autesserre., S., 2010, 'The Peacebuilding World' in The Trouble With The Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-40](#)

Why did international peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) fail? This book focuses on the three and a half years considered as the transitional period from war to peace in the DRC, from June 2003 to December 2006. It finds that the causes of ongoing conflict in the country were local as well as national and regional. As a result, they could only be successfully addressed by combining bottom-up and top-down peacebuilding. However, the dominant international peacebuilding culture – embedded in social routines, practices, discourses, technologies and institutions – precluded action on local violence.

State-building and peacebuilding

State-building is not synonymous with peacebuilding, but represents an integral part of peacebuilding. State-building interventions seek to build functioning and self-sustaining state structures that re-establish the social contract between the state and citizens and promote state legitimacy.

State-building has gained prominence in the past decade in the context of state fragility and has developed as an independent discipline outside of peacebuilding. There are attempts now to explore how support for state-building and peacebuilding can be integrated. While coming from different angles, peacebuilding and state-building converge in their aim to strengthen the relationship between the state and society and to promote a representative and inclusive political system. There is some evidence that a rhetorical commitment to integrated strategies from donors has not been matched in practice.

A common problem in post-conflict countries is the existence of different frameworks aimed at achieving similar goals. In Sierra Leone, for example, there is a government-led development framework under a National Poverty Reduction Strategy and at the same time a peacebuilding strategy lead by the UN peace support office. This has constrained the development of a coherent strategic approach to state and peacebuilding.

[DFID, 2009, 'Building the State and Securing the Peace', Department for International Development, London](#)

How can support for state-building and peace-building be integrated? This Emerging Policy Paper outlines a strategic framework for DFID's engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, plus operational implications. DFID's integrated approach to state-building and peace-building aims

primarily to promote inclusive political settlements. This facilitates the further goals of: (i) addressing causes of conflict and building resolution mechanisms; (ii) developing state survival functions; and (iii) responding to public expectations. Support across all four of these interrelated areas is necessary to help create a positive peace- and state-building dynamic.

[Van Brabant, K., 2008, 'Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. An Invitation for Reflection: Interpeace's Experiences', Interpeace, Geneva](#)

How can international actors accelerate the socio-political processes of state formation in fragile states? This paper examines the experience of the organisation in state-building, focusing on state-society relations as the core concept of state formation. Building democratic culture to support long-term socio-political negotiations is the most effective means of securing peace and building strong states.

Schwarz, R., 2005, 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 429-446

[See full text](#)

[Suhrke, A. and Wimpelmann, T., 2007, 'Peace Processes and State building: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements', Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen](#)

To what extent have recent civil war peace agreements included state-building provisions? This paper reviews the academic literature and examines recent peace agreements to assess the degree to which they make provision for future state operations. State-building provisions may involve a trade-off between the goals of ending hostilities and setting norms for peace-building. The characteristics of a conflict may determine the effectiveness of peace agreement provisions.

[Call, C.T., E.M. Cousens, 2007, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace?', Working with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York](#)

How effective are international efforts to build peace? This paper assesses the status of international peace efforts and highlights chronic weaknesses in peacekeeping processes. In recent years, international and bi-lateral institutions have made efforts to fine-tune their peacebuilding processes. However, systemic issues of international political will and attention, resource allocation and a failure to recognise local contexts continue to affect the ability of international and national actors to establish enduring peace.

Faria, F. and Youngs, R., 2010, 'European conflict resolution policies: truncated peace-building', March 2010, FRIDE, Madrid

[See full text](#)

For discussion and resources on state-building, see the [state-building](#) section of the GSDRC's fragile states guide.

State-building, patronage networks and economic rents

A good understanding of existing patronage relations is a critical prerequisite to effective state-building. State-building and peacebuilding strategies should consider the complex bargaining processes that surround international intervention and the perverse effects these processes can generate. Recent research has emphasised the importance of processes of rent creation and distribution in maintaining stability in conflict-affected countries. These processes are particularly influential in large conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, DR Congo and Sudan. This literature suggests that attempts to introduce more competition in the political system have the potential to undermine stability and security.

North, D., Wallis, J., Webb, S., Weingast, B., 2007, 'Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problems of Development', Policy Research Working Paper 4359, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

[See full text](#)

See also [North, D., Wallis, J. and Weingast, B., 2009, 'Violence and Social Orders A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History', Cambridge University Press](#)

De Waal, A., 2010, 'Fixing the Political Marketplace: How can we make peace without functioning state institutions?', The Chr. Michelsen Lecture, Fri 1 January 2010

[See full text](#)

Governance programming

Restoring governance is crucial in post-conflict countries. There are varying perspectives of what this entails. A narrow perspective of governance focuses on improving public management and strengthening government capacity to perform essential functions. A broader perspective looks at expanding the capacity of government, the private sector, and civil society organisations to exercise political and economic authority to manage a nation's affairs (see UNDESA and UNDP 2007).

Ultimately, the aim of governance programming is to shape a society's capacity to manage conflicting interests peacefully. This aim is facilitated through a range of donor activities, including assistance with: drafting constitutions, the electoral process, the development of inclusive institutions, public sector reform, justice sector reform, anti-corruption initiatives, the promotion of civil society, and conflict resolution projects.

Governance reforms cannot be viewed as technocratic exercises. They aim to reshape a society and are political in nature. In order to be effectual, reforms require public support for change, a sense of local ownership, political commitment to implement reforms and the administrative and financial capacity to do so.

Policymakers have placed growing importance on building institutions that are locally legitimate. The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report argues that 'strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence'.

[UNDESA and UNDP, 2007, 'The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries', United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and United Nations Development Programme](#)

International assistance organisations are crucial to helping governments increase their capacity to perform essential functions during post-conflict recovery. This book examines the challenges of restoring effective governance in crisis and post-conflict countries. Because the challenges facing these countries are complex and varied, governments and international organisations cannot rely on universally applicable approaches to restoring governance.

UNDESA, 2009, 'Lessons Learned in Post-Conflict State Capacity: Reconstructing Governance and Public Administration Capacities in Post Conflict Countries', Report of the Expert Group Meeting, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

[See full text](#)

[Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2004, Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations: Lessons Learned, Research Paper, UNDP & Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen Seminar Series, 5–7 May](#)

Which democratic systems are most likely to be successful in different post war contexts? What has been learned in the last ten years of peace building in countries such as Guatemala and Afghanistan? This paper looks at the recent experience in internationally assisted transitions from war to peace. Governance is a process, not a product, a long-term perspective is necessary and social engineering has distinct limits. External actors need to be conscious of the dilemmas of ownership and assistance that a post war situation presents. The dilemma is inherent in all aid activities, but is accentuated in a post war situation by the imbalance in resources and administrative capacity that typically exist.

[Hesselbein, G., Golooba Mutebi, F. and Putzel, J., 2006, 'Economic and Political Foundations of State-Making in Africa: Understanding State Reconstruction', Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, London](#)

How can the process of state reconstruction be understood? This paper examines state reconstruction in Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo in light of Tanzania's experience of establishing a stable state. Overall, it argues that a 'state in the making' lies somewhere between 'traditional' forms of organisation and the modern state and formal economy. Its conclusions cast doubt on the idea that state-making is best pursued through modern liberal democracy.

Wassara, S. S., 2009, 'The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan: Institutional Developments and Political Trends in Focus Areas', Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway
[See full text](#)

[World Bank, 2011, 'World Development Report 2011: Overview', World Bank, Washington DC](#)

Some 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence. This report argues that breaking these cycles involves a) strengthening legitimate national institutions and governance to meet citizens' key needs; and b) alleviating international stresses that increase the risks of conflict (such as food price volatility and infiltration by trafficking networks). It is important to: refocus assistance on confidence building, citizen security, justice and jobs; reform the procedures of international agencies to accommodate swift, flexible, and longer-term action; respond at the regional level (such as by developing markets that integrate insecure areas and pooling resources for building capacity); and to renew cooperative efforts between lower, middle, and higher income countries.

For discussion and resources on (re)building governance institutions, see the [state-building](#) section of the GSDRC's fragile states guide.

Elections, electoral systems and political institutions

The objectives of post-conflict elections are generally to move the conflict from the military battleground to the political arena; to legitimise the power of a government; and to instigate the democratisation process.

The sequencing and timing of elections is highlighted as a key issue in much conflict and governance literature. Elections may be held before the necessary accompanying conditions have been met. Holding elections before a society is demilitarised, for example, increases the risk of renewed violence by those who lose in the political arena. In cases where elections need to be deferred, other instruments of vertical accountability (e.g. civic organisations and media) and

horizontal accountability (e.g. 'watchdog') organisations can fill the void and contribute to the establishment of the necessary conditions.

The design of electoral systems and political institutions should be informed by a clear understanding of groups that have traditionally been excluded (e.g. women and minority groups). Research on constitutional design in emerging democracies suggests that parliamentary democracy is preferable to presidentialism as the latter tends to promote zero-sum competition and personalistic leadership. In post-conflict contexts, particularly in divided societies, such factors may increase the risk of renewed tension and violence. Parliamentary democracy is considered instead to encourage compromise and coalitions, and to provide a forum for concerns of diverse members of society. In reality however, studies indicate that parliaments have often fallen short of these ideals. Weak parliaments have suffered from the dominance of the executive, armed groups and other non-state actors, and have been unable to generate support from the public.

[Reynolds, A., 2006, 'Electoral Systems and the Protection and Participation of Minorities', Report, Minority Rights Group International, London](#)

In every successful case of peaceful and democratic conflict avoidance in the world, minority communities have been included and protected by the legislative process. This report focuses on the electoral system and makes a number of recommendations for best practice in minority representation and electoral system design. The participation of minorities in the legislative process at the stage of electoral reform is a key tool, both in peace building and in future conflict prevention.

Matlosa, K., 2004, 'Electoral Systems, Constitutionalism and Conflict Management in Southern Africa', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 11-54
[See full text](#)

[GSDRC, 2008, 'Election-related Conflict', Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

Election-related conflict or violence can occur at any stage of the electoral process – from pre-election registration, candidate nomination and campaigning to election day balloting to post-election results. Although election-related conflict is an under-researched area, there is a small body of literature that addresses its potential causes and methods of prevention and mitigation. This response considers electoral system choice, electoral administration, consultation, political parties and the disarmament of armed groups and the question of whether to include them in the political process, civic education, media and election monitoring.

[UNDP, 2007, 'Parliaments, Crisis Prevention and Recovery: Guidelines for the International Community', UNDP, New York](#)

What is the role of parliaments in peacebuilding and crisis management? How can the international community best support them? These guidelines suggest that assistance by external actors underestimates the productive role that parliamentary institutions can play. The formulation of peacebuilding strategies and power-sharing arrangements should consider impacts on democratic governance development. Electoral assistance must be backed by investments in long-term parliamentary strengthening in order to achieve human development and to avoid public disillusionment with the democratic process.

For further discussion and resources on elections in conflict contexts, see the [Elections in post-conflict or fragile environments](#) section of the GSDRC's Political Systems guide

For discussion and resources on the role and impact of power-sharing arrangements in peacebuilding, see 'power-sharing' in the [peace agreements](#) section of this guide.

Participation and Inclusion

Sustainable peace requires public trust in government, in particular among societal groups that had previously been excluded from political or administrative participation. Academics and practitioners alike argue that the inclusiveness of political institutions is of key importance, particularly in post-conflict contexts. It can also result in other forms of inclusion. Political voice and the ability to influence decision making facilitates forms of socioeconomic inclusion, such as land rights, educational and employment opportunities. It also facilitates notions of citizenship.

In addition to being an important end in itself, participation and inclusion can also be vital for peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Ghana serves as an important case study for the successful peaceful management of horizontal inequalities. Successive Ghanaian regimes have sought to reduce regional developmental gaps and to maintain a culturally and religiously inclusive state. This commitment, studies indicate, has diffused grievances and prevented ethno-regional political mobilisation.

A common tool to promote inclusion is the use of a quota system/reservations for government posts and seats in Parliament for women and minority groups, for example. The efficacy of this tool has been widely debated. Some argue that it can be tokenistic and may detract from the need to address underlying problems like systematic discrimination. Others see it as a necessary step that will allow for gradual social transformation and changes in attitudes. Minority-based political parties are another tool that gives voice to groups that have been excluded. This approach is also debated. Although sometimes genuinely desired by communities, there is a risk that the promotion of separate political outlets for different groups will detract from the promotion of long-term understanding and coexistence. In addition, all issues may be increasingly seen through the lens of ethnicity or religion, exacerbating the perception of group differences. This risk, some argue, can be countered if such mechanisms are accompanied by cultural and education policies that promotes inter-group cohesion.

[Stewart, F., undated, 'Policies Towards Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction', Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity \(CRISE\), Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford](#)

Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) are a major potential source of conflict. In cases where they are identified as a significant cause of conflict they must be addressed to avoid further outbreaks of violence. What types of policies reduce HIs in post-conflict settings? What are the potential risks of such policies? This paper considers the types of policies likely to reduce HIs and discusses evidence of how far post-conflict policies in Mozambique and Guatemala have taken HI considerations into account.

Langer, A., 2009, 'Living with Diversity: The Peaceful Management of Horizontal Inequalities in Ghana', *Journal of International Development*, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 534-546

[See full text](#)

[Baldwin, C., Chapman, C., and Gray, Z., 2007, 'Minority Rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention', Minority Rights Group International, London](#)

Minority issues lie at the heart of many of the world's conflicts. Yet minority rights are often marginalised in peace processes and conflict prevention programmes. This study looks at Chechnya, Darfur, Kashmir, Kosovo and Sri Lanka. Understanding the warning signs provided by

minority rights violations could prevent conflicts. Groups should not be separated along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines as a way of creating peace, as such divisions can entrench old hatreds and wounds in the long term.

[Lyytikäinen, M., 2009, 'Building Inclusive Post-Conflict Governance: How the EU Can Support Women's Political Participation', Initiative for Peacebuilding, International Alert, London](#)

How can the EU and other donors support increased women's political participation in post-conflict situations? What can be done to ensure that this results in meaningful change for women in general? This paper recommends practical strategies for the EU and other donors to guide the consideration of gender issues into their post-conflict governance interventions.

[GSDRC, 2008, 'Quotas for Women's Representation in Africa', Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

The success of quota systems in many African countries is largely attributed to: strong and active women's movements; regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that have adopted gender balanced representation and set quota targets for member countries; and opportunities in post-conflict and transition societies, which allowed for advances in women's representation.

For discussion and resources on the role and impact of power-sharing arrangements in peacebuilding, see 'power-sharing' in the [peace agreements](#) section of this guide.

Combating Corruption

Corruption is a symptom of dysfunctional state-society relations. Policies to counter corruption may include: redesigning programmes to limit the underlying incentives for pay-offs, for example through streamlining and simplifying regulations; and creating mechanisms for accountability and transparency of government actions, such as a freedom-of-information law. A key challenge for peacebuilders is to develop and enforce standards for public office that are sufficiently linked to local norms and expectations to generate support.

Combating corruption is especially challenging when it extends to criminal networks and organised crime. In some cases, corruption and criminal networks were incorporated in the strategies of rule of pre-war regimes. In other cases, corruption and illicit networks emerged as a part of war economies. In either case, they involve powerful actors, who are likely to undermine governance reforms and prescriptions for change. Donors often fail to prioritise measures to address corruption, generating problems later in the reform process.

[Rose-Ackerman, S., 2008, 'Corruption and Government', International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 328-343](#)

How does corruption affect post-conflict states? This article surveys cross-country evidence to consider how the weakness of institutions and leadership in post-conflict states make them a haven for both low-level and high-level corruption. It argues that although it is difficult and risky to include counter-corruption in post-conflict peacebuilding, if corruption is allowed to fester, it can undermine other efforts to create a stable, well-functioning state with popular legitimacy. International assistance can help, but it needs to be carefully tailored to avoid exacerbating the underlying problem created by the mixture of corruption and violence.

[Philp, M., 2008, 'Peacebuilding and Corruption', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 310-327](#)

This article suggests an understanding of corruption that combines 'core' universal features (actions, decisions and processes that subvert or distort the nature of public office and the political process) with acknowledgement of the importance of local norms. A primary task of peacebuilding is to create a shared set of rules and norms that will govern the exercise of public office in a context where multiple sets of rules compete. In post-conflict situations, corruption cannot always be either avoided or prioritised. While it should not be tolerated, strategic focus is required, and interventions must be realistic about what is achievable.

[Reno, W., 2009, 'Understanding Criminality in West African Conflicts', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 47-61](#)

What are the links between illicit commerce and political relationships in West Africa? How can a contextualised understanding of social relationships improve approaches to post-conflict statebuilding? This article critiques the automatic criminalisation of armed networks, some of which have strong societal roots. It argues for a more nuanced understanding of the connection between illicit economic activities and violent conflict and a more pragmatic approach to post-conflict statebuilding. A strategy that selectively incorporates some networks, and targets the more predatory, is likely to be most effective.

[Looney, R., 2008, 'Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption in Iraq', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 424-440](#)

How can corruption in Iraq be controlled? What forces are driving domestic corruption in the country? This article argues that corruption in Iraq is the product of three interrelated forces: the growth of the informal economy, the deterioration of social capital, and the evolving relationship between tribes, gangs and insurgents. To reduce the impact of corruption, oil revenues could be distributed directly to the public.

Doig, A., Tisne, M. 'A Candidate for Relegation? Corruption, governance approaches and the (re)construction of post-war states', *Public Administration and Development*, Volume 29, Issue 5, pp 374-386

[See full text](#)

Further discussion and resources on corruption can be found in the [political and institutional factors](#) section in the causes of conflict component in this guide, as well as under 'war and shadow economies' in the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section of this guide.

Rule of law and justice reform

Rule of law commonly refers to “the principle of the supremacy of the law, equality before the law, fair and impartial application of the law, legal certainty and procedural transparency” (Hansen, and Wiharta 2007: xvi). It serves to safeguard against arbitrary governance and is essential for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict between different actors in society.

Conflicts are often preceded by a weakening or breakdown in the rule of law. Conflict in turn destroys existing justice and security systems. Post-conflict rule of law programming comprises various aspects, such as the promotion of human rights, constitution-making, justice sector reforms and working with traditional justice mechanisms. Rule of law programming cannot be implemented uniformly, but should instead incorporate local frames of reference and local systems of dispute resolution in order for local populations to have confidence in the system. It is

important, however, that such local systems do not reinforce local power inequities or patterns of social exclusion.

[Bassu, G., 2008, 'Law Overruled: Strengthening the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States', Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism, vol. 14, no.1, pp. 21-38](#)

What is meant by 'the rule of law', and how can it most effectively be promoted in post-conflict states? This article considers definitions, and outlines lessons from Kosovo and Haiti. Donors need to recognise rule of law reform as a political activity, and to harmonise as much as possible potentially contradictory elements: (a) local narratives and resources; and (b) the historical connection of the traditional 'thick' version of the rule of law with a liberal democratic state.

[Hansen, A. S. and Wiharta, S., 2007, 'The Transition to a Just Order: Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict - A Policy Report', Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden](#)

The rule of law must be addressed as part of any effort to prevent, manage or resolve conflict. This report argues that local stakeholders should be given as much authority as possible in establishing the rule of law. Although the shape and pace of reform will vary in different areas of the justice and security sector, popular and political acceptance is indispensable to all stages of the transition in order for it to be consolidated.

[Hansen, A. S., Wiharta, S., Claussen, B. R., and Kjeksrud, S. 2007, 'The Transition to a Just Order: Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict - A Practitioners' Guide', Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden](#)

How should local ownership be promoted as part of justice and security sector reform? This handbook suggests ways of putting the principle of local ownership into practice. Transferring the responsibility for rule of law to local stakeholders is complicated but essential. It is important to build the capacity of local people to drive change and sustain efforts to strengthen the rule of law.

For more discussion and resources on rule of law, justice sector reform, and transitional justice, see the [conflict-affected and fragile states](#), [non-state justice and security systems](#) and [transitional justice](#) sections of the GSDRC's justice guide.

Socioeconomic Recovery

There is consensus that recovery does not mean rebuilding pre-conflict structures and dynamics, or a return to pre-conflict economic trends. Instead, recovery should be seen as a process of socioeconomic transformation. The ultimate aim is to establish the conditions for self-sustaining equitable growth and human development while addressing key risk factors for the renewal of violence.

Socioeconomic recovery thus covers a broad range of activities spanning reconstruction of physical infrastructure, livelihood and employment generation, rehabilitation of public health and educational systems, development of social safety nets, legal and regulatory reforms, private sector development, the creation of markets and transparent banking and financial institutions.

[Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F., 2008, 'A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview', Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity \(CRISE\) Oxford University, Oxford](#)

Which policies to promote sustainable peace-building and socio-economic development are needed in different types of post-conflict environment? This paper offers a typology of post-conflict environments, suggesting that policy choice should be informed by three key variables: the state of economic development; the presence of high-value natural resources; and the existence of sharp horizontal inequalities. Four enabling conditions are also important in determining policy

options and effectiveness - the state of security, the commitments of the international community to the country, state capacity and the inclusivity of government.

Lewarne, S. and Snelbecker, D., 2004, 'Economic Governance in War Torn Economies: Lessons Learned from the Marshall Plan to the Reconstruction of Iraq', Long Report Prepared for USAID: [See full text](#)

[Gueli, R., Liebenberg, S., and Van Huyssteen, E., 2007, 'Integrated Development Planning in South Africa: Lessons for International Peacebuilding?', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 7, no. 1, pp.89-112](#)

How can international peacebuilding efforts be better integrated? This article assesses the efforts of the UN to improve donor coordination in post-conflict settings and finds that, in spite of recent reform efforts, peacebuilding missions still often lack integrated systems of planning and implementation. It recommends that the international community draws lessons the post-apartheid South African experience on developing an integrated approach to governance that both meets immediate needs and lays the foundation for lasting peace. Multi-agency planning requires structured and systematic interaction, alignment of different planning instruments, and targeted interventions.

For discussion and resources on service delivery, see the [service delivery and state-building](#) section of the GSDRC's fragile states guide and the [service delivery in conflict and fragile contexts](#) section of the GSDRC's service delivery guide.

Transformation of war economies

There are typically three types of war economies: the combat economy, shadow or parallel economy, and coping economy. The combat economy concerns the exploitation of natural resources and illicit goods by individuals and groups to finance armed conflict. The shadow or parallel economy refers to opportunistic activities outside of the formal economy. While actors in this economy benefit from conflict conditions that allow for their activities, they are not necessarily committed to the pursuance of war. The coping economy refers to survival tactics adopted by individuals in the absence of a functioning state.

These distinctions should be recognised when devising strategies and policies aimed at transforming war economies. Shadow economies that are not conflict-oriented could potentially be brought into the formal sector, for example. The combination of different types of economies also needs to be considered. International actors and the Afghan government have targeted the poppy industry in Afghanistan in order to stem funding for the Taliban. This industry, however, as highlighted in much current literature on Afghanistan, also provides coping livelihoods for a vast number of Afghans. In the absence of alternatives, this policy of eradication could alienate local populations from government officials and local tribal elites who support the policy.

[Studdard, K., 2004, 'War Economies in a Regional Context: Overcoming the Challenges of Transformation', International Peace Academy, New York](#)

What is the relationship between the regional dimensions of war economies and peacebuilding in post-conflict situations? This report argues that the failure to consider the regional dynamics of war economies undermines peacebuilding efforts. Policymakers should distinguish between economic activities that pose a threat to peace processes and activities that contribute to social and economic stability. Certain informal regional economic activities that are presently ignored or criminalised should be incorporated into peacebuilding and reconstruction strategies.

Wennman, A., 2005, 'Resourcing the Recurrence of Intrastate Conflict: Parallel Economies and Their Implications for Peacebuilding', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 479-494

[See full text](#)

[Felbab-Brown, Vanda, 2009, 'Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 100-114](#)

[What have been the effects of counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan since 2001?](#) Have eradication campaigns been successful? This article argues that aggressive opium poppy eradication programmes have been premature and counterproductive. They have not increased stability or undermined the counter-insurgency. It concludes that the most important role peacekeeping forces can play is providing security. The term peacekeeping is used to refer not only to UN missions, but also to other international missions.

For discussion and resources on corruption, see the [governance programming](#) section of the peacebuilding component of this guide.

For resources on organised crime, see 'serious crimes' in the [conflict-affected and fragile states](#) section of the GSDRC's justice guide.

Livelihoods and Employment

Livelihoods are "the means by which households obtain and maintain access to the resources necessary to ensure their immediate and long-term survival" (USAID 2005: 2). It is acknowledged that livelihoods and employment require sustained attention beginning early in the recovery process. Meeting these needs is essential to ease suffering and help people in conflict-affected societies to re-establish their lives. Active employment is also considered crucial for occupying demobilised combatants and unemployed civilian youth, and committing them to the peace process. Nonetheless, economic strategies for international assistance interventions still seem to fail to direct sufficient attention and funding to livelihood and employment generation. It is often assumed instead that long-term growth through macroeconomic stabilisation can be relied upon for job creation.

Livelihoods and self-employment can be supported through grants for small and medium enterprises, access to microfinance and credit institutions, and the establishment of infrastructure to facilitate remittances. These mechanisms are usually not sufficient, however, for generating significant employment. Large public works projects may be needed to jump-start employment. Ultimately though, long-term employment generation will likely rely heavily upon private sector development (see private sector development below).

United Nations, 2009, 'United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Generation, Income Generation and Reintegration', United Nations, Geneva

[See full text](#)

[USAID, 2005, 'Livelihoods and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention', USAID, Washington, DC](#)

The failure of livelihoods can contribute to conflict by weakening society's social fabric and forcing people to resort to violence in order to obtain necessary resources. This toolkit examines the relationship between conflict and livelihoods and presents lessons learned from programmes promoting sustainable livelihoods. Rebuilding infrastructures and agricultural inventories, fostering market linkages and rebuilding trust among agricultural communities all constitute legitimate livelihood programmes.

[Justino, P., 2009, 'The Impact of Armed Civil Conflict on Household Welfare and Policy Responses', HiCN Working Paper, no. 61, Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton](#)

How does armed conflict impact on households and how do they respond to and cope with it? This paper examines the direct and indirect effects of conflicts and shows that the indirect effects are channelled through markets, political institutions and social networks. Until there is more research on the fundamental processes linking armed civil conflict and household welfare, it will be difficult to develop effective policies for preventing and resolving conflicts.

[Woodward, S.L. 2002, 'Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation', Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation, International Peace Institute, New York](#)

What issues should policymakers consider when creating a post-conflict economic strategy? This paper highlights five important lessons that have emerged from experience of peace implementation. These are the need for: (1) broad-based impact assessments; (2) early emphasis on employment; (3) investment in building institutional and social capital; (4) donor awareness of the political impacts of funding decisions; and (5) recognition that an international presence introduces economic distortions.

For further discussion and resources on livelihoods and employment, see 'livelihoods and employment' in the [early recovery](#) section of this guide and 'socioeconomic programming' in the [stabilisation](#) section of this guide.

Economic recovery and growth

Although aid can address the needs of populations in conflict-affected countries in the short-term, countries need to develop the capacity to generate sufficient resources on their own. This requires economic recovery and sustained growth. A strengthened state, particularly an effective civil service, is essential for promoting growth. The pattern of growth should be one that aims to lower the risk of renewed conflict. Indeed, many analysts argue that conflict prevention should take precedence over growth, because macroeconomic growth policies such as low inflation and balanced budgets may create societal tensions. Rapid economic reform may lead to narrow forms of development where only a small sector of the population benefit from growth, posing a significant threat to peace in post-conflict countries.

Key recovery priorities for conflict-affected countries are to expand employment rapidly, reduce horizontal inequalities, build a sustainable fiscal basis for the state, and seek to lessen rent-seeking associated with the presence of valuable natural resources (UNDP 2008). How these priorities are fulfilled will differ from country to country. It is important to understand local coping mechanisms and drivers of recovery and to build on these social dynamics and institutional processes.

Given the importance of economic activity, it is possible to incorporate specific attention to transformative peacebuilding in economic processes (see the [peacebuilding models](#) section of this guide). These activities may include for example agricultural cooperatives that incorporate divided groups, multi-ethnic workforces, and procurement and business links across ethnic groups. Working together can create an entry point for dialogue and may facilitate relationship building.

[Addison, T., Le Billon, P., and Murshed, S. M., 2001, 'Finance in Conflict and Reconstruction', Discussion Paper No. 2001/44, World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University \(UNU-WIDER\), Helsinki](#)

What role does finance play in war and post-conflict reconstruction? Domestic and foreign finance can determine who wins the war, the duration of the conflict and can contribute to increased

post-conflict poverty and inequality. Action to reduce war finance (and to increase its cost) may encourage peace, provided such action is implemented across the international community. Financial liberalisation during reconstruction may foster economic instability and endanger peace. Strong financial regulation and supervision is important

[UNDP, 2008, 'Strengthening the Indigenous Drivers of Post-Conflict Economic Recovery', Chapter 3 in Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery \(BCPR\), UNDP, New York, pp. 48-105](#)

How can the international community best support economic recovery after conflict? This chapter examines a community-based approach to stimulating economic activities in countries emerging from conflict. It contends that economic recovery is quicker and more sustainable when it is built on 'indigenous drivers'; local actors have the strongest long-term incentive to engage in activities conducive to sustained economic recovery. The indigenous drivers approach allows people and communities, as well as national institutions, to establish the priorities for post-conflict recovery and for reforming institutions.

[Vrbensky, R., 2009, 'Can Development Prevent Conflict? Integrated Area-Based Development in the Western Balkans', Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 75-110](#)

How successful is the area based development approach (ABD) in contributing to conflict prevention and linking reconstruction and development? This article discusses the strengths and limitations of the approach, drawing on two ABD programmes in South and Southwest Serbia. It argues that although ABD is often effective in responding to complex conflict characteristics on sub-national levels, under its current conceptualisation, it responds ineffectively to the full complexity of issues related to conflict and development on multiple levels.

[UNDP, 2008, 'Macroeconomic Policy Considerations in Post-Conflict Recovery', Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery \(BCPR\), UNDP, New York, pp. 106-143](#)

How can post-conflict macroeconomic planning prevent conflict relapse and support recovery? This section from the 2008 UNDP Crisis Prevention Report investigates how to craft post-conflict macroeconomic policy as part of an effective post-conflict recovery and reconstruction process. Data available from post-conflict countries since 1989 reveals that macroeconomic recovery measures can decrease the chance of conflict recurrence by addressing deep, structural issues of inequality and distribution. Increasing growth rates evens out economic disparities and helps people rebuild their lives.

For further discussion and resources on transformative peacebuilding through economic activity, see 'social renewal and coexistence programming' in the [reconciliation, social renewal and inclusiveness](#) section of this guide.

Private sector development

Private sector development is essential for sustainable, self-sufficient economies and employment generation. In immediate post-conflict contexts, however, domestic and international investment is usually limited. The state plays a key role in creating the enabling environment for the private sector. This includes basic economic infrastructure and a regulatory framework, the development of credit markets, stimulation of investment and promotion of exports, and human resource development.

Donor strategies for private sector development in conflict-affected countries have been the subject of debate. Donors have focused in large part on support for small and medium-sized

enterprises (SMEs), access to credit and financial services and policies of economic liberalisation. While some have found this to be an effective strategy, others argue that it is limited in its growth and employment potential. Instead, they argue that greater attention needs to be paid to the development of employment-creating sectors, such as industrial production.

Private sector development in conflict-affected countries should involve consultation with a broad range of actors, including political factions, social groups, state actors, displaced populations and other conflict-affected groups, and local and international private sector actors. International actors may include members of the diaspora, regional players and major transnational companies. This process can help to identify particular needs and products and services that can be tailored to meet these needs. The financial sector, for example can offer new products in conflict-affected societies, such as remittance transfers services, microfinance, and reconstruction loans.

[Bray, J., 2009, 'The Role of Private Sector Actors in Post-Conflict Recovery', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1-26](#)

What role does business play in post-conflict recovery? How can policymakers ensure private sector actors play a positive, rather than a negative, role? This article argues that it is essential to differentiate between different types of business. Each type will play a different role depending on how it assesses risk and opportunity in the aftermath of conflict.

Mac Sweeney, N., 2009, 'Private Sector Development in Post-Conflict Countries: A Review of Current Literature and Practice', Secretariat of the Donor Committee on Enterprise Development, Cambridge, UK

[See full text](#)

[Joras, U., 2008, '"Financial Peacebuilding" – Impacts of the Nepalese Conflict on the Financial Sector and its Potential for Peacebuilding', *Working Paper*, no. 3, Swisspeace, Bern](#)

How can the local financial sector contribute to peacebuilding in countries emerging from violent conflict? This paper explores the issue, with a focus on Nepal. The Nepalese private commercial financial sector is relatively healthy and should have the economic flexibility to support national peacebuilding efforts. External encouragement and awareness-raising is required for the financial sector to appreciate how it can influence conflict and peacebuilding and to increase understanding of the economic long- and short-term benefits of peace its their own operations.

[Divjak, B. and Pugh, M., 2008, 'The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *International Peacekeeping*, vol.15, no. 3, pp. 373 – 386](#)

Governance structures instituted in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Dayton Peace Accord and the United Nations Office of the High Representative have facilitated widespread corruption. This paper analyses structural and cultural factors which affect the relationship between corruption and the constitutional arrangements based on the Accords. Incentives such as social protection and income generation are needed to redress local level clientelism and ethno-national loyalties and replace social contracts forged by political elites.

For resources on the private sector and its role in peacebuilding, see the [private sector](#) section of the peace and security architecture component of this guide.

Natural resource governance and the environment

It is increasingly recognised that peacebuilding efforts should extend to developing mechanisms to manage natural resources such that resource use is sustainable and can support stability, livelihoods and long-term development.

Mechanisms such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, involving companies in the extractive and energy sectors, governments and NGOs; and the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), which sets a global standard for transparency in oil, gas and mining, indicate that it may be possible to reduce the risk of extractive sector-related conflicts through corporate social responsibility and multi-stakeholder initiatives.

Sustainable management of scarce resources cannot be solved unilaterally. It requires cooperative processes, which have the potential to contribute to transformative peacebuilding see [peacebuilding models](#)). Regional water cooperation in the Middle East, for example, is considered essential for health security, livelihoods, and to peacefully manage water disputes that might otherwise fuel conflict. Water discussions can potentially provide an entry point for broader dialogue.

[Godnick, W., Klein, D., González-Posso, C., Mendoza, I., and Meneses, S., 2008, 'Conflict Economy, International Cooperation and Non Renewable Natural Resources', Initiative for Peacebuilding, International Alert](#)

What is the relationship between the management of non-renewable natural resources and conflict? This report analyses the political and economic contexts of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru to assess government and donor policies for mitigating conflict in the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources. It concludes that the EU and other donors should adopt and encourage its companies to adopt more conflict-sensitive business practices to ensure more mutually beneficial development for communities and corporations.

[UNEP, 2009, 'From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment', United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi](#)

Conflicts associated with natural resources are twice as likely to relapse into violent conflict. Yet, less than a quarter of peace negotiations for conflicts linked to natural resources have addressed resource management mechanisms. This study argues that the recognition of the contribution of environmental issues to violent conflict underscores their potential as pathways for cooperation and the consolidation of peace. Integrating environment and natural resources into peacebuilding strategies is now a security imperative.

[Kramer, A., 2008, 'Regional Water Cooperation and Peacebuilding in the Middle East', Initiative for Peacebuilding, International Alert](#)

What impact can cooperation in water resource management make on peacebuilding efforts? This paper reviews case studies of two water cooperation initiatives in the Middle East to determine whether such efforts can act as pathways for building peace. It concludes that while cooperation over water resources may serve as a starting point for dialogue, further support from external actors is needed to overcome existing inequalities and political obstacles that obstruct progress toward peace.

[GSDRC, 2009, 'Community-based Approaches and the Extractives Sector in Situations of Fragility and Conflict', Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

This report identifies a number of recommendations on community engagement in the extractives

sector with a particular focus on fragile and conflict-affected countries. It also explores the use of the Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) model in such contexts.

For further discussion and resources on transformative peacebuilding through economic activity, see 'social renewal and coexistence programming' in the [reconciliation, social renewal and inclusiveness section](#) of this guide.

Cultural heritage

Cultural heritage is significant to cultural identity and a sense of nationhood. Its preservation is linked to nation-building processes. Recovery and peacebuilding interventions need to incorporate the rehabilitation of cultural heritage. A broad perspective of culture heritage goes beyond cultural property and includes traditions, customs, values and methods of ensuring the continuity of a community.

Studies have shown, however, that oftentimes international interventions have not only failed to protect cultural heritage, but have contributed to their destruction. A common failure is the refusal by international donors to support the repair and reconstruction of traditional vernacular housing. This housing represents not only built heritage but a 'way of life', encompassing traditional building skills. Instead, generic and standardised housing have been imposed that do not address the needs of local inhabitants.

The literature on cultural heritage stresses the importance of involving local communities in rehabilitation efforts: only efforts that incorporate local needs and draw on local values, building technologies and skills will be sustainable. In addition, it is important to involve local actors in inventorying heritage as their definition of heritage items may differ from national and international actors.

[Cultural Emergency Response, 2006, 'Culture is a Basic Need: Responding to Cultural Emergencies', Conference Report, 25-26 September, Prince Clause Fund for Culture and Development, The Hague](#)

How do disasters and violent conflict affect culture and cultural heritage? How can policymakers and practitioners seek to protect and preserve culture during humanitarian emergencies? This report argues that any humanitarian emergency is a cultural emergency and any cultural emergency is a humanitarian emergency. Yet, the role of culture and the protection and preservation of culture are largely neglected in humanitarian assistance, emergency preparedness, and post-disaster and post-conflict recovery. There needs to be greater awareness among policymakers and those working in relief and recovery organisations of the imperative of saving culture and greater advocacy and training by international heritage workers to make these issues prominent and well understood.

Manhart, C., 2004, 'UNESCO's Mandate and Recent Activities for the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan's Cultural Heritage', RICR/IRRC, vol. 86, no. 854, pp. 401-414
[See full text](#)

Mumtaz, B. and Noschis, K., eds., 2004, 'Development of Kabul: Reconstruction and Planning Issues', Papers from 10th Architecture and Behaviour colloquium, 4-7 April, Ticino, Switzerland
[See full text](#)

For further discussion and resources on cultural heritage, see 'cultural preservation' in the [stabilisation](#) section.

Reconciliation, social renewal and inclusiveness

Reconciliation

The term ‘reconciliation’ is frequently used by academics and practitioners. There is consensus that it should be an important component of dealing with violent conflict and divided societies. There is limited consensus, however, on what reconciliation entails and how it should be promoted. For some, reconciliation is about justice in its many forms, including but not limited to transitional justice (see the [transitional justice](#) section of the justice guide). For others, reconciliation is about truth-telling – learning about what materialised during the conflict and what happened to loved ones. Proponents of this approach advocate for truth commissions as a way to promote reconciliation (see [transitional justice](#)). Yet others believe instead that reconciliation is about dialogue and forgiveness, where perpetrators acknowledge and apologise for their wrongs and victims may choose to forgive. These various elements of reconciliation are considered to contribute to the healing of individuals who have suffered the devastating consequences of violent conflict, including those who committed acts of violence.

‘Reconciliation’ has been critiqued as representing an unrealistic utopian goal in post-conflict divided societies. It may be more appropriate to view it not as an end state, but as a continuing process and way in which to re-engage with and reframe the ‘other’. From a transformative peacebuilding perspective, reconciliation may be seen as the process of overcoming hostility and mistrust between divided peoples and facing the past. Overcoming hostility and mistrust is a complex process that involves re-humanisation of the ‘other’ through personal contact and dialogue; confidence building, the dispelling of myths and the lessening of fear; and the development of empathy – recognition of shared suffering. Facing the past implies the re-examination of historical narratives, developing a common understanding of the causes and nature of the conflict, as well as shared notions of responsibility. This facilitates the evolution of new identities of citizenship and helps reduce the potential for renewed conflict.

Reconciliation processes should take place at various levels. While there is broad consensus that reconciliation is a ‘bottom up’ process that cannot be imposed on populations, the state and external actors can still play important roles. Political leaders can give support and legitimacy to reconciliation programmes. Their engagement in reconciliatory processes such as public apologies, public ceremonies and commemorations with representatives from across the divides, and reform of divisive education systems can open up the space for community and individual level processes. External support can also be essential, particularly in situations where communities remain staunchly divided and unstable, and local populations and political leaders are unable or unwilling to initiate reconciliation processes. Despite the recognised importance of reconciliation processes, however, they have not featured as a priority in peace processes and in international assistance plans and funding. This may be due in part to the challenging, costly and long-term nature of the task – and the difficulty in assessing impact of programmes. This should not be a deterrent though – reconciliation processes should be considered in early stages of recovery and peacebuilding and in conflict prevention interventions.

Automatically including reconciliation in a peacebuilding menu, however, should also be avoided. It is important to always take into account the local context and to assess whether a society is ready to engage in reconciliation.

[Rosoux, V., 2009, ‘Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process: Scope and Limits’, in *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, eds., J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenjuk, and I. W. Zartman, SAGE, London, pp. 543-560](#)

How is reconciliation understood? What is its role in peacebuilding? This chapter surveys the study of reconciliation and analyses the Franco-German and South African cases. While not universally applicable models, these two examples hold lessons for both the scope and limitations of reconciliation. Reconciliation has too many ambiguities and shortcomings to serve as the key concept in peacemaking and stabilisation.

Huyse, L., 2003, 'The Process of Reconciliation', Chapter 2 in *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict*, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pp. 19-33

[See full text](#)

[Lederach, J.P., 1997, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC](#)

How can peacebuilding adapt to the realities and dilemmas posed by contemporary conflicts? This publication argues that building peace requires a comprehensive approach. It provides strategic and practical suggestions to help establish an infrastructure for sustainable transformation and address the immediate and deep-rooted needs of divided societies.

[Franovic, I., 2008, 'Dealing with the Past in the Context of Ethnonationalism. The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia' Berghof Occasional Paper 29, Berghof Research Centre, Berlin](#)

What is the role of ethnonationalism in hindering sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, and how can it be addressed? This paper argues that ethnonationalism complicates the peacebuilding process by preventing reconciliation and allowing individuals to blame entire ethnic groups. Three steps are needed to pursue the twin, interrelated goals of both dealing with the past constructively and furthering peacebuilding in the region: (1) public acknowledgment; (2) deconstructing the myth of ethnic war; and (3) reconstructing identities and de-victimisation.

Traditional approaches to reconciliation and healing

People often acquire their sense of meaning from their culture. Consideration of and learning from local contexts and cultures is essential in the design and implementation of reconciliation processes. Often, traditional and local customs and rituals already exist to promote healing, reconciliation and social solidarity. Although some traditions may have been altered in form and substance by the impact of colonisation, modernisation and wars, they may still resonate with local populations.

Traditional approaches often focus on the psycho-social and spiritual dimensions of violent conflicts. These aspects, while usually underemphasised by Western actors, are significant to the psychological healing of people deeply traumatised by the experiences of violent conflict. Traditional approaches are also often inclusive, with the aim of reintegrating parties on both sides of the conflict into the community.

Much research cautions, however, that while it is essential to explore traditional approaches, they should not be idealised. Attention should be paid to ensure that reliance on local traditions does not reinforce structural causes and dynamics of conflict, in particular the exclusion of women. Recent research recommends that a hybrid model should be adopted that combines local traditions and modern principles such as gender equity.

[Murithi, T., 2006, 'African Approaches to Building Peace and Social Solidarity', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp.9-34](#)

What role should indigenous approaches to peace-building play in post-conflict reconstruction in Africa? How can these be harnessed more effectively? This article argues that indigenous value

systems can contribute to the peaceful reconstruction of Africa. However, it is important to find a balance between traditional values and progressive values such as gender equality.

[Huyse, L., 2008, 'Introduction: Tradition-based Approaches in Peacemaking, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Policies' in eds. Huyse, L. and Salter, M., Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, International IDEA, Stockholm, pp. 1-22](#)

What role does traditional justice play in dealing with legacies of human rights abuses? How can interpersonal and community-based practices interrelate with state-organised and internationally sponsored forms of retributive justice and truth telling? This report provides a comparative analysis of traditional justice mechanisms in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Uganda and Burundi. Most of the countries studied combine traditional justice and reconciliation instruments with other transitional justice strategies.

Social capital, social cohesion and inclusiveness

The weakening or destruction of social capital and social cohesion can be a cause, dynamic and impact of violent conflict (see the section on [conflict dynamics and impact](#) in this guide). Peacebuilding and the ability to engage in non-violent everyday conflict management require the strengthening or (re)building of positive social capital across groups and social cohesion. These are long-term and challenging processes. Where possible, they should rely on existing bases for social capital.

Research on social capital in conflict-affected areas finds that positive social capital requires the promotion of social relations across ethnic, religious, cultural, geographic, class, age and gender divides, recognising the multiple identities that people have. Such relations can be facilitated for example through cross-cutting community groups and associations, such as associations of widows and female heads of household. Community-driven development projects have been adopted as a mechanism that may not only unite diverse groups within communities, but may also link communities to the state through decentralisation, thus strengthening social cohesion (see 'community-led development and reconciliation' in [non-state actor and peacebuilding](#) section below).

The restoration of society-state relations may also be facilitated through the development of representative state institutions. The inclusion of those formerly excluded from political, economic, social or cultural power and participation can contribute to new or restored trust in the state and the reconciliation of individuals with state actors and state institutions (Mani 2005).

[Colletta, N. J. and Cullen, M. L., 2000, 'The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda', World Bank, Washington, D.C.](#)

What is the interaction between social capital, social cohesion and violent conflict? How can governments and international actors foster the socially cohesive relations necessary for conflict prevention, rehabilitation and reconciliation? This report uses data from two communities in Cambodia and Rwanda, in high and low intensity conflict areas. It is argued that the higher state responsiveness and cross cutting network relations intersect, the more likely society will have the inclusion and cohesiveness necessary to mediate conflict and prevent violence.

[Mani, R., 2005, 'Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community After War, Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 511-526](#)

A peaceful future for post-conflict societies depends on their ability to build an inclusive political community. Does transitional justice as it is currently practiced facilitate reconciliation and inclusion? Experience to date suggests that transitional justice measures do not fulfil the central

intention of reconciliation. This paper proposes reparative justice as an alternative and broader framework. The reparative justice approach aims to facilitate individual and societal reconciliation towards the goal of regenerating an inclusive political community.

Social renewal and coexistence programming

The transformation and (re)building of relationships requires the development of innovative approaches and methods of creating space within which different groups can engage with one another. In some cases, socialisation processes have to begin first within groups, before seeking to bring former adversarial groups together. An approach that is gaining attention in peacebuilding and reconciliation literature and practice is the mainstreaming of coexistence and relationship transformation into the design of projects that serve other needs. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its report *Helping to Prevent Violent Conflict*, recommends development initiatives designed explicitly to facilitate contact and dialogue between members of conflict groups as a means of breaking down social barriers, overcoming mistrust and creating a positive peacebuilding environment. The assumption is that participation in common projects, such as service delivery, livelihood and community development projects, and structured interaction among previously divided communities will help to reframe perceptions of the 'other' and facilitate changes in perceptions and attitudes. It also provides a safe space to engage in dialogue that can potentially extend beyond the task at hand.

There is evidence that such projects have been effective in transforming individual relationships. There have been shortfalls, however. In order to transform individual ties into meaningful 'bridging social capital' – comprised of networks of civic engagement across identity fault-lines, long-term engagement is required. Donors and other international and local actors, however, have often failed to provide sufficient commitment, funding and collaboration that would allow for this. Such transformation processes have also been limited by the persistence of the structural causes of conflict. Relationship-building does not occur in a vacuum. If the structural causes of violent conflict, such as horizontal inequalities remain, social tensions will likely persist. In addition, the failure to connect micro-level coexistence processes to broader political levels can hinder the reach of such projects.

[Broome, B. J., 2009, 'Building Relational Empathy Through an Interactive Design Process', in Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, eds., D. J. D. Sandole, S. Byrne, I. Sandole-Staroste, and J. Senehi, Routledge, Oxon and New York, pp. 185-200](#)

How can opposing groups move beyond their differences to develop a shared agenda for building peace? This chapter discusses an example in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots collaborated to develop a shared strategy for civil society peacebuilding. Structured dialogue supported the development of 'relational empathy' between them, allowing new understanding to emerge and creative approaches to be developed.

[Haider, H., 2009, '\(Re\)Imagining Coexistence: Striving for Sustainable Return, Reintegration and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina', International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 91-113](#)

How can international and local actors facilitate the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to societies that have experienced violent inter-group conflict? What steps can be taken to renew coexistence and rebuild trust in areas of return? This article explores initiatives designed to repair social relationships and provide for durable return in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It finds that projects designed to promote livelihoods, community development and coexistence concurrently in BiH have been successful in rebuilding trust and facilitating return. In particular, inter-group collaboration around shared goals allowed for a reframing of the 'other' and triggered dialogue among former 'enemies'.

[Chigas, D. et al., 2006, 'Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A Study of Peacebuilding and the March 2004 Riots', CARE International and CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects, Pristina](#)

Did deficiencies in peacebuilding programmes contribute to the March 2004 riots in Kosovo? This paper reports on a study conducted in the aftermath of the riots to determine any peacebuilding programme gaps that inadvertently contributed to the recurrence of violence. While the riots should not be the only benchmark for assessing peacebuilding in Kosovo, peacebuilding programmes need to re-consider their heavy focus on multi-ethnicity as the core of their strategy.

[Kramer, A., 2008, 'Regional Water Cooperation and Peacebuilding in the Middle East', Initiative for Peacebuilding, International Alert](#)

What impact can cooperation in water resource management make on peacebuilding efforts? This paper reviews case studies of two water cooperation initiatives in the Middle East to determine whether such efforts can act as pathways for building peace. It concludes that while cooperation over water resources may serve as a starting point for dialogue, further support from external actors is needed to overcome existing inequalities and political obstacles that obstruct progress toward peace.

For additional discussion and resources on transformative peacebuilding through economic activity, see 'economic recovery' in the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section of this guide.

For resources on media initiatives in coexistence and social renewal, see the [media](#) section of this guide.

Education systems and peace education

There is growing awareness of the important role that education can play in dividing or connecting societies. As such, the focus of post-conflict education rehabilitation should extend beyond rebuilding infrastructure and restoring basic education to the provision of a safe space for psycho-social healing and dialogue; for challenging and changing perceptions of the 'other' and transformation of attitudes.

Much literature on reforming education systems and peace education emphasises that teachers should foster an environment in which historical events can be explored and questioned from multiple points of view. The aim is to help students see events through their enemies' eyes and to facilitate empathy; as well as to teach how narratives can be used to promote fear, mistrust and hate. In addition, peace education can seek to promote new forms of identity that are not based on conflict fault-lines but based instead on respect for cultural diversity and citizenship. In order to promote such transformation, much research advocates for a shift in teaching methods from a focus on 'rote learning' and 'transmission of knowledge' to one based on critical thinking and open debate.

A key problem in the current practice of peace education is that it takes place mainly outside important education institutions and thus is limited in its reach. The integration of peace education into regular curricula should therefore be the strategic approach.

[Weinstein, H. M., Freedman, S. W., and Hughson, H., 2007, 'School Voices: Challenges Facing Education Systems After Identity-based Conflicts', Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 41-71](#)

Since the mid-1990s, increased attention has been paid to the role of schools in post-conflict societies. There has been more focus on how schools contributed to identity-based conflicts and how schools might address the socially constructed schisms that led initially to the conflicts.

Moreover, there is increasing recognition of the importance of community processes in contributing to social identity formation. Schools, in particular, are among the major influences on young people's identities and on their attitudes towards the 'other'. They thus have the potential to contribute to reconciliation processes.

[Nelles, W., 2006, 'Bosnian Education for Security and Peacebuilding?', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 229-241](#)

How do education systems reinforce ethno-cultural differences? What role can education play in conflict-prevention and peace building? This paper examines education as a security issue in Bosnia Herzegovina and reflects on the prospects for a sustainable peace aided by education.

McGlynn, C. et al., 2004, 'Moving out of Conflict: The Contribution of Integrated Schools in Northern Ireland to Identity, Attitudes, Forgiveness and Reconciliation', *Journal of Peace Education*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 147-163

[See full text](#)

Zembylas, M., 'The Politics of Trauma: Empathy, Reconciliation and Peace Education', *Journal of Peace Education*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 207-224

[See full text](#)

[GSDRC, 2009, 'Post-conflict Rehabilitation of Education Services', *Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham*](#)

Education systems can contribute to conflict. In Rwanda, for example, the education system was used as an instrument in fomenting exclusion and hate. In many post-conflict settings, rehabilitation of the education sector requires not re-establishing the system that existed prior to the conflict but rather reforming the whole system. Education rehabilitation goes beyond rebuilding infrastructure and restoring basic education to rebuilding the social fabric of society and developing inclusive education systems. As such conflict-sensitivity must be incorporated into rehabilitation efforts.

For further discussion and resources on social renewal and relationship building, see the sections on [peace agreements and conflict transformation](#) and [non-violence and local conflict management](#) in this guide. For additional resources on reconciliation, see the [non-state actors and peacebuilding](#) section.

Non-state actors and peacebuilding

Civil Society

There is a vast amount of research that discusses the strong potential of civil society to contribute to peacebuilding processes. Civil society actors can play various roles at different stages of conflict, spanning a large range of activities. These activities include: monitoring and early warning analysis; conflict analysis; advocacy and education; protection; two-track mediation and facilitation; alternative media, war and peace reporting; service delivery and livelihood generation; youth work; initiatives to foster social cohesion and social capital; psycho-social support; documentation and initiatives for dealing with the past.

The effectiveness of civil society in promoting peacebuilding varies from function to function at varying phases. Its effectiveness depends also on the nature and severity of the conflict itself and the role of political actors. Recent research has found that the role of civil society is supportive

and that the central impetus for peacebuilding comes primarily from political actors and conflict parties. Civil society thus cannot be seen as a substitute for state-building. The attitude of government and local politicians to civil society is also relevant. Donors and peacebuilding agencies could provide incentives for the government to cooperate with civil society actors.

Other research warns that funding the NGO sector does not automatically result in the development of a strong civil society. This is especially the case when funding is uncoordinated, resulting in a proliferation of projects and duplication. In order to foster a strong civil society, members of society need to see themselves as citizens and to get involved in local community organisations and associations. This may take time in the aftermath of conflict.

Much research on civil society engagement emphasises the need to consider the composition of civil society. Donors should adopt an inclusive approach and seek to fund a broad array of civil society organisations. This can allow for broader perspectives and needs assessments and promote participation of marginalised groups. It is also important to recognise that civil society actors may not necessarily be dedicated to peace and peacebuilding. Civil society groups may be linked with political groups, and there have been cases where academics, media, diaspora groups and religious leaders have contributed instead to violent conflict.

[Paffenholz, T., 2009, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding', Working Paper, no. 4, The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva](#)

How can civil society most effectively work for peacebuilding? This paper presents the findings of a comparative research project which analysed the performance of civil society in regards to protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery in situations of war and armed conflict. It concludes civil society can play an important supportive role, but the effectiveness of its activities varied substantially. Contextual factors may limit or strengthen its ability to contribute to peacebuilding.

[See also Paffenholz, T. \(ed.\), 2010 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment', Lynne Rienner](#)

[Fischer, M., 2006, 'Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Ambivalence, Potentials and Challenges', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

What are the comparative advantages, and limitations, of civil society in contributing to peacebuilding? This paper discusses definitions of civil society (CS); outlines examples of CS peacebuilding activities; and discusses the positive contribution and potential limitations of CS involvement, with particular reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Civil society can play a key role in peacebuilding, but cannot compensate for state-building deficits: the strengthening of the state, economy and society must proceed simultaneously.

[Colvin, C., 2007, 'Civil Society and Reconciliation in Southern Africa', Development in Practice, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 322-337](#)

How has the concept of reconciliation been understood in Southern Africa? How have government policy and civil society initiatives supported reconciliation? This article presents findings from the Southern African Reconciliation Project (SARP). This collaborative investigation into reconciliation activities involved five NGOs in Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Sustainable and effective reconciliation initiatives require the strengths of both formal and informal processes.

[Pouligny, B., 2005, 'Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 495-510](#)

How should international agencies work with local civil society during peacebuilding operations? This article analyses the relationship between aid agencies and local NGOs and communities to identify problems in the way the international community has traditionally undertaken peace operations. It argues that international bodies need to reform their understanding of local civil society in order to foster better local ownership of peacebuilding projects.

Barnes, C., 2006, 'Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War and Building Peace', Issue Paper, no. 2, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, The Hague

[See full text](#)

Van Tongeren, P. and Van Empel, C. eds., 2007, 'Joint Action for Prevention: Civil Society and Government Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding', Issue Paper, no. 4, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, The Hague

[See full text](#)

Hofmann, C. and Schneckener, U., 2011, 'NGOs and Nonstate Armed Actors: Improving Compliance with International Norms', United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC

[See full text](#)

Community-led development and reconciliation

Community-led development is an approach that empowers local community groups and institutions by giving the community direct control over investment decisions, project planning, execution and monitoring through a process that emphasises participatory planning and accountability. The basic premise for demand-led approaches is that local communities are better placed to identify their needs and the actions necessary to meet them. Studies find that community-led projects have generally been effective in establishing or expanding essential social services and physical infrastructure at the local level.

The community approach has been adopted in conflict-affected societies. It is considered to be additionally useful in such environments to build social cohesion and social capital. Since public institutions are often weak in conflict and post-conflict settings, community-led development can be used to connect the state with its citizens. Community-led processes, for example reliance on local community councils, can also be used to build social capital in divided societies by providing safe forums for interaction, communication and joint decision-making. Such processes can help to overcome mistrust and set a precedent for peaceful and constructive management of local disputes.

Community-led projects must pay careful attention to issues of inclusion and representation, as a goal in itself, but also to ensure in conflict-affected societies that the lack of inclusion does not exacerbate divisions and result in missed opportunities to build social capital. Studies have found, however, that poor and socially excluded groups may find it difficult to respond to the opportunities created by such projects.

[World Bank, 2006, 'Community-Driven Development \(CDD\) in the Context of Conflict-Affected Countries: Challenges and Opportunities', Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

What are the challenges and opportunities of community-driven development (CDD) in conflict-affected countries? This paper reviews 13 case studies of countries affected by current or recent conflict that have specifically incorporated CDD in their development efforts. The authors find that CDD is effective in facilitating rapid implementation and cost-effective project delivery, promoting participatory models of governance, and rebuilding social capital.

[Pottebaum, D. and Lee, C., 2007, 'In Control of Their Future: Community-Led Reconciliation and Recovery', Paper presented at the World Bank Workshop, 'Moving out of Poverty in Conflict Affected Areas', 16 April, World bank, Washington, DC](#)

How can community-led reconciliation and recovery (CRR) programmes foster peace among conflict-affected populations? What challenges confront such initiatives? This paper builds on lessons learnt in a CRR programme in Aceh, Indonesia to establish general principles for effective CRR strategies. Strengthening leadership capacity, reforming the mindset of war-torn communities and encouraging co-operation between communities in conflict are central to the success of CRR programmes.

[Haider, H., 2009, 'Community-based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict-affected and Fragile Contexts', GSDRC Issues Paper, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre \(GSDRC\), Birmingham UK](#)

The 'community' has often been resilient in conflict-affected and fragile contexts, providing survival and coping mechanisms for violence, insecurity and fragility. Growing attention has thus been paid to the adoption of community-based approaches to help address the extensive needs in these contexts. This paper explores the principal aims of community-based approaches and key challenges and considerations in designing and implementing such approaches, particularly in environments of conflict and fragility.

Religious Actors

Religious actors can play an important role in peacemaking (see 'religious peacemaking' in [direct prevention mechanisms](#)) and peacebuilding. Their contributions range from mediation and inter-faith dialogue to advocacy and education to the provision of emotional and spiritual support and reconciliation activities.

Faith-based peacebuilding actors do not confine their activities to conflicts with religious elements, but also engage in secular conflicts. They may also work alongside secular peacebuilding actors. Their assistance often extends to beneficiaries of different religions and to secular communities. Studies have found that where faith-based actors seek to assist only their followers, this can alienate non-followers and deepen divisions in society, as occurred in the DRC.

The potential strengths of religious actors in carrying out peacebuilding activities include: strong faith-based motivation, moral and spiritual authority, ability to mobilise others for peace, long-term commitment and long-term presence on the ground. In some cases, as in Afghanistan, religious actors may be more deeply engrained in society than NGOs. Weaknesses of religious actors in carrying out peacebuilding include: risk of proselytisation, lack of focus on results and a possible lack of professionalism (Tsjeard, Kadayifci-Orellana, and Abu-Nimer 2005).

Tsjeard, B., Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A., Abu-Nimer, M., 2005, 'Faith Based Peace Building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors', Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague
[See full text](#)

[Wardak, M., Zaman, I., and Nawabi, K., 2007, 'The Role and Functions of Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan: Case Studies from Sayedabad and Kunduz', Co-operation for Peace and Unity, Kabul](#)

To what extent have Afghan religious leaders been involved in the post-2001 efforts to build a new state and foster development? What are their perspectives on the unfolding process, and on the various actors that are driving it? This paper explores the possibilities for engaging Afghan religious leaders more thoroughly in the work for stability and development. Most religious leaders have a positive view of development. Thus, both the government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should make greater efforts to forge links with them.

Whetho, A., and Uzodike, U. O., 'Religious Networks in Post-Conflict Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Prognosis', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp.57-84

[See full text](#)

For discussion and resources on the role of religion and religious actors in conflict and mobilisation, see the section on [identity politics](#), and 'ethno-religious mobilisation' in the [mobilisation](#) section.

Diaspora

Diaspora groups form an important part of civil society. Development agencies, NGOs and academics have increasingly recognised the potential positive contributions diaspora communities can make to economic development in their homeland countries, for example through remittances and investment. There have been minimal attempts however to understand and recognise the contribution that such groups can also make to peacebuilding. Most existing research focuses instead on the negative role that diaspora groups can play in fuelling violent conflict in their homelands, particularly in financing armed groups and engaging in oppositional politics (see [transnational politics and role of diaspora](#)).

Diaspora groups, however, can also be actively involved in peace processes and peacebuilding. They can be effective agents of change and have sought to mitigate tensions and divisions within their homelands. While often neglected, there is evidence that diaspora groups have, for example, provided financial assistance to promote non-violence, through cross-community cooperation, development and reconciliation projects. Nonetheless, it is important not to idealise the role of diasporas in this respect as many diaspora members are not engaged in these forms of activity.

Diaspora groups can also promote transnational ties, act as bridges and mediators between home and host societies at various levels of society. They may have the capacity to draw on talents, skills, education, imagination and resources of different networks and target outputs to address specific needs of their conflict-affected homeland. As this is still a relatively new area of study, further research is necessary to examine in more depth diaspora contributions and how they can be beneficial partners in reconstruction and peacebuilding.

[Cochrane, F., 2007, 'Civil Society beyond the State: The Impact of Diaspora Communities on Peace Building', *Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition*, vol. 2, no. 2](#)

Diaspora communities are key aspects of civil society, but what are their potential positive contributions to peacebuilding? This article identifies diaspora as a neglected aspect of existing literature on the role and impact of civil society in divided societies. As seen in the case of the Irish diaspora in the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process, diaspora communities have the potential to impact both positively and negatively on peacebuilding efforts.

[Kent, G., 2006, 'Organised Diaspora Networks and Homeland Peacebuilding: The Bosnian World Diaspora Network as a Potential Development Actor', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 449-469](#)

How connected with the homeland are existing diaspora networks? What factors limit and promote strong relationships? How effective have diaspora networks been in assisting the transformations required for peacebuilding? This article assesses the potential of diasporas to contribute to post conflict reconstruction in the homeland, looking at the case of the Bosnian World Diaspora Network (BiH Network). It suggests that many factors are necessary for diaspora contributions to take place, and that 'victim' diasporas (who fled war in the homeland) may not be able to prioritise peacebuilding and reconstruction without host land support.

Oussama S., 2007, 'Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in the Arab World: The Work of Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon and Morocco', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin

[See full text](#)

Berndt, H., 2006, 'People Building Peace: Transforming Violent Conflict in South Asia', Church Development Service (EED), Bonn

[See full text](#)

Waldman, 2008, 'Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan – The Case for a National Strategy' Oxfam International Research Report, Oxfam International

[See full text](#)

For discussion and resources on women and peacebuilding, see the chapter on [women in conflict-affected areas](#); for the role of private sector the media in peacebuilding, see the section on [the private sector and the media](#).

Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)

There is an increasing amount of research that stresses the link between the resolution of forced migration and internal displacement and sustainable peace. Ongoing or protracted exile and displacement signals unresolved conflict issues and undermines peacebuilding processes. It also increases the risk of regional instability if refugees are hosted in neighbouring countries, stemming in part from tensions between refugees and local populations.

Long periods of exile and displacement are a growing challenge for the international refugee protection regime and the international community. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has outlined three durable solutions for refugees: voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement in a third location. Designed originally with refugees in mind, these solutions have been extended to IDPs, through the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The options are adapted to: return to their former homes, integration at the location they were displaced to, or resettlement to another part of the country.

Support for these solutions extends beyond the humanitarian community and necessarily involves as well development and peacebuilding actors. Durable solutions, in particular repatriation or return, requires a wide range of assistance interventions in order to provide for security, property restitution and conditions for sustainable return - particularly inclusive governance, livelihood and employment generation and social renewal.

Involvement of refugees and IDPs in peacebuilding and development

Despite the acute needs of refugees and IDPs, they are rarely consulted in peace processes. In addition, policy makers and practitioners often overlook the need to target support to host countries and those suffering from protracted displacement, focusing their attention on governments and populations solely within the border of the country of origin and/or in communities with returnees, in the case of internal displacement. Broader regional dynamics should be considered in peacebuilding and development efforts. In addition, research and studies find that early engagement with refugee and displaced populations may contribute to conflict transformation.

Angola serves as a case study for targeted involvement of IDPs in conflict management and peacebuilding processes. Theatre, media and training activities were implemented among IDP groups to facilitate dialogue and trauma healing; to teach peacemaking and non-violent conflict management skills; to engage in discussion of tough issues, such as structural causes of conflict and sustainable development; and to mobilise demand for peace. In Uganda, as well, efforts were made to address the socioeconomic, political and legal problems faced by refugees in protracted exile through the integration of services to refugees into regular government structures and policies. The aim was to move from relief to development. Such programming, however, can be controversial as host countries that are keen on repatriation may fear that it will be mistaken for the promotion of 'local integration'.

There is some limited research that considers the contributions that refugees can make to peace processes, recovery and peacebuilding in their country of origin. These contributions may result from new skills that they acquire in exile. This recognition has resulted in recommendations that special attention be paid to providing refugees and IDPs with training opportunities, such as language training, vocational training, professional development and peace education. Recent research advocates that the UN Peacebuilding Commission should take up these issues and mainstream consideration for refugees and IDPs in peace processes and peacebuilding efforts.

[Loescher, G., Milner, J., Newman, E., and Troeller, G., 2007, 'Protracted Refugee Situations and the Regional Dynamics of Peacebuilding', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 491-501](#)

What are the links between the prolonged presence of refugee populations and fragile states? How can protracted refugee situations contribute to conflict, instability and effective peacebuilding? This article explores the challenges posed by protracted refugee situations to human rights and security. The question of refugees has been largely absent from the international political agenda and recent debates on peacebuilding. As a result, protracted refugee situations have mainly become the domain of humanitarian agencies.

[Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2007, 'Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-Building', Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement](#)

How can internal displacement best be integrated into peace processes, peace agreements and peacebuilding? This report contends that resolving displacement is strongly connected to achieving peace, especially in cases of large-scale displacement. Assisting displaced people to return and reintegrate has the potential both to address the root causes of conflict and to prevent further displacement. Durable solutions to displacement should form an integral part of effective peacebuilding.

[Utterwulge, S., 2004, 'Conflict Management in Complex Humanitarian Situations: Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Work with Angolan IDPs', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 224-244](#)

What is the role of internally displaced people (IDPs) in peacemaking and peacebuilding in complex humanitarian situations? This field report analyses the strategies used by the Luanda-based Centre for Common Ground and IDPs in conflict resolution in Angola. IDPs must play a central role in conflict management and the construction of peace if national reconciliation is to be sustainable. Peacemaking and peacebuilding that target and involve IDPs must occur before, during and after war-related complex humanitarian situations.

[Kaiser, T., 2005, 'Participating in Development? Refugee Protection, Politics and Developmental Approaches to Refugee Management in Uganda', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 351-367](#)

This article examines the 'Self-Reliance Strategy' implemented by the Government of Uganda and UNHCR for long-term Sudanese refugees in Uganda, which seeks to move from a relief to a development approach. However, the prospects for success are limited by ongoing conflict in northern Uganda and the lack of rights of long-term exiles – in particular, freedom of movement. Developmental approaches must go beyond a narrow focus on material needs and incorporate an explicit focus on refugee protection.

Refugee warriors

The term 'refugee warriors' refers to organised elements of exiled communities engaged in armed campaigns against their countries of origin. Armed refugee warriors are usually intermingled with a refugee population – and challenge the conventional perception of refugees as victims. Their presence, particularly in refugee camps, has presented a tremendous challenge for humanitarian efforts. Humanitarian workers have been criticised for providing armed elements in camps with aid, as occurred in the case of the armed militia operating from the refugee camps in Eastern DRC in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

Recent research has also found that forced migration contexts are fertile grounds for mobilisation into violence. These contexts involve the loss of normal institutional anchors and produce feelings of powerlessness and exclusion. In addition, where refugees have been created by conflicts involving identity discrimination, camps can become prime places for the development of group hostilities and recruitment into militant groups. Such research has also extended to the exploration of returnees who were part of a military entity while in exile and return as part of this group – termed 'returnee warriors'. There is a risk that these returnees may not reintegrate peacefully but rather continue to engage in militant action.

[Harpviken, K. B., 2008, 'From "Refugee Warriors" to "Returnee Warriors": Militant Homecoming in Afghanistan and Beyond', *Global Migration and Transnational Politics, Working Paper*, no. 5, George Mason University, Fairfax County, Virginia](#)

Why do some refugees, upon return to their countries of origin, engage in violent action? This paper assumes that in some refugee situations a significant share of returnees engage in militant action. It examines three sets of explanatory factors (enabling environment, ideology and organisation) in order to contribute to an expanding analytical framework for refugee warrior phenomena, and to identify an agenda for future research.

Kahn, C., 2008, 'Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics of Darfur's IDP Camps', Sudan Working Paper, no. 15, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

[See full text](#)

For further discussion and resources on the mobilisation into violence of children and youth in refugee/IDP camps, see [children and youth in conflict-affected areas](#).

Reintegration

It is increasingly acknowledged that in order for voluntary repatriation/return to represent a durable solution, the conditions necessary for successful reintegration must be supported. These conditions span a range of activities, including restoration of infrastructure and services; promotion of housing and property rights; human rights monitoring; livelihoods and employment generation; and efforts to rebuild social capital and social cohesion. These activities in turn require the active involvement of a range of actors beyond the humanitarian field, extending to development and peacebuilding actors. In addition, an important component of sustainable reintegration is the willingness and capacity of the state to reassume responsibility for the rights and well-being of all its citizens. As such, interventions may also need to address building the capacity of the state and the development of inclusive governance institutions.

Return and reintegration may be particularly challenging in the context of divided post-conflict societies, where political tensions and inter-group tensions are especially high. In such cases, attention needs to be paid at the outset to the facilitation of inter-group interaction, dialogue and rebuilding trust. Research has found that initiatives that are designed to bring populations together to collaborate around common needs; and that are aimed at broader community development that benefits not just returnees but also all residents of the community can be effective in reducing tensions and resistance to return. They can also create the foundation for the transformation of relationships.

UNHCR, 2004, 'Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities', The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva

[See full text](#)

[Fagen, P.W., 2011, 'Refugees and IDPs after Conflict: Why They Do Not Go Home', United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC](#)

National and international programmes to return refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes after conflict frequently leave far too many without viable futures. Using Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Burundi as case studies, this paper argues that the effects of protracted conflict and displacement means that, for many, returning home is not a viable solution. Greater flexibility in determining the best solutions and more investment in alternative and longer-term forms of reintegration are needed.

The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2007, 'When Displacement Ends: A Framework for Durable Solutions', The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement

[See full text](#)

[Haider, H., 2009, '\(Re\)Imagining Coexistence: Striving for Sustainable Return, Reintegration and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina', International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 91-113](#)

How can international and local actors facilitate the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to societies that have experienced violent inter-group conflict? What steps can be taken to renew coexistence and rebuild trust in areas of return? This article explores initiatives designed to repair social relationships and provide for durable return in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It finds that projects designed to promote livelihoods, community development and coexistence concurrently in BiH have been successful in rebuilding trust and

facilitating return. In particular, inter-group collaboration around shared goals allowed for a reframing of the 'other' and triggered dialogue among former 'enemies'.

UNHCR, 2004, 'Quick Impact Projects (QIPs): A Provisional Guide', The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva

[See full text](#)

For additional resources on refugees and IDPs, see the [early recovery](#) section of this guide.

Additional resources

For resources on monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding interventions, see [monitoring and evaluation of interventions in conflict-affected areas](#).

CHAPTER 5:

INTERVENING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

Monitoring and Evaluation of Interventions in Conflict-affected Areas

Conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding all aim to have long-term impact in terms of sustainable peace and development. Given the time-frames and the convergence of a multitude of activities in conflict-affected areas, it may be difficult to attribute quantifiable results to specific conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities. This should not, however, be a deterrent, or an excuse for not conducting assessments.

There is consensus that many of the standard criteria for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are applicable to interventions in conflict-affected areas. In addition, the OECD-DAC provides a series of common monitoring and evaluation principles that can be applied to different types of conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions. These are: inclusiveness; the testing of underlying theories of change; the use of qualitative and quantitative methods; testing assumptions and learning; ethical standards for approaching informants and handling the reporting of findings.

The following are a selection of M&E frameworks, tools and recommendations developed by international organisations, donor agencies, academics and non-governmental organisations. They cover conflict prevention, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, stabilisation, and peacebuilding interventions.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding

[OECD-DAC, 2007, 'Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Toward DAC Guidance', A Joint Project of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and DAC Network on Development Evaluation, Paris](#)

The past decade has seen growing numbers of governments and organisations devote resources to interventions intended to avert or end conflict. How can these be evaluated? This represents a step in the development of practical evaluation guidance. Scope, conflict analysis, impacts, skills and tools all need to be considered. Next steps should include donor experimentation with evaluations, an annual review of evaluations and a policy review.

Scheers, G., 2008, 'Assessing Progress on the Road to Peace Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities', Issue Paper, no. 5, European Centre for Conflict Prevention

[See full text](#)

Conflict resolution, conflict transformation and peacebuilding

[Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, E., Dayton, B., and Paffenholz, T., 2009, 'Evaluation in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding', in Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, eds., D. J. D. Sandole, S. Byrne, I. Sandole-Staroste, and J. Senehi, Routledge, Oxon and New York, pp. 286-299](#)

Why is evaluation essential in conflict resolution and peacebuilding work? How can traditional evaluations be adapted for this purpose? This chapter examines the difficulties and possibilities of evaluating conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives. Renewed attention to evaluation strengthens connections between peacebuilding theory and practice.

[Lanz, D., Wählich, M., Kirchhoff, L., and Siegfried, M., 2008, 'Evaluating Peace Mediation', Proposal of a General Framework for Evaluating International Mediation Activities, Initiative for Peacebuilding \(IfP\) - Mediation Cluster](#)

How can accountability mechanisms be established for international peace mediation given that it takes place in extremely complex contexts and its contributions are difficult to grasp? This study has developed a framework for evaluating international mediation activities that differ from standard methodologies. It proposes a series of non-suggestive evaluation questions that allow a systematic but flexible assessment of aspects of peace mediation.

[De Coning, C. and Romita, P. 2009, 'Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations' International Peace Institute, New York](#)

It is difficult to make causal linkages between inputs and outcomes due to the complex nature of conflict. Donor countries and NGOs would do better to focus instead on the contributions particular activities make towards a desired outcome. Sustainable DDR requires achievements in other areas. DDR evaluation should look across a variety of sectors and consider the political dynamics that affect DDR processes. Identifying M&E benchmarks and indicators can help reconcile competing perspectives of strategic decisions. Other suggestions to improve M&E are: a web-based database of M&E lessons learned; a network to debate M&S issues; policy discussions on M&E at high profile discussion-making forums; and mechanisms to ensure that M&E results are incorporated into decision-making processes.

Church, C., and Rogers, M. M., 2006, 'Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs', Search for Common Ground, Washington, D.C.

[See full text](#)

Stabilisation

[Cohen, C., 2006, 'Measuring Progress in Stabilisation and Reconstruction', Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

Measuring progress is essential to the success of stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. This report examines the shortcomings of current processes, including the tendency to measure implementation rather than impact. Proper assessment tools and reliable measures of progress are needed to enable policymakers to take stock of the challenges before intervening and to continuously track the progress of their efforts towards stabilisation. Political will is also essential to ensure leadership and cooperation across organisational boundaries.

Peace and Security Architecture

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT: COHERENCE, COORDINATION, SEQUENCING AND FUNDING MECHANISMS.....	131
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.....	135
REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE	138
OTHER ACTORS: THE PRIVATE SECTOR	143
OTHER ACTORS: THE MEDIA	144

International and regional engagement: coherence, coordination, sequencing and funding mechanisms

Coherence and coordination

Conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding interventions involve a wide range of internal and external actors, including governments, civil society, the private sector and international and regional agencies. They also entail a broad range of activities that span security, political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and justice dimensions. There is broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programming increases the risk of duplication and inefficient spending; reduces capacity for delivery; and results in a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals, and ultimately weak outcomes on the ground.

The pursuit of coherence helps to manage interdependencies and allows for the development of an overarching strategic framework. There are four elements of coherence (De Coning 2007: 6):

- Agency coherence: consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency
- Whole-of-government coherence: consistency among the policies and actions of different government agencies of a country
- External coherence (harmonisation): consistency among the policies pursued by various external actors in a given country context
- Internal/external coherence (alignment): consistency between the policies of the internal and external actors in a given country context

Coordination is the means through which coherence is pursued. Through coordination tools, such as action plans, common needs assessments and productive division of labour, the various actors involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding can connect to the overall strategic framework. Coherence has been difficult to achieve, however, in part because of resistant organisational behaviour. Governments should give greater attention to organisational dynamics in seeking to promote all four elements of coherence.

In addition to targeted interventions in conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding, changes to other policy areas also need to be coordinated as they can impact (often negatively) on conflict dynamics. These include efforts to combat trafficking of drugs, arms and people; changes in international demand for illicit or illegal goods; and deportations of convicted felons from developed countries to developing countries.

[De Coning, C., 2007, 'Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions', NUPI Report, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo](#)

How important are coherence and coordination in United Nations peacebuilding missions? This study argues that pursuing coherence helps to manage the interdependencies that bind the peacebuilding system together. Coordination is the means through which individual peacebuilding agents can ensure that they are connected to the overall strategic framework. Unless peacebuilding agents, including the Norwegian Government, generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding strategy and operationalise the principle of local ownership, peacebuilding systems will continue to suffer from poor rates of sustainability and success.

[Lotze, W., De Carvalho, G. B., and Kasumba, Y., 2008, 'Peacebuilding Coordination in African Countries: Transitioning from Conflict Case Studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Occasional Paper, vol. 3, no. 1*](#)

How can the coordination of African peacebuilding initiatives be improved? This paper includes case studies from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Liberia. There is much scope for coordination to be improved, particularly among local, internal actors who do not own their national peacebuilding frameworks. Peacebuilding coordination is currently too donor driven.

[Kent, R, 2007, 'The Governance of Global Security and Development: Convergence, Divergence and Coherence', *Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 125 – 165*](#)

How can we explain the lack of coherence within international conflict-handling mechanisms? This article examines the gaps in the international community's conflict-handling mechanisms from the perspective of coherence and organisational behaviour. It finds that organisational behaviour is one explanation for a lack of coherence and the various disconnects within international conflict-handling mechanisms. Ultimately, solutions to the organisational problems that inhibit coherence in international peace-building efforts will depend on political will.

Rintakoski, K. and Autti, M., eds., 2008, 'Comprehensive Approach: Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management', Seminar Publication, Ministry of Defence - Finland, Helsinki
[See full text](#)

[OECD-DAC, 2009, 'Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development', *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee \(OECD-DAC\), Paris*](#)

Integrated, comprehensive and inclusive armed violence reduction (AVR) programmes are an emerging and growing area of development practice around the world. This paper discusses the components of a multi-level AVR approach. Adopting integrated AVR programmes requires understanding of the multi-faceted, multi-level nature of armed violence, application of rigorous diagnostics of local situations and incorporation of local ownership at all levels of programme design and implementation.

For discussion and resources on the UN coherence and coordination, see 'United Nations' in the [international peace and security architecture](#) section of this guide.

For further resources on coherence and coordination, see [whole of government approaches](#) in the GSDRC's fragile states guide.

Sequencing

One of most debated issues with respect to post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding is how to prioritise and sequence the range of necessary interventions. There is consensus among academics, policy makers and practitioners that in post-conflict situations, the immediate need for security is paramount. Without security, all other interventions are likely to fail. Beyond this, the

consensus seems to dissipate. Some advocate that governance and economic stabilisation should take precedence over service delivery and large-scale infrastructure. Others stress that service delivery should be prominent early on to address pressing needs and to provide a 'peace dividend'. Others argue infrastructure projects should begin early in the process both as a base for development and to provide necessary employment.

Sequencing is contextual and should be tailored to the specific needs and requirements of each country. Job creation and income-generation will be more important in some contexts than others. In divided post-conflict societies, repairing fractured social relations is also often an immediate priority. Regardless of how activities are sequenced, it is important to recognise that interventions cannot be rushed. In order to succeed in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, donors may need to remain engaged for a large number of years.

[Timilsina, A., 2006, 'Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritisation and Sequencing of Policies in Post-Conflict Countries', Chapter 9 - 'Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations', RAND dissertation, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, CA](#)

How should policies be prioritised in post-conflict countries and how should they be sequenced? This chapter uses case studies from post-conflict countries to identify a framework to help policymakers better navigate the complexities and challenges of prioritisation and sequencing. It argues that in the early stages of post-conflict security should be prioritised, along with humanitarian and relief efforts; governance and democratisation; economic stabilisation and reforms; and large-scale infrastructure and long-term development. Sequencing should be non-linear, context-dependent and specific to the needs and requirements of each country.

[Chand, S. and Coffman, R., 2008, 'How Soon Can Donors Exit From Post-Conflict States?', Working Paper no. 141, Centre for Global Development, Washington, DC](#)

When can donors successfully exit from post-conflict states? The answer, according to this analysis, is in decades. In Liberia, Mozambique, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste, the best case scenario for successful exit ranges from 15 to 27 years. Successful exit entails the creation of sufficient fiscal space to fund the recurrent budget from internally generated revenues. Extended donor presence provides space for the creation and maturation of institutions capable of preventing the state from rolling back into failure.

[Suhrke, A., Buckmaster, J., 2006, 'Aid, Growth and Peace: A Comparative Analysis', Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 337 – 363](#)

What factors shape the sequencing of post-war aid? What effect do aid patterns have on the long- and short-term stability of peace? This article maps patterns of post-war aid in order to identify patterns of sequencing and magnitude. It finds that contrary to other studies and conventional wisdom, post-war aid is not always front-loaded immediately after peace and then rapidly phased out. Instead, post-war aid has followed a variety of patterns, influenced by the political contexts of donation and implementation.

Financing

Financing in post-conflict situations impacts the choice of interventions, the power and responsibility of different groups, and the balance of meeting short-term needs with long-term development. Financing shortfalls can be difficult to estimate as they are rarely based on needs assessments.

There are also debates concerning the sequencing of financing. Some scholars and practitioners argue that aid should be concentrated in earlier phases when the demands for multiple recovery

programmes are greatest as well as the need to quickly provide jobs and protection to 'at risk' groups. They also assert that investment in capacity building is required upfront. Others argue that the absence of absorptive capacity in the immediate post-conflict period means that aid should peak a few years after a crisis in order to be used effectively.

Trust funds are a form of financing that allows aid to be collected upfront but dispersed gradually. Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) have been adopted in recent years in order to improve donor coordination. They are established ideally in close connection with a comprehensive needs assessment, with extensive involvement of donors, aid agencies and local authorities. This allows for a shared understanding of the pressing needs and methods of addressing them. It is also advocated that MDTFs are linked to recipient country budgets so that a balance can be struck between immediate post-conflict priorities and long-term institutional development.

It is also important that local organisations and NGOs are not by-passed in recovery and peacebuilding programming and financing; they are often the only ones capable of implementing activities on the ground.

[Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010 'Transition Financing: Building a Better Response' OECD, Paris](#)

Aid modalities have been working poorly in post-conflict or 'transition' situation and must be more effective, rapid and flexible. Aid architecture should respond to the long-term, non-linear nature of transition rather than be compartmentalised into humanitarian and development modalities with their corresponding constraints. Pooled funding such as MDTFs have been shown to be useful tools especially when they are based on proper needs assessments. Sometimes they have been slow to operate and inadequately responsive to needs. This has occasionally led to a proliferation of other instruments without sufficient clarity and co-ordination between them. A funding "mix" may best release funds responsively and handle the inherent trade-offs between quick delivery and capacity building.

[Schiavo-Campo, S., 2003, 'Financing and Aid Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations', World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

What does the international experience with post-conflict reconstruction tell us about financing modalities and aid arrangements in post-conflict situations? Are there a series of recommendations that emerge from the experiences of post conflict countries? This paper looks at the experience of aid funds in four post-conflict environments. In a general sense a pre-requisite for post-conflict reconstruction and effective financing, is the establishment and maintenance of peace.

[GSDRC, 2007, 'Post-conflict Recovery: Financing and Coordination Instruments', Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Birmingham](#)

There has been a push in recent years towards greater coordination and pooled financing mechanisms to promote sustainable post-conflict recovery. Donor coordination is facilitated through negotiated strategic frameworks, which articulate a shared vision, action plan and productive division of labour; and through common needs assessments. Pledging conferences, (the more common form of financing recovery in the past) have been criticised for non-delivery or late delivery of funds and a donor-driven agenda. Pooled funds can correct for these shortcomings and foster greater coordination. They come in the form of Post-Conflict Funds (small grants for flexible, smaller scale interventions), Multi-Donor Trust Funds (for large scale collaborative programmes) and the proposed Strategic Post-Conflict Recovery Facility (a flexible fund that would bridge the gap after emergency relief tapers). These un-earmarked funds would also allow financing to be channelled through the local government.

Cutillo, A., 2006, 'International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict. A Review of Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding', Policy Paper, International Peace Academy, New York

[See full text](#)

Case Studies

[IDA, 2007, 'Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Reconstruction to Development', International Development Association \(IDA\) at Work, World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

This brief stresses that such strong engagement early on was critical since the financial package offered the prospect of reconstruction and return to normalcy, which helped to secure the peace deal. In the first few post-war years, financing was made under simplified procedures due to BiH's initial weak absorptive and managing capacity. The brief also emphasises that repairing fractured social relations should be an immediate post-war priority. This can be assisted through community development initiatives, such as small infrastructure projects, micro-finance for new local businesses, and grants to NGOs to strengthen civil society and protect vulnerable groups. Longer-term goals include developing a market economy, reforming the public sector and building state capacity so that it can provide a social safety net; as well as constructing larger infrastructure, such as a motorway linking BiH to neighbouring European countries.

[IDA, 2007, 'Sierra Leone: Recovering from Years of Conflict', International Development Association \(IDA\) at Work, World Bank, Washington, DC](#)

In 1997, the World Bank administered a multi-donor trust fund for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The basic security that this DDR programme provided paved the way for reconstruction and economic recovery, critical for a transition to peace. In subsequent years, IDA worked with other donors to support government efforts to rehabilitate schools, clinics, markets and roads; and NGO training and employment programmes – all of which promoted the return of internally displaced persons, refugees and former combatants. In 2003, donors greatly enhanced their coordination of public financial management reforms; they provided multi-donor budget support that underpinned a full poverty reduction strategy, as opposed to funding select reforms. One of the key lessons learned is that significant up-front investment in capacity building of implementing agencies is crucial.

International peace and security architecture

Peace and security architecture refers to the collection of organisations, mechanisms, and relationships through which the international, regional and local communities manage conflict, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

This section focuses on the United Nations, which remains the key institution in charge of international peace and security; and international financial institutions.

United Nations

The United Nations has sought to implement a number of organisational reforms in recent years. Among them is the adoption of an integrated mission concept that aims to engage the various capabilities within the UN system in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. This is to be achieved through the establishment of a common strategic objective and comprehensive operational approach among the various agencies of the UN. The goal is to maximise UN contributions in countries emerging from conflict. Such reforms have been hindered, however, by the absence of adequate organisational change and accompanying incentives and mechanisms to

encourage UN agencies to pool resources, consolidate rules and procedures, and invest in collaborative efforts.

The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, mandated in 2005, is an attempt to provide coherence to and coordination of peacebuilding missions. The mandate of the Commission is: to bring together all relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, and troop contributing countries; to marshal resources and predictable financing; to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; and where appropriate, to highlight any gaps that threaten to undermine peace. Recent evaluation of the Commission indicates that it has managed to create linkages between political, security, development and financial actors and to promote long-term attention to recovery and peacebuilding processes. Difficulties with coordination persist, however.

Hybrid operations are another possible mechanism for cooperation and coordination. Most have thus far consisted of either *ad hoc* short-term military support to a UN operation or the deployment of the UN in a long-term mission that takes over from a short-term regional intervention. The joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, launched in 2007, is the first time that a comprehensive hybrid operation has been adopted. The hybrid operation in this case was designed in large part because of the rejection by the Sudanese government of a UN presence. The way in which hybrid operations have been carried out has been critiqued, however, for attempting to match capacities from different organisations without providing the necessary mechanisms or political arrangements for coordination. There have been concerns about command and control mechanisms and methods of accountability.

United Nations, 2009, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict', Report, no. A/63/881-S/2009/304, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, New York

[See full text](#)

[Campbell, S. P. and Kaspersen, A. T., 2008, 'The UN's Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 15, no. 4, pp 470-485](#)

Have the UN integration reforms introduced between 1997 and 2007 increased efficiency and effectiveness in multidimensional peace operations? What are the barriers to better integration between UN agencies? This article argues that the reforms have largely ignored the barriers to their implementation – such as the fragmentation of the UN structure and the complexity of war-to-peace transitions. Reform impact has been greatly diminished by the absence of accompanying incentives or effective organisational change backed by long-term political engagement and support.

[CIC/IPI, 2008, 'Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission' Centre on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute, New York](#)

How successful is the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)? This paper commissioned three years after the creation of the PBC assesses progress made and makes suggestions for enhanced impact. Continued focus on performance by all stakeholders will be necessary if the PBC is to (a) consolidate its positive impact on cases undertaken to date, and (b) extend its reach to new cases. In selecting new cases, the PBC should consider the potential to solidify its role as the central international meeting ground of political/security and financial/development actors.

[Andersen, L., 2007, 'UN Peace Operations in the 21st Century: State-building and Hybridity', *Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen*](#)

How have global peace operations evolved in the past decade? What challenges do these trends create? This paper maps recent United Nations led and delegated peace operations. It identifies two major trends in policy and practice: State-building interventions and hybrid operations. While these may be seen as pragmatic solutions to political problems, they also raise serious questions about accountability.

For further discussion and resources on the United Nations architecture, see the [peacekeeping](#) section of this guide. For resources on the UN Peacebuilding Commission in particular, see the [peacebuilding](#) sections of this guide.

International Financial Institutions

The international trend toward greater inter-agency cooperation and harmonisation in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction has extended to the international financial institutions (IFIs). The World Bank has traditionally distanced itself from matters related to conflict due to its non-political mandate. The increasing calls for World Bank participation and a growing recognition of the linkages between security and development have resulted in greater engagement by the World Bank in conflict contexts. The Bank has since emerged as a key player in coordinating and administering international support for post-conflict recovery.

The IFIs have also increasingly recognised that their policies must be adapted in conflict-affected countries and that conventional economic goals and activities will not automatically result in peacebuilding, and in some cases may be contrary to securing the peace. Instead new innovations may be required, for example, incorporating horizontal equity impact assessments into policy formulation and project appraisal; and rethinking the push for macroeconomic stabilisation, in particular cuts in government spending and potential tradeoffs with political stabilisation.

[Boyce, J.K., 2004, 'The International Financial Institutions: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Capacities', Paper prepared for the Centre on International Cooperation, Seminar on 'Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management', 8-9 June, Copenhagen](#)

Do the international financial institutions (IFIs) have the capacity to respond effectively in the planning and implementation of the civilian components of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding? This study suggests that the World Bank has gone further than other IFIs in addressing the distinctive challenges posed by engagement in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. However, there are areas where capacity building could enhance the effectiveness of their contributions. To respond effectively, the IFIs cannot stick to the same policies they would follow if a country has never had a civil war.

[Lie, J. H. S., 2008, 'The World Bank and Conflicts: From Narrow Rules to Broader Principles', NUPI Report, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo](#)

What is the relevance of the World Bank (WB) to conflicts, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction? This study argues that the WB's new operational policies promote a stronger inclination for the Bank to engage in conflict situations. Full participation in a Comprehensive Approach involving civil and military actors is still difficult. However, the WB is important to such an approach and it should be consulted and listened to on matters of reconstruction and development.

Bell, E., 2008, 'The World Bank in Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries: "How", Not "How Much"', International Alert, London

[See full text](#)

Regional peace and security architecture

Violent conflicts often involve regional causes, dynamics and impacts, such as insecurity and poor governance in neighbouring countries, the presence of cross-border rebel groups, regional illicit trading networks in arms and high-value resources, refugee flows, destruction of cross-border infrastructure and other humanitarian and development spill-over effects.

Regional organisations have increasingly begun to work to promote peace and security. They may be considered more effective and legitimate external actors for conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding than the United Nations and other international actors. They are also more likely to have an interest in preventing, containing or resolving conflicts in their region. Their approaches range from diplomacy, to peacekeeping, to regional cooperation over infrastructure and regional public goods. The level of engagement and effectiveness varies, however, across regions and among regional and sub-regional organisations. Literature on regional organisations document that the rise in assertiveness, self-assurance and capacity of the leading regional peace and security bodies in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has not been paralleled in the rest of Asia or in the Middle East. In addition, effectiveness is often not determinable by official organisational mandates. Economic organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for example, have developed effective peacemaking capacities.

Despite the rise in prominence of regional bodies, research highlights that in practice, they can, similar to the UN, suffer from internal divisions, a lack of common values (with the exception of the European Union) and inflexibility. In addition, many lack adequate institutions, procedures and capacity and can serve purely to legitimate regional policies of their member states or to lock out or lock in selected states during the negotiation processes.

The rise of strong regional actors has also resulted in innovative coalitions in the South, with the inauguration of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum in 2003. IBSA could play a crucial role – within the framework of South-South cooperation – in addressing conventional non-traditional security threats in the contemporary global order, such as terrorism, drugs and drug-related crimes, transnational organised crime, illegal weapons traffic, and threats to public health, in particular HIV/AIDS.

[Wulf, H., 2009, 'The Role of Regional Organisations in Conflict Prevention and Resolution' in Still Under Construction: Regional Organisations' Capacities for Conflict Prevention', ed. H. Wulf, INEF Report 97, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, pp. 5-19](#)

What role do regional organisations have in conflict prevention and resolution? Due to an overburdened UN system, the international community has increasingly tasked regional organisations with conflict prevention and peacekeeping. This chapter outlines why regional organisations have played such a marginal role in the past. There are still weaknesses in regional organisations' conflict prevention and management functions which will limit their future role.

[Soko, M., 2007, 'IBSA Regional Security Dimensions: The South African Perspective', Policy: Issues and Actors, vol. 20, no. 6, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg](#)

In response to the high level of conflict and insecurity across the continent, African countries now seek to broaden the security issue by emphasising non-military security threats. However, this new paradigm poses the challenge of reconciling national sovereignty and non-interference with the more assertive security agenda championed by regional and sub-regional formations.

For further resources on regional peace and security architecture, see responsibility to protect in the [peacekeeping](#) section of this guide.

Africa

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2002 was an important step in developing a new African peace and security architecture. In comparison to its predecessor, which was hamstrung by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of its member states, the AU is more proactive and has adopted principles and norms that relate to the responsibility to protect. In addition, there is an increasing recognition and codification of a broader notion of security that encompasses non-military aspects. The NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) initiative has been instrumental in emphasising the links between development, peace and security. Regional Economic Communities (e.g. ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa) have also been incorporated into the African peace and security architecture – and have varied experience and efficacy in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts hampered by a lack of effective crisis response structures. Failure of progress by regional and sub-regional organisations has, by some, been attributed to an entrenched political culture that endorses the use of force and mutual intervention by states in each other's conflicts and domestic affairs.

The new peace and security architecture in Africa under the direction of the AU includes the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Stand-By Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Panel of the Wise and the African Peace Facility (APF).

The PSC has had a mixed record since its launch in 2004. The PSC has played significant roles in conflict management in Burundi and Comoros and was quick to expel Mauritania and Togo following their *coups d'états*. However the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia was ignored despite this intervention lacking a mandate and Sudan has successfully obstructed several deliberations on Darfur.

Future objectives are to strengthen the mediation and conflict prevention aspects of PSC; institutionalise this mediation expertise and experience in the PSC and AU; and to form a unit within the PSC to monitor and evaluate the evolving dynamics of a conflict.

The ASF, which was scheduled to be operational by 2010, seeks to act as a rapid response force. It will be available for activities ranging from preventative deployments and observer missions to peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and post-conflict activities. The ASF when ready could be adopted for hybrid operations, in which the AU deploys first followed by the UN. There are concerns, however that the ASF has focused too much on the military components and that more attention is required to develop the civilian dimension, including child protection, gender issues, human rights, civil affairs, economic recovery and HIV/AIDS issues.

Together with regional early warning systems, the CEWS is set to anticipate and prevent conflicts in Africa through collecting data and information. This is to support PSC decision-making and to guide ASF deployment. The Panel of the Wise acts as a consultative body to the PSC on peace and security issues and is deployed in preventative diplomacy. The aim of the APF is to cover conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation as well as to accelerate decision-making and coordination processes.

The literature on Africa's peace and security architecture finds that progress has been made in creating a sound architecture that can act effectively to protect regional peace and security. This is evident for example in the AU's ability to act at the political level to mandate peacekeeping missions and the steps it has taken to establish the ASF. Key challenges remain, however – for example, the lack of political will to intervene in the affairs of sovereign countries; as well as the lack of adequate financial resources to meet demands, and the inability displayed thus far by African organisations to mobilise such resources. External support is essential – and donors have become increasingly involved in helping to develop the regional architecture. Donor involvement has centred on capacity-building for the political and administrative structures; support for early warning systems; and enhancing military capacities.

[Klingebl, S. et al., 2008, 'Donor Contributions to the Strengthening of the African Peace and Security Architecture', German Development Institute, Bonn](#)

How can the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) be strengthened? What is the role of external support? This analyses how external support for the new APSA is changing. African reform dynamics, the emerging international security agenda and the complex relationship between security approaches and development policy have led external actors to search for new approaches across foreign, security and development policy areas.

[Williams, P., 2009, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating an Embryonic International Institution' The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 603-626](#)

How has the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union helped promote peace, security and stability on the African continent? This paper evaluates the PSC in terms of the significance of PSC deliberations and official statements; its political relevance; its efficiency and productivity; and the extent to which it should be considered the best placed institution to deal with Africa's security challenges. It concludes that the PSC has had mixed results and its future will hinge on whether more AU members will devote it greater resources.

[Aning, K. and Atuobi, S., 2009, 'Responsibility to Protect in Africa: An Analysis of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture', Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 90-113](#)

What is the best way to develop 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) norms in Africa? This article from the journal Global Responsibility to Protect argues that collaborative ventures between the African Union (AU) at the continental level, the regional economic communities (RECs) at the sub-regional level and the UN at the global level are the best options for deepening R2P norms. The AU's attempt to solve the continent's problems will continue to be thwarted by its lack of political will and the weakening of its norms and principles by some member states.

Dersso, S. A., 2010, 'The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture', ISS Paper no. 209, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

[See full text](#)

El Abdellaoui, J., 2009, 'The Panel of the Wise. A Comprehensive Introduction to a Critical Pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture,' ISS Paper 193, Institute for Security Studies,

[See full text](#)

[Healy, S., 2009, 'Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security', Paper no. 59 \(series 2\), Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London](#)

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organisation of seven East African countries, aiming to achieve regional peace, prosperity and integration. When member states fuel military action even while participating in peace talks, however, what can

IGAD achieve? This paper assesses IGAD's development and contribution to two major peace processes, in Sudan and Somalia. Despite a significant influence on the outcomes, IGAD is undermined by weak institutional systems and an entrenched political culture of military aggression across the region.

[van Jaarsveld, S. and Mottiar, S., 2009, 'Mediating Peace in Africa: Securing Conflict Prevention - Strengthening the Mediation and Conflict Prevention Aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture' African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes \(ACCORD\) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland](#)

How can the African Union's mediation and conflict prevention mechanisms be strengthened? This seminar report assesses the evolving African peace and security architecture and presents five key recommendations for its future development. It argues that the AU's partnerships should be strengthened, mediation work institutionalised, early warning systems established, lesson-learning institutionalised and that civil society should become more involved in mediation processes.

For additional discussion and resources on the African peace and security architecture, see the [peacekeeping](#) and [third party mediation](#) sections of this guide.

Asia

As noted in the outset, apart from Southeast Asia – and its Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), there are few prominent regional organisations in the rest of Asia involved in peace and security.

In contrast to most regions, the peace and security architecture in Asia has primarily involved informal mechanisms. The ASEAN approach has focused on 'softer' aspects, such as regional understanding, trust and long term relationships, as methods of conflict prevention and conflict management.

The absence of comprehensive Charter provisions addressing conflict prevention and management has not hindered ASEAN's recent movement into conflict prevention and management, in particular its ceasefire monitoring in Aceh and conflict prevention efforts in Cambodia and Burma. ASEAN continues, however, to place primacy on sovereignty and non-interference.

[Swanström, N., 2005, 'Regional Cooperation and Conflict Prevention', Chapter 4 in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia, ed. N. Swanström, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Washington, DC and Nacka, Sweden, pp. 71-101](#)

What is the future of regional cooperation and conflict prevention? This chapter discusses the links between regional cooperation and conflict prevention. Conflicts often have regional implications, dimensions and connections that necessitate a multilateral approach to conflict prevention. Effective regional cultures of prevention are needed, and these require agreement on core values and increased trust between member states. Regional, national and international actors need to engage in a process to redirect norms and values towards prevention and long term strategies.

Europe

Although the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are structured very differently, there are functional crossovers in the fields of diplomacy, civilian crisis management, and more generally in areas such as the promotion of democracy and human rights. The two organisations have cooperated in the past, for example, in efforts to

promote conflict prevention and political and economic stability in Southeast Europe. Joint efforts could also be beneficial for conflict prevention activities in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Cooperation in the field may not always contribute to long-term conflict prevention, however. The EU's acceptance of Estonia and Latvia as EU candidates and later as members, for example, undermined the OSCE's efforts to persuade governments of the two countries to protect minority rights.

[Stewart, E., 2008, 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 266-284](#)

Is cooperation with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) important to the European Union (EU)? Could an EU-OSCE partnership end OSCE's current crisis? This paper examines EU-OSCE relations, outlining modes of co-operation and overlap in objectives. The OSCE, with its inclusive membership and consensus-based approach, remains a relevant and essential actor in European security. Its current political crisis should not jeopardise EU commitment to cooperation.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean are considered to be among the more peaceful regions in the world. With the exception of Columbia, there are no ongoing violent conflicts or imminent threats of violent conflict. There are concerns, however, that weak states and unresolved structural tensions have the possibility to eventually evolve into violent confrontations. The region's security agenda focuses mainly on non-traditional security threats, such as illegal drug trafficking and money laundering, the illicit trafficking of firearms, corruption, transnational organised crime, the consequences of global warming as well as HIV/AIDS.

The Organisation of American States (OAS) is the region's primary peace and security organisation. The focus of the OAS agenda has historically been on peaceful resolution of inter-state conflicts, but the OAS has in the 1980s and 1990s also engaged in conflict prevention. Successful cases include interventions in Central America, where special peace programmes were set up with the participation of the political leadership and grassroots civil society organisations. Similar to other regional organisations, key challenges faced by the OAS include strongly embedded principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and a lack of political will and difficulties in building consensus among its member states. Efforts to increase civil society involvement in the activities of the OAS, has been blocked in large part by a lack of political will among several member states.

[Jácome, F., 2009, 'Violent Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean' in *Still Under Construction: Regional Organisations' Capacities for Conflict Prevention*, ed. H. Wulf, INEF Report, no. 97, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, pp. 20-39](#)

This case study analyses the main conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean and examines the mechanisms that have been developed to prevent or resolve them. The paradigms that guide debates on the prevention of violent conflict in the region need to be changed. The causes of conflict are cumulative and so prevention should take into account the three interrelated aspects of development, governance and the promotion of a culture of peace.

Serbin, A., 2008, 'The Organisation of American States and Conflict Prevention', Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, New York

[See full text](#)

Other actors: the private sector

Much of the research about the private sector in conflict zones highlights ‘war economies’ – illicit and semi-illicit natural resource exploitation, trade as a means of financing wars, and how profit-seeking business activities contribute to the perpetuation of violence (see the [resource and environmental factors](#) section of this guide). Less attention has been given to the role of the private sector in peacebuilding.

Private sector actors have various motivations to engage in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Violent conflict and instability have a big negative impact on the private sector through decreased investment and access to markets, damaged infrastructure, direct attack, loss of employees, and general costs related to the unpredictability of operating in a conflict environment. In addition to this economic rationale, there is a moral imperative for local business. They form part of the social fabric of a conflict context and experience the trauma and destruction it brings to their own families and communities.

There are multiple ways in which private sector actors can contribute to peacebuilding. These may relate to economic dimensions (e.g. job creation, addressing socioeconomic exclusion); security (e.g. participation in DDR processes; negotiating security with armed groups); reconciliation (participation in dialogue initiatives; joint economic activities across conflict-divides); and political dimensions (e.g. peace advocacy and lobbying; participation in multi-stakeholder political peace-processes).

In order to maximise these potential contributions, there needs to be a more balanced portrayal of the role of the private sector; greater exploration of the various positive roles that private sector actors can play; and better two-way engagement and learning between the NGO community and the corporate sector.

[International Alert, 2006, ‘Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector’, International Alert, London](#)

What role can the domestic private sector play in peacebuilding? This report assembles evidence from case studies to demonstrate that local businesses can contribute to peacebuilding. It argues that the international community should embrace the potential of this ‘peace entrepreneurship’ to provide necessary resources and skills for the promotion of sustainable peace.

[Rettberg, A., 2004, ‘Business-Led Peacebuilding in Colombia: Fad or Future of a Country in Crisis?’, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London](#)

The private sector has often been accused of fuelling armed conflict, but what motivates business-led peace building? What explains business preferences for peaceful solutions at the local level? This paper examines four business initiatives in Colombia that are leading peacebuilding initiatives and mitigating the effects of conflict. It asks what motivated them to become involved in business-led peacebuilding with a view to understanding the wider prospects for business to partner in peace building, while also pointing out potential limits and obstacles.

[Killick, N., et al., 2005, ‘The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding’, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

What peacebuilding role can local business play? Who can partner with business in the interest of peace? This paper explores how to engage local business and with whom it is likely to succeed. Awareness-raising, further research to identify peacebuilding roles and implementation of practical initiatives would strengthen the use of local business as peacebuilders.

[Zandvliet, L., 2005, 'Opportunities for Synergy - Conflict Transformation and the Corporate Agenda', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin](#)

What is the role of business within conflict transformation? Why do companies and conflict transformation advocates have difficulty hearing each other within this debate? This paper argues that there is significant overlap between the corporate and conflict transformation community. However, both parties focus on their differences, rather than mutual interests. Collaboration is required between stakeholders; the obstacles impeding constructive dialogue must be removed.

For further resources on the role of the private sector, see the [socioeconomic recovery](#) section of this guide.

Other actors: the media

Similarly to the case of the private sector, much of the research about the role of media in conflict zones highlights negative aspects – its use as a tool to spread propaganda, indoctrinate, dehumanise and mobilise populations into acts of violence, including collective violence. Yet, in recent years, there has been increasing attention to the positive role that media can play in conflict contexts. This has been matched by increasing donor and NGO interventions in conflict-affected societies to promote the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media to foster long-term peace and stability. Media strategies have included: raising the profile of moderate voices; creating peaceful channels through which differences can be resolved non-violently; and creating a robust media culture that allows citizens to hold government accountable. Activities have ranged from training to provision of equipment; from launching media regulation initiatives to enhancing professional associations; and from supporting individual media to transforming former state radios into public service broadcasters.

It is important to distinguish between support for independent mass media in their role of providing society with a full account of relevant topics, including background and context, and the communication efforts done by peace promoters via the media amongst other channels. Support to mass media has to ensure that the media does not follow any hidden agenda as this is the main source of their credibility, whereas communication activities can target media with tailored information.

Thus, there are various ways the media can play a role in conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding. Various media channels can act as peace promoters, for example, at the start of negotiations in order to build confidence and create a climate conducive to negotiation. The media might also mobilise public support for peace agreements when media reporting is done in a balanced and comprehensive way. Media may have the potential to contribute to conflict transformation and peacebuilding as well by countering stereotypes and misconceptions, promoting empathy and depolarising attitudes by portraying similarities with the 'other', and facilitating dialogue and understanding.

More research is required to determine what is required for media to make a sustainable positive contribution. There should also be greater collaboration between the media and peace professionals. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding professionals can use the media in conjunction with their other programming – and need assistance in determining how they can combine these interventions to have the biggest impact. Media professionals also need to learn about why and when their work can contribute to preventing violent conflict and building peace between groups.

[Bajraktari, Y. and Hsu, E., 2007, 'Developing Media in Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC](#)

What strategies, tool and methods work best in the development of post-war media institutions? In war-torn societies, the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media is critical to fostering long-term peace and stability. This report provides guidance by drawing on best practices from past and present post-war media development efforts. A permanent, indigenous mechanism dedicated to monitoring media development is critical to fostering a healthy, independent media sector. It is particularly important to monitor hate speech.

[Spurk, C., 2002, 'Media and Peacebuilding: Concepts, Actors and Challenges', Swisspeace, Bern](#)

How can media support peacebuilding? Media have played a destructive role in many conflicts; but media programming can also play a positive role, particularly when integrated into an overarching peacebuilding strategy. Free and independent media can also foster democracy. This report summarises concepts of media and peacebuilding and looks at trends and challenges. Media can contribute to peacebuilding through indirect activities (providing non-partisan, balanced information and accountability) and through direct conflict-related programmes.

[Bratic V., and Schirch, L., 2008, 'Why and When to Use the Media for Peacebuilding', GPPAC Issue Paper, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict](#)

How can civil society organisations working in conflict prevention and peacebuilding improve their interactions with the media? Why and when should they use the media? This paper argues that different types of media can bring about different types of change. Information programming can encourage cognitive change by increasing knowledge and framing public discussion. Entertainment programming and advertising encourage attitudinal change. The media rarely directly affects behaviour, but it influences attitudes and opinions that shape behaviour. Behavioural change happens through the cumulative impact of the media and other social institutions; an integrated strategy is important.

James, B., ed., 2004, 'Media: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction', The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Paris

[See full text](#)

Bratic, V., 2009, 'Examining Peace-Oriented Media in Areas of Violent Conflict', Search for Common Ground

[See full text](#)

Case Studies

Bajraktari, Y. and Parajon, C., 2008, 'Media and Conflict: Afghanistan as a Relative Success Story', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC

[See full text](#)

Acayo, C. and Mnjama, N., 2004, 'The Print Media and Conflict Resolution in Northern Uganda', African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 4, no. 1, pp.27-44

[See full text](#)

Paluck, E. L., 2009, 'Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict with the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 96, no. 3, pp. 574-587

[See full text](#)

Šajkaš, M., 2007, 'Transitional Justice and the Role of the Media in the Balkans' Discussion Paper prepared for the International Centre for Transitional Justice

[See full text](#)

Tripathy, S. R., 2007, 'Monitoring a Moving Target: Peace Building Soap Opera in Nepal', Paper presented at the 3rd Symposium Forum Media and Development: Measuring Change in Media Development, September, Bonn

[See full text](#)